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Abstract 
Standby-redundant control using Erlang/OTP and 
JADE for a manufacturing cell 
G.T. Hawkridge 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering 
Stellenbosch University 
Dissertation: Ph.D. (Mechatronic Engineering) 
April 2019 
In past decades, the manufacturing sector has been characterised by intense 
competition resulting from globalisation and shifting customer requirements. This 
has led to the pursuit of approaches and paradigms that better handle the 
requirements of modern manufacturers. This pursuit has culminated in the recent 
focus on the Industry 4.0 and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) paradigms. 
The future manufacturing systems envisioned by these paradigms are increasingly 
complex. The reliability or availability of complex systems is a concern since 
complexity increases the likelihood of unexpected failure modes. Holonic systems 
show great promise for managing this complexity, but they may contain holons 
that represent single points of failure. The availability of these holons can be 
improved through standby redundancy. 
This dissertation evaluates the hypothesis that Erlang/OTP provides an effective 
platform for implementing standby redundancy in a distributed holonic 
manufacturing cell. Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the 
development of fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems. The Open Telecom 
Platform (OTP) is a set of Erlang libraries that simplifies the development of large 
complex systems. OTP is such a central feature of Erlang that they are typically 
referred to collectively, as Erlang/OTP. 
Erlang/OTP’s standby redundancy effectiveness is evaluated in two stages. First, it 
is evaluated through the implementation of standby redundancy for a monolithic 
station controller, the performance of which is benchmarked against the claims of 
an existing commercial solution. This implementation is representative of standby 
redundancy for singular resource holons. The evaluation shows that the 
Erlang/OTP implementation can handle the same failure modes as the commercial 
solution and achieves a similar changeover time. Furthermore, it shows that 
Erlang/OTP is suitable for implementing standby redundancy at a software level 
for embedded devices that do not provide such mechanisms at a hardware level. 
Next, Erlang/OTP’s effectiveness for standby redundancy in a distributed holonic 
cell controller is evaluated through a case study comparison of an Erlang/OTP 
implementation and a Java Agent Development (JADE) framework 
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implementation. JADE is a popular Multi-Agent System framework and has in 
many respects become the de facto standard for holonic control implementations 
in academic research. The two implementations are compared using a set of 
quantitative and qualitative criteria. The comparison demonstrates that the 
Erlang/OTP implementation outperforms the JADE implementation for all the 
standby-redundant performance metrics. This is attributed to the centrality of 
fault-tolerance in Erlang and OTP. The comparison suggests that more 
development effort may be required for a standby-redundant Erlang/OTP holonic 
implementation, since Erlang/OTP does not contain the same degree of 
supporting communication and protocol infrastructure as an established 
framework like JADE. However, Erlang/OTP’s superior performance outweighs this 
shortcoming and the comparison concludes that Erlang/OTP provides a better 
platform for implementing standby redundancy than JADE.   
The findings of both evaluations confirm that Erlang/OTP provides an effective 
platform for implementing standby redundancy in a distributed holonic controller 
for a manufacturing cell. Using Erlang/OTP, the ability to combine standby 
redundancy and holonic control has the potential to improve controller availability 
for the complex distributed systems envisioned by Industry 4.0 and IIoT. 
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Uittreksel 
Bystandsoortollige beheer met gebruik van 
Erlang/OTP en JADE vir 'n vervaardigingsel 
G.T. Hawkridge 
Departement Meganiese en Megatroniese Ingenieurswese  
Universiteit Stellenbosch  
Proefskrif: PhD (Megatroniese Ingenieurswese) 
April 2019 
Vir die afgelope dekades is die vervaardigingsektor gekenmerk deur intense 
kompetisie, voortgebring deur globalisering en veranderende kliëntvereistes. 
Hierdie kompetisie het gelei tot die strewe na benaderings en paradigmas wat die 
vereistes van moderne vervaardigers beter bevredig. Hierdie strewe het uitgeloop 
op die onlangse fokus op Industrie 4.0 en die Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 
paradigmas. 
Toekomstige vervaardigingstelsels, soos beoog deur hierdie paradigmas, is 
toenemend kompleks. Die betroubaarheid en beskikbaarheid van komplekse 
stelsels wek kommer omdat die kompleksiteit die waarskynlikheid van 
onverwagte falingsmodusse verhoog. Holoniese stelsels is belowend vir die 
hantering van hierdie kompleksiteit, maar sulke stelsels mag steeds enkel-
falingspunte bevat. Die beskikbaarheid van hierdie stelsels kan verbeter word deur 
bystandsoortolligheid. 
Hierdie proefskrif evalueer die hipotese dat Erlang/OTP ‘n doeltreffende platform 
bied vir die implementering van bystandsoortolligheid in ‘n verspreide, holoniese 
vervaardigingsel. Erlang is ‘n funksionele programmeringstaal wat ontwerp is vir 
die ontwikkeling van fout-verdraagsame, sagte-waretyd-beheerstelsels. Die Open 
Telecom Platform (OTP) is ‘n versameling Erlang programmateke wat die 
ontwikkeling van groot, komplekse stelsels vergemaklik. OTP is só ‘n sentrale deel 
van Erlang dat hul gewoonlik saam na verwys word as Erlang/OTP. 
Die doeltreffendheid van Erlang/OTP se bystandsoortolligheid word in twee fases 
geëvalueer. Eers word dit geëvalueer deur die implementasie van 
bystandsoortolligheid vir ‘n monolitiese werkstasiebeheerder, waarvan die 
verrigting met ‘n bestaande kommersiële oplossing vergelyk word. Hierdie 
implementasie is verteenwoordigend van die gebruik van Erlang/OTP om ‘n enkele 
hulpbron (resource) holon te implementeer. Die evaluasie wys dat die Erlang/OTP 
implementasie dieselfde falingsmodusse as die kommersiële oplossing kan 
hanteer en eenderse oorgangstye behaal. Verder wys dit dat Erlang/OTP gepas is 
vir die implementasie van bystandsoortolligheid in ‘n sagteware-vlak vir 
ingebedde toestelle wat nie vir sulke meganismes op ‘n hardware-vlak voorsiening 
maak nie. 
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Volgende is Erlang/OTP se doeltreffendheid vir bystandsoortolligheid in ‘n 
verspreide holoniese selbeheerder geëvalueer deur middel van ‘n gevallestudie-
vergelyking tussen implementasies in die Erlang/OTP en Java Agent Development 
(JADE) raamwerke. JADE is ‘n gewilde raamwerk vir multi-agentstelsels en het die 
de facto standaard vir holoniese beheerimplementasies in akademiese navorsing 
geword. Die twee implementasies word vergelyk deur gebruik te maak van ‘n stel 
kwantitatiewe en kwalitatiewe kriteria. Die vergelyking demonstreer dat die 
Erlang/OTP implementasie die JADE implementasie uitpresteer in al die 
bystandsoortolligheid-werkverrigtingsmaatstawwe. Dit kan toegeskryf word aan 
die sentraliteit van fout-verdraagsaamheid in Erlang en OTP. Die vergelyking dui 
wel daarop dat meer ontwikkelingsmoeite benodig mag word om 
bystandsoortolligheid in Erlang/OTP te implementeer, aangesien Erlang/OTP nie 
dieselfde vlak van ondersteunende kommunikasie- en protokolinfrastruktuur 
voorsien as ‘n gevestigde raamwerk soos JADE nie. Tog oortref die werkverrigting 
van Erlang/OTP hierdie tekortkoming en die vergelyking bereik die gevolgtrekking 
dat Erlang/OTP ‘n beter platform vir bystandsoortolligheid bied as JADE. 
Die bevindinge van beide evaluasies bevestig dat Erlang/OTP ‘n doeltreffende 
platform vir die implementasie van bystandsoortolligheid in ‘n verspreide, 
holoniese beheerder vir ‘n vervaardigingstelsel bied. Die kombinasie van 
bystandsoortolligheid en holoniese beheer in Erlang/OTP het die potensiaal om 
beheerderbeskikbaarheid vir komplekse, verspreide stelsels, soos beoog deur 
Industrie 4.0 en IIOT, te verbeter. 
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1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter provides the background and context for the research 
presented in this dissertation. The objectives and contributions of this research 
are presented, followed by a motivation of their importance. The methodology 
that was followed in pursuing these objectives is then described. Finally, this 
dissertation’s structure is outlined. 
1.1. Background 
In the past decades the manufacturing sector has been characterised by intense 
competition resulting from globalisation and shifting customer requirements. To 
better handle this competition, the manufacturing sector has been pursuing 
manufacturing systems and paradigms which provide shorter lead times, 
increased product customisation, flexible production capacity, real-time feedback, 
lower costs and improved resource efficiency (Bi et al., 2008; Lasi et al., 2014).  
Various paradigms, such as flexible manufacturing systems (FMSs) and 
reconfigurable manufacturing systems (RMSs), have been investigated with 
varying levels of success. This investigation continues with the recent focus on 
Industry 4.0, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and the Industrial Internet of Things 
(IIoT) (Brettel et al., 2014; Bi, Xu & Wang 2014; Gerbert et al., 2015). With these 
progressions, modern manufacturing systems are becoming increasingly 
distributed and complex.  
The reliability or availability of such complex systems is a significant concern. 
Availability here refers to the percentage of time for which a system is ready and 
able to perform its expected functions. The reduced availability of critical 
subsystems (such as controllers) can have significant financial implications due to 
lost productivity and may lead to reduced product quality or missed deadlines. 
The holonic paradigm has been highlighted as a promising tool for managing 
complexity, changes and disturbances in systems (Monostori et al., 2016). Holonic 
manufacturing control maintains the global control and optimisation potential of 
hierarchical structures, while leveraging the improved flexibility and fault-
tolerance of heterarchical structures. 
Standby redundancy is a common approach for improving the availability of 
traditional manufacturing control systems. For standby-redundant control there is 
a single primary controller and one or more backup controllers which takeover as 
primary when the current primary experiences a fault (described in greater detail 
in section 2.4.3.2). In this dissertation standby redundancy is considered for 
improving the availability of holons in a holonic control architecture. 
This dissertation contributes to research by the Mechatronics, Automation and 
Design Research Group, at the Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic 
Engineering of Stellenbosch University, into control solutions for modern 
manufacturing systems. This research follows on from research by Kruger (2018) 
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which evaluated Erlang as an alternative to multi-agent systems (MAS) for the 
implementation of holonic control in a RMS. 
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems (Armstrong, 1996). The Open 
Telecom Platform (OTP) is a set of Erlang libraries that simplifies the development 
of large complex systems (Armstrong, 2010). OTP is such a central feature of Erlang 
that they are typically referred to collectively, as Erlang/OTP. 
1.2. Objectives and Contributions 
This dissertation evaluates the following hypothesis: 
Erlang/OTP is an effective platform for implementing standby-redundant 
control in a distributed holonic manufacturing cell.  
This hypothesis is evaluated through the case study implementation of a standby-
redundant holonic controller for a singulation and feeder cell in an assembly line. 
This implementation is developed around the PROSA reference architecture since 
it provides a proven and well-known foundation. 
The objectives of this dissertation use the concepts of a manufacturing cell and of 
a manufacturing station (shortened form of workstation). These concepts are 
understood to have the following definitions: 
• A manufacturing cell is a grouping of stations that perform a single, or set 
of similar, production tasks. The production tasks performed by a cell are 
usually compound and/or performed for multiple product instances 
simultaneously.  
• In the context of a cell, a station is a set of manufacturing equipment that 
performs a specific manufacturing task. This manufacturing equipment 
may be fully automated or utilised by an operator. The tasks performed by 
a station are typically elementary manufacturing operations (i.e. 
singulation, riveting, part pick and place) and are usually only applied to a 
single product instance at a time. 
Station-level control is focussed on the execution of the manufacturing 
equipment. This includes managing sensors and coordinating actuators. Cell-level 
control is focussed on coordinating the execution of the stations. This includes 
managing the information and material flow throughout the cell. In this 
dissertation, the cell level control is achieved using a holonic architecture within 
which the stations are represented by singular resource holons.  
This dissertation considers the implementation of standby redundancy for a 
holonic cell in two stages; 
• First, standby redundancy for a singular station controller. This standby 
redundancy implementation is representational of standby redundancy for 
singular resource holons. Special attention is given to complications that 
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arise due to the coupling between the holon’s software entity and the 
physical equipment it represents. 
• Next, the ability to implement standby redundancy for resource holons is 
expanded to achieve standby redundancy within a holonic cell controller. 
Consideration is given to maintaining communication integrity within the 
cell in the presence of standby redundancy events. 
Although this dissertation considers cell-level control where the resource holons 
are singular, these resource holons could in fact be compound (i.e. lower order 
holarchies) due to the fractal nature of holonic architectures. It is therefore 
expected that many of the proposed approaches and findings can applied or 
adapted to higher levels of holonic control. 
This research is the first evaluation of standby-redundant control using Erlang/OTP 
for manufacturing and offers the following contributions: 
• An implementation approach for standby redundancy in a 
monolithic/centralised station controller using Erlang/OTP.  
• A review and evaluation of rollback conversation recovery protocols based 
on the requirements of holonic manufacturing control. 
• An evaluation of the redundancy requirements for a PROSA-based holonic 
controller. 
• An implementation approach for standby redundancy in a distributed 
holonic cell controller using Erlang/OTP. 
• An approach for achieving process specialisation in Erlang/OTP. 
• An implementation approach for agent standby redundancy in JADE. 
• An evaluation and comparison of two distributed standby-redundant 
implementations, using Erlang/OTP and JADE, for a distributed holonic 
manufacturing cell controller. 
1.3. Motivation 
Industry 4.0 is characterised by several concepts, such as cloud-computing, IIoT 
and Big Data, that are radically different to those of traditional manufacturing 
systems (Almada-Lobo, 2016). These concepts lead to dramatic increases in 
system complexity, especially for small- and medium size manufacturers 
(Schumacher et al., 2016). According to Thames & Schaefer (2016), managing 
complexity is one of the limiting factors in the application of Industry 4.0 concepts. 
The reliability of these complex systems is concerning, since as the complexity of 
a system increases, so does the likelihood of failure mechanisms that are not 
anticipated by the designers (Sagan, 2004). 
Due to the sheer number of control devices required for IIoT systems, embedded 
systems, such as microcontrollers, are likely to play a vital role since they are 
flexible and inexpensive (Wan et al., 2016; Jazdi, 2014). However, low cost 
embedded devices do not typically undergo strict quality assurance procedures 
and their reliability may therefore be a concern. 
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Holonic control has been proposed as a solution for managing the complexity of 
Industry 4.0 systems (Monostori et al., 2016). Holonic control inherently allows for 
functional redundancy. Functional redundancy here refers to the existence of 
multiple holons that offer the same capability. Even though holonic systems will, 
in general, continue operating in the presence of holon failure (for holons that 
have functional redundancy), this holon failure will reduce the functionality or 
capacity of the system, leading to bottlenecks and possible system failure. 
Additionally, certain holon types do not allow for functional redundancy and may 
therefore represent single points of failure. 
Standby redundancy is a common mechanism for handling single points of failure 
in traditional manufacturing control system. Standby redundancy is therefore 
considered for improving the availability of individual holons in a holonic 
architecture. 
Erlang/OTP is not widely known in the manufacturing systems’ academic 
community; however, it has a strong track record in the telecommunication and 
web industries. Erlang/OTP is well suited to large scale message handling systems, 
which is a primary contributor to its success in the telecommunication and web 
industries. A prominent example of this is WhatsApp, which used Erlang/OTP to 
develop a high-reliability, massively-scalable messaging service that serves more 
than 450 million users (O’Connell, 2014). Erlang/OTP should therefore be 
considered as a candidate for use in Industry 4.0 and IIoT systems, since the 
handling of large volumes of communication traffic is a key concern in these 
systems. 
As far as its suitability for manufacturing control is concerned, according to Kruger 
(2018), Erlang is an effective platform for the implementing holonic control and 
has several advantages over existing MAS frameworks in this regard. Furthermore, 
Erlang/OTP has been used to achieve a technology readiness level 7 for the control 
implementation of a 3D printing factory (Valckenaers & Van Brussel, 2015). 
Erlang/OTP has several characteristics that make it an attractive candidate for the 
implementation of standby redundancy in holonic control. Fault tolerance is one 
of the core development objectives for Erlang/OTP, due to its initial intended 
usage for high reliability telecommunication systems. This focus on fault tolerance 
has shaped many of the platform’s philosophies and features (described in section 
3.3). Furthermore, Erlang/OTP has a strong heritage in embedded systems; one of 
Erlang’s earliest successes was in Ericsson’s AXD301 asynchronous transfer mode 
switch. More recently, Erlang/OTP has been used by GRiSP to create robust 
embedded controllers (Anonymous, s.a. (a)). This embedded system heritage 
enables an Erlang/OTP standby-redundancy approach to be used to improve the 
availability of low-level control systems, developed using low-cost embedded 
devices, as well as higher-level holonic control architectures. 
Through Erlang/OTP, the ability to combine standby redundancy and holonic 
control has the potential to improve controller availability for the complex 
distributed systems envisioned by Industry 4.0 and IIoT. 
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1.4. Methodology 
To evaluate the effectiveness of Erlang/OTP for implementing standby-redundant 
control in a distributed holonic manufacturing cell, this dissertation uses case 
study evaluations. Although a case study, by its nature, provides a restricted 
context, the key results of the study should be transferable to other situations if 
the case study contains elements that are typical of practical applications. This 
dissertation considers case study implementations for a singulation and feeder cell 
in an assembly line. 
In this dissertation, Erlang/OTP is first evaluated for implementing standby 
redundancy in a centralised station controller. This evaluation is performed by 
benchmarking the performance of an Erlang/OTP standby-redundant case study 
implementation against the standby-redundant performance metrics claimed by 
a similar existing commercial solution for software-based redundancy on PLCs, 
namely Siemens Software Redundancy. 
Erlang/OTP is then evaluated for implementing standby redundancy within a 
distributed holonic cell controller through a comparison with a JADE 
implementation of standby redundancy for the same holonic architecture. JADE is 
a MAS framework which is the predominant implementation tool for holonic 
control in academic research. Both the Erlang/OTP and JADE implementations are 
restricted to using standard features of their respective software platforms. 
As discussed in Kruger (2018), generalised comparisons of software platforms are 
complicated by paradigmatic, syntactic and philosophic differences. Instead, this 
comparison follows the examples of Chirn and McFarlane (2005) and Kruger 
(2018) by focusing on each platform’s supporting functionality for a specific use 
case. In this comparison, that focus is the implementation of standby redundancy 
in a holonic cell controller. 
This comparison uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative metrics. 
Qualitative metrics are necessary to compare the behaviour and characteristics of 
the standby redundancy implementations and their underlying software 
frameworks. Qualitative evaluations are based on experiences and impressions of 
the author and are therefore susceptible to the preconceptions and agenda of the 
evaluator. While the subjective nature of qualitative metrics is unavoidable, the 
comparison endeavours to provide an impartial evaluation, reinforced by 
experimental results and references to literature where applicable. 
1.5. Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is formulated as a collection of papers. All the presented papers 
are co-authored by the supervisors of this research. However, the author is the 
primary contributor for these papers. The supervisors’ contributions have been in 
reviewing these papers and providing feedback and advice on the structuring of 
arguments. 
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The contents of the included papers are presented in the same form as they were 
submitted for publication. Changes have been made to the formatting, numbering 
and referencing styles of the presented papers to improve the consistency and 
flow of this dissertation. Each of the presented papers contains an abstract, 
introduction, a review of the literature relevant to that paper, and a reference list. 
It is therefore expected that significant portions of these sections will overlap with 
one another from paper to paper. The context and objective of the included 
papers are described at the beginning of each chapter. This dissertation is divided 
into eight chapters, structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature relevant to this research. This review 
overlaps with and expands on those in the papers in the following chapters. The 
review discusses the different manufacturing paradigms.  The different control 
architectures are then discussed, followed by some background on the PROSA and 
ARTI reference architectures for holonic control. The different forms of 
redundancy are then described.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Erlang programming language, focussing on 
the aspects that are utilised in this research. 
Chapter 4 contains a paper describing the implementation of standby redundancy 
for a monolithic/centralised station controller. This paper is followed by 
supplementary sections that elaborate on case study details that could not be 
included in the paper and describe the handling of software faults in Erlang/OTP-
based standby-redundant implementations. 
Chapter 5 considers the implementation of standby redundancy in a holonic cell. 
This chapter includes three papers. The first paper presents an approach for the 
recovery of contract net-based conversations in holonic systems that implement 
standby redundancy. The second paper proposes an architecture for 
implementing redundancy in a holonic cell controller and presents the Erlang/OTP 
implementation thereof. The third paper discusses the use of callback module 
layering to achieve extensible process specialisation in Erlang/OTP. 
Chapter 6 contains a paper that proposes an approach for the implementation of 
standby redundancy in the JADE multi-agent framework. Chapter 7 presents a 
paper that compares the Erlang/OTP and JADE implementations of standby 
redundancy for a case study holonic manufacturing cell.  
This dissertation is concluded in chapter 8 which summarises the findings and 
contributions of this research and makes some recommendations for future 
research. The reference list is provided in chapter 9 and includes all the sources 
referenced in this dissertation, including those referenced within the presented 
papers. 
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2. Literature Review 
This section begins with an overview of flexible and reconfigurable manufacturing 
systems followed by a summary of the Industry 4.0 paradigm. The different 
architectures that can be used to control these systems are then reviewed – 
focussing on the holonic control paradigm. The prominent reference architectures 
for holonic control are then described. Finally, redundancy for manufacturing 
control is discussed. 
2.1. Manufacturing System Paradigms 
This section describes the context of this research. The FMS paradigm is well-
established within manufacturing system. RMSs are similar to FMSs and have been 
the topic of a lot of recent research. Both paradigms have influenced and are 
applicable to the recent Industry 4.0 paradigm. 
2.1.1. Flexible and Reconfigurable Manufacturing Systems 
The development of both the flexible and reconfigurable manufacturing system 
paradigms were driven by two primary goals: the ability to adapt production 
capabilities to match market demand and the ability to cost effectively achieve 
product customisation (Mehrabi et al., 2000). 
An FMS is described by Browne et al. (1984) as an integrated, computer-controlled 
system which contains automated material handling equipment and CNC 
machines. By using an intelligent control solution, FMS systems are able to 
produce a variety of products at the same time and each individual product can 
be customised. Due to this flexibility, FMSs are inherently able to adapt to demand 
variations. The production capacity is easily scaled by adding or removing 
machines. The disadvantage of FMSs is that they are typically only suitable when 
producing a large variety of parts in small quantities since CNC machines have a 
low throughput (Koren et al., 1999).  
An RMS is defined as a system which can quickly and cost-effectively change its 
production capacity within a family of parts. This concept of a part family is key, a 
part family is a group of parts or products which are physically similar and require 
similar machining processes (Goyal et al., 2013). In other words, the 
manufacturing equipment within an RMS system is able to perform a specific set 
of similar operations on a set of similar parts, whereas the manufacturing 
equipment in an FMS system is able to perform a type of manufacturing operation 
(i.e. milling, turning, etc.) on a variety of parts. RMSs can be considered an 
intermediary between traditional dedicated production lines and FMSs, since they 
provide more flexibility that traditional systems and higher throughput than FMSs. 
RMSs are reconfigured through the addition, removal or restructuring of physical 
or software components (Azab et al., 2013). 
Both flexible and reconfigurable systems require a significant amount of 
intelligence in their control systems to manage product variations and to 
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efficiently handle the restructuring of manufacturing equipment. The holonic 
control paradigm (discussed in section 2.2.5) has been investigated as a promising 
solution for controlling such systems. 
2.1.2. Industry 4.0, Cyber-Physical Systems and the Industrial 
Internet of Things 
There have been three industrial revolutions, each of which were initiated a 
technological breakthrough and were characterised by remarkable economic 
growth. According to Drath & Horch (2014) these three revolutions were 
mechanisation, electrification and digitalisation. Mechanisation, the first 
industrial revolution, took place in the 1780s. It is epitomised by the invention of 
the mechanical loom which transformed the textile industry from local home-
based production to centralised factories. Electrification, the second industrial 
revolution, began with the use of electric power in factories and culminated with 
the invention of the production line. Digitisation, the third industrial revolution, 
began with the use of PLCs which enabled software-based automation of 
manufacturing systems.   
It is believed that the fourth industrial revolution will be due to the increased 
connectivity that results from the application of modern internet and 
communication technology to the manufacturing industry (Lasi et al., 2014). There 
is some debate as to whether the fourth industrial revolution has already begun 
or whether it has yet to be realised. The pursuit of systems that embody the fourth 
industrial revolution has been termed Industry 4.0. There are several research 
topics that contribute to the Industry 4.0 paradigm (Brettel et al., 2014). CPSs and 
the IIoT are two such topics.  
2.1.2.1. Cyber-Physical Systems 
The CPS concept focuses on the deep integration of the physical and 
computational aspects of systems (Lee et al., 2015). According to Leitao et al. 
(2016), “a cyber-physical entity is one that integrates its hardware function with a 
cyber-representation acting as a virtual representation for the physical part”. A 
CPS is a collection of multiple cooperating cyber-physical entities. 
To achieve this integration between the virtual and the physical, CPSs are reliant 
on advances in sensor technology to enable accurate real-time measurements of 
the physical system’s state (Baheti & Gill, 2011). CPSs extend beyond virtual 
representations of the physical world; the aim is to improve the operation of 
physical systems through feedback from the cyber representation (Lee, 2008). 
These improvements are exhibited for the different levels of a cyber-physical 
production systems (CPPSs) in the 5C architecture proposed by Lee et al. (2015): 
1. The Smart Connection Level facilitates the interoperability and ease-of-
integration of sensors through Plug & Play approaches. This level is also 
concerned with the accuracy of sensor measurements and may use 
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condition-based monitoring to assess the health of sensors and 
components. 
2. The Conversion Level is responsible for converting the raw data extracted 
from sensors into meaningful information about the state of the CPS’s 
physical component. This leads to manufacturing equipment that is self-
aware. 
3. The Cyber Level collates and manages the information generated across 
the system. The cyber level can use historical information to generate 
performance estimates. 
4. The Cognition Level is a decision support system that presents system 
information in meaningful ways to simplify and improve the decision-
making processes of experts and management. 
5. The Configuration Level performs system optimisation and adaptation 
based on feedback from the high-level data-analytic and machine learning 
systems. 
The CPPS paradigm draws on many other research topics, including RMSs and 
holonic control paradigms (Monostori et al., 2016). 
2.1.2.2. The Industrial Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the creation of a network of everyday objects 
that are connected to one another and can communicate with one another over 
the Internet or using Internet technologies. This is typically achieved in one of two 
ways, either through the embedding of communication capable computational 
device in the object (Wortmann & Flüchter, 2015), or through the embedding of 
an identification mechanism that corresponds to a separate digital representation 
of the object (Xu et al., 2014). 
The IIoT paradigm refers to the use of IoT approaches and technologies in 
industrial applications. There is a degree of overlap between IIoT and CPS systems 
since both consider digital representations of physical devices. This has led certain 
researchers to conclude that the IIoT and CPS concepts are the same thing (Yang, 
2014), whereas others believe that IIoT is a building block for CPS systems 
(Monostori, 2014).  
2.2. Control Architectures 
This section provides an overview of some of the common architectures used for 
manufacturing control. This overview covers centralised, hierarchical, 
decentralised and heterarchical control architectures to provide background and 
context to the holonic control paradigm which is considered in this dissertation. 
These architectures are depicted in Figure 1 and described below.  
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Figure 1: Manufacturing Control Architectures 
2.2.1. Centralised Control 
In a centralised control architecture, the entire system is controlled using a single 
controller (Duffie & Prabhu, 1996). The benefit of this approach is that the 
controller has access to all the system information which makes system wide 
optimisation easier. This architecture is easily implemented for small, simple, 
localised systems. However, the amount of computational power and wiring 
required for centralised control becomes prohibitive as the system gets larger, 
more complex and more dispersed. Centralised control is not flexible; if any aspect 
of the system configuration is changed then the entire controller must be rewired 
and reprogrammed. It is also not robust since a fault in the central controller will 
cause the entire system to go down. 
2.2.2. Hierarchical Control 
A hierarchical control architecture consists of multiple controllers arranged in a 
strict multi-level hierarchy (Van Brussel, 1994). Tasks or instructions are conveyed 
down through the hierarchy and information is propagated back up. 
The top level of the hierarchy receives instructions from an operator or from 
management, the controller assess the instructions and divides them into subtasks 
which it assigns to its subordinates on the level below. Each layer of the hierarchy 
repeats this procedure of dividing tasks into subtasks and passing them on to the 
layer below until they are carried out by the bottom level. The controllers at the 
bottom level then read data about the system from their sensors. The controller 
then consolidates this data into useful information about the task which was 
performed and reports it back to its superior. At each higher level the data from 
the subordinate controllers is consolidated and used to assess the successfulness 
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of each assigned task until the top level of the hierarchy reports back to the 
operator or management.  
The higher up in the hierarchy a controller is, the longer it takes for it to receive 
feedback on the tasks it issues. As a result, the higher levels of the architecture are 
used to control the slow dynamics of a system and the lower levels are used to 
control the faster dynamics (Scattolini, 2009).  
Hierarchical control architectures use a modular approach, so they work well for 
complex systems. They are conducive to system wide optimisation. Hierarchical 
systems are more robust than centralised systems since a controller fault will only 
affect a portion of the system. The portion of the system which is affected depends 
on the hierarchical position of the faulty controller. If the controller is high up in 
the hierarchy, it will affect a large portion of the system and if it is lower down in 
the hierarchy it will affect a small portion of the system (Dilts, Boyd & Whorms, 
1991). The disadvantage of a hierarchical architecture is that its rigid structure 
makes it inflexible to capacity and product variations.  
2.2.3. Decentralised Control 
A decentralised control architecture divides a system into many subsystems, each 
subsystem is then independently controlled by a separate controller (Bakule, 
2008). The controllers do not communicate with one another; they operate using 
local system knowledge only. As a result, it is difficult to achieve any form of global 
optimisation. The advantage of this form of control architecture is that it facilitates 
physical reconfiguration as the controller is not reliant on its position relative to 
the rest of the system. The disadvantage of decentralised control is that it cannot 
facilitate capacity or product variations. It also complicates access to real time 
data. 
2.2.4. Heterarchical Control 
In a heterarchical control architecture there are no hierarchical or master-slave 
relationships between controllers; each controller is viewed as an independent 
autonomous entity. Heterarchical controllers are similar to decentralised 
controllers since all control decisions are made locally (Van Brussel, 1994). The 
difference between these two architectures is that heterarchical controllers 
communicate and cooperate with one another as peers to get information and 
achieve goals. Heterarchical controllers do not need any prior knowledge about 
the physical configuration of the system which leads to a system which is modular, 
scalable and reconfigurable (Duffie & Prabhu, 1996). Heterarchical control 
architectures are inherently robust as faults or disturbances are isolated. Since all 
heterarchical controllers are peers, it is difficult to achieve global optimisation and 
to prove a minimum level of performance (Botti & Boggino, 2008). 
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2.2.5. Holonic Control 
The objective of the holonic control paradigm is to combine the best features of 
the hierarchical and heterarchical control architectures. Holonic control is based 
on the concept of a holon, which was devised by philosopher Arthur Koestler 
(1989) to describe how biological and social systems are organised. The word 
holon refers to something which is simultaneously a complete whole and part of 
a larger whole (Van Brussel, 1994). 
A holon being a complete whole means that it is an autonomous, independent unit 
which can handle disturbances and pursue goals. Yet, as part of a larger whole, a 
holon does not require instructions from a superior, but will accept and execute 
the instructions it receives from a superior. Holons will also communicate and co-
operate with peer holons to achieve common goals.  
A grouping of related holons is called a holarchy. Holonic systems are developed 
using a fractal approach, which implies that any holon in a holarchy is either a 
singular entity or a lower-order holarchy. An example of this is where a cell 
controller views a station controller as a holon, while the station controller itself 
may be a set of holons that control that station.  
The holonic control paradigm uses abstraction and modularity to simplify complex 
systems. Due to the hierarchical nature of a holarchy, it is possible to attain access 
to all necessary information and achieve global optimisation. Holonic control 
systems are flexible since holons are cooperative. Furthermore, since holons are 
independent, holonic control is inherently robust due to its distributed nature. 
2.3. Holonic Reference Architectures 
To help formulate manufacturing holarchies, reference architectures have been 
defined. Reference architectures facilitate the implementation of holonic 
manufacturing systems by providing a framework for the classification of holons.  
There are two predominant holonic reference architectures: PROSA and ADACOR. 
Recently the PROSA reference architecture has been extended in the form of the 
ARTI reference architecture. This section describes the PROSA, ADACOR and ARTI 
reference architectures. 
2.3.1. PROSA 
The Product-Resource-Order-Staff Architecture (PROSA) was developed by Van 
Brussel et al. (1998). The name is an acronym for the four categories with which 
the reference architecture classifies holons, i.e. product holons, order holons, 
resource holons and staff holons  
A product holon contains the process and production knowledge required produce 
a specific product. Product holons represent the model of the product type and 
not specific instances of the product. Order holons represent system activities and 
are responsible for ensuring that these activities get completed on time. An order 
holons often represents the production of a product instance. Each order holon 
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negotiates with other holons to get their product instance produced. Resource 
holons represent the manufacturing resources present in the system. These three 
classes of holons are sometimes referred to as the standard holons.  
The interaction between the standard holons can be seen in Figure 2. The order 
holons exchange production knowledge with the product holons (i.e. what is the 
procedure for producing this product), the order holons exchange production 
execution knowledge with the resource holons (i.e. negotiation of scheduling) and 
the resource holons exchange process knowledge with the product holon (i.e. how 
to perform the required operation on the product instance). Staff holons are 
optional holons which assist the standard holons by providing “expert” advice. 
A key concept when implementing a PROSA based holarchy is self-similarity (Van 
Brussel et al., 1998). Self-similarity states that all holons of the same type should 
expose a common interface regardless of whether they are singular or composite 
holons and regardless of the “hierarchical” level of the holarchy to which they 
belong. 
 
Figure 2: Interaction of the Standard Holons in a PROSA Architecture  
(adapted from Van Brussel et al., 1998) 
2.3.2. ADACOR 
ADACOR is an acronym for ADAptive holonic COntrol aRchitecture. ADACOR was 
developed by Leitão & Restivo (2006). The ADACOR reference architecture focuses 
on agility, flexibility and disturbance rejection. ADACOR defines four holon 
categories: product holons, operational holons, task holons and supervisor holons. 
ADACOR’s product, operational and task holons are similar to PROSA’s product, 
resource and order holons, respectively. The product holons represent the 
products that the system produces, the task holons represent the system’s 
production or maintenance tasks and the operational holons represent the 
manufacturing equipment. However, ADACOR’s supervisor holon performs a role 
that is not inherently provided for in PROSA. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
 
The supervisor holon is responsible for grouping the other holons into suitable 
hierarchies to achieve the global optimisation potential of hierarchical control. 
During normal operation, the supervisor holon manages all interaction between 
the task and operational holons as shown in Figure 3. When a disturbance is 
detected, the supervisor holons dissolve the hierarchy, resulting in task and 
operational holons interacting directly as in a heterarchical architecture. Over 
time, the supervisor establishes a new hierarchy that is better equipped to handle 
the new manufacturing conditions. 
 
Figure 3: ADACOR Holon Interaction during Normal Operation (Adapted from Leitão & Restivo, 
2006) 
2.3.3. ARTI 
The Activity-Resource-Type-Instance (ARTI) architecture is an extension to the 
PROSA reference architecture that arose out of need to generalise PROSA 
terminology for application to non-manufacturing domains (Van Brussel & 
Valckenaers, 2017). ARTI separates holons into those that represent activities and 
those that represent resources. Each category is then further divided into holons 
that represent types and holons that represent instances. Each instance holon is 
an instance of specific type holon. This leads to four possible classifications: 
activity type, activity instance, resource type and resource instance. 
An activity type holon represents a type of activity that can be performed in the 
holonic system. The PROSA product holon is an example of an activity type, since 
represents a type of product that could be produced. A scheduled maintenance 
task such as relubricating bearings is also an example of and activity type. An 
activity instance holon represents a specific instance of an activity type holon. To 
PROSA order holon is an activity instance of a “product” activity type. A resource 
type holon represents the type of resource (i.e. a CNC mill). A resource instance 
holon represents a specific piece of manufacturing equipment (i.e. the CNC mill 
with asset number “xyz”). 
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ARTI further distinguishes between intelligent beings and intelligent agents within 
each holon class (Valckenaers & Van Brussel, 2015). An intelligent being reflects 
the reality of what it represents while an intelligent agent encompasses the 
decision-making components. This segregation seeks to separate the generic from 
the application specific. 
While the ARTI reference architecture contains several aspects that help to 
generalise holonic implementations, it requires further evaluation, 
implementation and clarification by researchers other than the architecture’s 
developers before it can be considered a mature reference architecture. It is, 
however, believed that the ARTI reference architecture shows great promise for 
use within the Industry 4.0 paradigm. 
2.3.4. Selection 
This dissertation uses the PROSA reference architecture to formulate and describe 
the considered holonic cell control architecture. PROSA is selected since it was the 
first developed reference architectures and is therefore more familiar within the 
manufacturing research community. It is expected that the findings can be carried 
over to an ADACOR-based implementation with minimal effort due to the 
similarities between PROSA’s product, resource and order holons and ADACOR’s 
product, operational and task holons. It is similarly expected that this research 
could be extended to the ARTI reference architecture since it is based on PROSA, 
and that doing so may make this research more accessible to other industrial use 
cases. 
2.4. Redundancy 
Redundancy refers to the use of additional elements or systems to provide a 
backup in the event of a failure (Downer, 2009). The concept of redundancy is 
based on the idea of probabilistic independence. If a single element has a failure 
probability of 𝑝1 and if 𝑛 identical independent elements are placed in parallel, 
then the chance of all of them failing is 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝1
𝑛. The combination of 𝑛 
independent parallel components is therefore more reliable than a single 
component. This section considers the need for redundancy in the manufacturing 
industry and describes the different types of redundancy for controllers (i.e. 
control hardware and software) and for control entities that are entirely software 
based. 
2.4.1. Need for Redundancy 
There is always a possibility of failure in systems that are complex and tightly 
coupled (Sagan, 2004). Furthermore, as the complexity of a system increases, so 
does the likelihood of failure mechanisms that are not anticipated by the designer. 
Problematically, most manufacturing systems fall into the category of complex, 
tightly coupled systems. Systems can be designed with one of three approaches 
to handling failures: they can be fail-safe, fault-tolerant or fail-operational (Blanke 
et al., 2001). Redundancy is the primary tool for achieving these approaches. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
A fail-safe system responds to the occurrence of a fault by returning to a known 
safe state in a controlled manner. In some stable systems this can be achieved 
without redundancy by disengaging the power and letting the system come to a 
stop at its natural equilibrium. In cases that are safety critical or when the system 
is naturally unstable, redundancy is necessary to maintain control of the system 
so that it can be brought to a safe state.  
Systems that need to continue operating in the presence of faults can be designed 
to be fault-tolerant or fail-operational. The distinction between the two is that fail-
operational systems must maintain the same level of performance in the presence 
of a fault, whereas a degradation in the level of performance is acceptable for 
fault-tolerant systems. These approaches are not possible without some form of 
redundancy. Although these approaches are often used for safety critical systems, 
this research will evaluate the use of redundancy to avoid the financial 
implications of reduced availability in manufacturing systems. Availability refers to 
the percentage of time for which a system is ready and able to perform its 
expected function. 
2.4.2. Challenges 
In theory, redundancy is a wonderful tool that can dramatically increase the 
availability of a system. In practice, redundancy must be implemented with care 
as it may not improve availability as much as is expected and in some cases, it can 
even degrade the availability of a system (Sagan, 2004: 17). This is because the 
principle of redundancy requires that the redundant elements fail independently, 
and real system elements are seldom completely independent. Since the 
redundant elements are exposed to the same conditions, it is possible for them to 
fail at the same time and for the same reason due to common-cause faults. 
Common-cause faults are especially likely if all elements are identical. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure that all common-cause faults are identified and 
mitigated to prevent these faults becoming single points of failure. There is also 
the possibility that an element may fail in a way that causes others to fail, either 
directly or because of the additional load placed upon them. Adding redundancy 
increases the complexity of the system and may introduce additional points of 
failure. This is particularly true when additional hardware is required to facilitate 
redundancy as this could become a new point of failure.  
Another challenge when designing redundant systems is that they do not always 
fail in the manner which is expected. The naïve assumption is that a failed 
component’s outputs will cease. However, the output may also become noisier, 
drift, get stuck at a certain value/point, become random or any number of other 
possibilities. All these possibilities need to be considered to ensure that they do 
not affect the system. One of the biggest threats to the effectiveness of redundant 
systems is the human aspect. Operators and management are more likely to push 
a system beyond its designed operating range when they believe that the 
redundant backup is guaranteed to prevent complete failure. 
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2.4.3. Controller Redundancy Approaches 
Redundancy is used for many different aspects of manufacturing systems (i.e. 
actuators, communication networks, etc.). However, this research considers the 
use of redundancy in a manufacturing system’s control implementation. Four 
approaches for controller redundancy are presented here: independent 
operation, standby redundancy, 1:N redundancy and N Modular redundancy. 
These methods are summarised in Figure 4 and explained below. Different terms 
are sometimes used for the various redundancy approaches, but the terminology 
of National Instruments (2008) is adopted here. The term controller here 
encompasses the computational device with its inputs and outputs, as well as the 
control software which executes on that control device. 
 
Figure 4: Types of Controller Redundancy 
2.4.3.1. Independent Operation 
Independent operation is not explicitly a form of redundant control, but it can be 
considered as a form of functional redundancy within a system: instead of having 
one large sub-system capable of performing a required task, several smaller 
independent sub-systems are used. Therefore, if one of the sub-systems fails only 
a portion of the production capacity is lost. 
2.4.3.2. Standby Redundancy 
Standby redundancy is implemented using two or more controllers, i.e. a primary 
controller and one or more backup controllers, which are housed separately. The 
primary controller has complete control until a fault is detected and then control 
is transferred to one of the backup controllers, which becomes the new primary 
controller. There are three configuration categories for standby redundancy: cold, 
warm and hot. These configurations are differentiated by the amount of time 
changeover takes and the amount of system bump that occurs during changeover. 
System bump refers to abrupt movements and reduction in product quality that 
result from the difference between the systems actual state and the initial state 
of the backup controllers (National Instruments, 2008). For the following 
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descriptions of the standby redundancy configuration categories, a system 
containing a single primary and a single backup are considered. 
If a long changeover time and a substantial amount of system bump are acceptable 
then cold standby redundancy can be used. In this configuration the backup 
controller is completely powered down, when a fault is detected by the operator 
or a third-party watchdog then the primary is shut down and the backup controller 
is powered up. The advantage of this approach is that there is minimal chance of 
the backup controller experiencing a failure prior to changeover. The disadvantage 
is that since the backup system has no knowledge of the system state it must 
assume some default state which can result in substantial system bump. 
Hot standby redundancy is used in cases where a fast changeover time and little 
or no system bump are required. In this configuration the backup controller is 
powered on and operates with its outputs disabled. The backup controller 
monitors the control inputs and outputs of the primary controller to maintain 
accurate knowledge of the system state and will initiate changeover if it does not 
agree with the outputs of the primary controller. Additionally, the primary 
controller can initiate a changeover if it detects a fault in its own execution. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that, since the backup controller is operational, it 
may need to be replaced sooner. 
Warm standby redundancy refers to configurations that fall between hot and cold 
standby redundancy. The backup controllers are powered on, but changeover is 
still governed by an operator or third-party watchdog. The backup might only 
monitor the control inputs, or the primary might send its knowledge of the system 
state at regular intervals. Changeover time is usually similar to hot redundant 
systems, but the system bump is typically larger as the backup’s knowledge of the 
system state could be old, inaccurate or incomplete. 
2.4.3.3. N Modular Redundancy 
N modular redundancy is implemented using a set of three or more functionally 
identical controllers connected in parallel. These controllers are all provided with 
the same control inputs while their outputs are sent to arbitration circuitry. This 
circuitry decides what output to give to the system by applying some selection 
criteria to the outputs from the controllers (National Instruments, 2008). 
A majority vote is typically used; however, some applications require more 
advanced logic. To avoid ties, this method usually uses an odd number of 
controllers. The arbitration circuitry is also responsible for identifying controller 
faults. This is simple if the controllers are required to give identical results, as a 
lack of consensus indicates a fault. If slight variations in numerical or analogue 
results are acceptable then this can be a challenge. 
The advantage of this method is that there is no system bump or delay when a 
fault occurs, which means that control of the system is seamless. Unfortunately, 
this method is expensive due to the number of controllers required. As a result, 
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this approach is usually only used when the need for system to be fail-operational 
warrants the cost. 
In highly critical applications the reliability of an N modular redundant system is 
improved by using different makes of controllers, programmed by different 
people, manufactured in different places and tested on different days to ensure 
that the controllers are as independent as possible (Bjorndahl & Byers, 2011). 
Additionally, the number of controller faults/failures (𝑛𝑓) which the system can 
accommodate can be improved by increasing the number of redundant controllers 
(𝑁) according to the equation: 𝑁 = 2𝑛𝑓 + 1. 
2.4.3.4. 1:N Redundancy 
1:N redundancy uses a single standby controller as a backup for multiple active 
controllers. The obvious disadvantage of this method is that more than one active 
controller fault will result in partial or complete system failure. A further 
disadvantage is that some form of multiplexer is needed to route the correct input 
and output signals to the standby controller. However, this is less of a problem 
when distributed IO is used. The advantage of this form of redundancy is its cost 
effectiveness. It is well suited for applications with a limited budget where the 
availability of a fault-tolerant system is desired for financial reasons, but not 
essential to meet safety requirements.  
2.4.4. Redundancy for Software Entities 
For many distributed manufacturing control architectures there is a one-to-one 
mapping between the controller software and the computational control device 
that executes it. However, this is not typically the case for holonic and multi-agent 
systems which are comprised of autonomous independent software entities. 
These entities are not tied to a specific control device; therefore, their redundancy 
approaches need to be considered separately. 
Not much literature regarding redundancy in manufacturing control could be 
found within the academic realm. However, within the commercial domain, there 
is a significant amount of literature relating to distributed controller redundancy 
solutions as discussed in the previous section. There has been some research into 
redundancy through replication for multi-agent systems (Guessoum et al., 2002; 
Carzaniga et al., 2009).  
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3. Erlang/OTP Overview 
This section provides an overview of Erlang/OTP, as well as its core features and 
approaches. Erlang is a programming language and runtime environment 
developed at Ericsson in the 1980s and publicly released as open source software 
in 1998. The Erlang programming language was designed for applications that 
require concurrency, fault tolerance and distribution (Anonymous s.a. (b)). A key 
feature of Erlang is its Open Telecom Platform (OTP), which is a set of libraries that 
simplifies the development of large complex systems (Armstrong 2010: 73). 
3.1. Concurrency 
Erlang programs are built up by independent concurrent processes which 
cooperate with one another to achieve the systems goals. Erlang processes have 
the following properties: processes have sole access to their internal state, 
processes influence one another through asynchronous message passing and 
processes have the capability to spawn further processes (Armstrong 2010: 70).  
Erlang code runs within its own virtual machine, known as BEAM (Bogdan/Björn's 
Erlang Abstract Machine), which handles scheduling, memory management and 
message passing for the Erlang processes. Additionally, BEAM supports symmetric 
multiprocessing (SMP) which enhances process concurrency on multicore 
processors (Lundin 2008). BEAM provides Erlang with processes that are 
lightweight, which facilitates the large number of processes required to 
implement complex systems (Larson, 2009: 55). Furthermore, BEAM can run on 
most Unix, Linux and Microsoft Windows based operating systems which 
enhances the portability of Erlang code (Anonymous s.a. (c)). In Erlang, a node 
refers to an instance of BEAM. 
3.2. Distribution 
Distribution flows naturally from Erlang's concurrency model. Since processes 
communicate through message passing and there is no shared state, the only 
difference between process communication within a node and process 
communication between nodes is latency. As a result, it possible to develop an 
Erlang program on a single device and deploy it to a cluster with minimal code 
modification (Armstrong 2010: 70). 
For a process to send a message to another process, it must know the process’s 
pid (process identifier). A pid can be thought of as the address of the process. Pids 
are unique within and between different nodes. When a process sends a message 
to another, it typically includes its own pid so that the other process can reply. 
There are two mechanisms through which a process can obtain another process’ 
pid. The first is that it can be passed as an argument when the process is spawned. 
The second and more common mechanism is registered names. Erlang provides 
the mechanism for processes to register themselves under a certain name. Other 
processes can use this name to query the name registry and obtain the 
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corresponding pid. There are two different name registries: the local registry and 
the global registry. Names within a local registry are unique to processes within 
that registry’s node. The global registry is synchronised across all nodes which 
belong to the same global group, so names within the global registry are unique 
within a global group. 
3.3. Fault-Tolerance 
Erlang’s process model facilitates fault-tolerance by providing process isolation. 
Process isolation means that if an Erlang process is killed, whether by an error or 
by another process, it will not cause an error in any of the other processes. 
To handle situations where processes are reliant on other processes to be able to 
fulfil their function, Erlang provides mechanisms for process linking and process 
monitoring. If two processes are linked, the death of the one will result in the 
death of the other. Alternatively, if a process is monitoring another process, it will 
receive a message if the other dies. These features are used by OTP to implement 
supervisor processes.  
A supervisor process starts and monitors its child processes and restarts them if 
they fail. If the failure rate exceeds a specified frequency, the supervisor fails, and 
all its children are killed. The children of a supervisor processes can include other 
supervisor processes. This leads to a supervision tree. The principle behind a 
supervision tree is that, if an error occurs, it will propagate through the supervision 
tree until it reaches the point where all the processes required to rectify that error 
have been restarted. In this way, an error can be contained in the region which it 
affects. 
An OTP application is a supervision tree where all the children are 
implementations of standard OTP behaviours. A behaviour is an abstraction that 
implements the generic portions of a common model or pattern. The standard 
behaviours include gen_server (that implements a client-server relationship), 
gen_event (that implements a publish-subscribe mechanism), gen_statem 
(that implements an event driven state machine) and the supervisor model. 
The application specific logic for these behaviours is implemented in the form of 
callback modules. An advantage of using these behaviours is that they have been 
thoroughly tested in many software products. 
An interesting feature in Erlang/OTP is OTP's distributed application failover and 
takeover mechanisms. These mechanisms will restart an OTP application on 
another node if the node upon which it is currently running fails. To enable the 
failover and takeover mechanisms, an OTP application must be configured as a 
distributed application. This configuration specifies on which nodes the 
application is permitted to run, as well as the priority of each node. OTP will start 
the application on the running node with the highest priority. If this node fails, 
OTP's failover mechanism will restart the application on the running node with the 
next highest priority. On the other hand, if at any time a node with a higher priority 
comes online, the takeover mechanism executes. The takeover mechanism starts 
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the application on the higher priority node and stops the application on the lower 
priority node once the higher priority node is initialised. There is a brief period 
when the application is running on both nodes simultaneously, which must be 
handled to avoid unintended side effects. 
A further interesting feature offered by Erlang/OTP for high availability systems is 
the ability to perform live code upgrades. This allows the system’s code to updated 
to a new version while the system is running and without disturbing its 
performance (Armstrong, 1996). 
3.4. Interfacing with Native C Code 
In manufacturing contexts, controllers often need to interface with sensors and 
actuators. On general purpose computers, such interfacing often relies on 
software drivers that can be accessed from C-programs. Erlang provides four 
mechanisms for interfacing with native C code, namely C-nodes, ports, port drivers 
and Native Implemented Functions (NIFs). These mechanisms offer varying levels 
of compromise between fault-tolerance and performance. C-nodes and ports 
allow Erlang to interface with C code without risking the integrity of the Erlang 
system. 
From Erlang's perspective, a C-node is just like any other Erlang node, since it can 
send and receive messages and be monitored. The C-node sends and receives 
messages over TCP/IP using native Erlang types. However, using TCP/IP makes 
communicating with C-nodes slower than the other options. If a C-node crashes, 
the Erlang system will view the crash as a node failure and handle it accordingly.  
A port consists of an Erlang process which forwards messages between the Erlang 
system and C code running in an OS process separate from the BEAM instance. 
The input and output streams of the C code are piped to the connected Erlang 
process, which makes ports faster than C-nodes. If the C code crashes, the 
connected process is notified and can then restart it.  
Port drivers and NIFs offer performance advantages at the expense of fault-
tolerance. A port driver is a port which, instead of running in a separate OS 
process, is compiled as a shared library and linked directly into the BEAM process. 
Port drivers perform better than ports since there is no context switching between 
OS processes, but if the port driver crashes it will bring down the BEAM instance 
as well. NIFs are C functions which are called as Erlang functions. NIFs are also 
shared libraries linked into BEAM and have the same benefits and risks as port 
drivers. 
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4. Erlang/OTP-Based Standby Redundancy for 
Monolithic Station Control 
This chapter begins with a paper entitled “An Evaluation of Erlang for 
Implementing Standby Redundancy in a Manufacturing Station Controller” 
(Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). This paper presents an Erlang/OTP implementation of 
standby redundancy for a monolithic station controller. This implementation is 
benchmarked against the performance and features offered by Siemens Software 
Redundancy for PLCs. This paper was presented at the eighth international 
workshop on Service Orientation in Holonic and Multi-Agent Manufacturing 
(SOHOMA) in Bergamo, Italy (2018). 
This chapter considers the simplest case of standby redundancy, where there is a 
single primary controller and a single backup controller. The presented case of a 
monolithic station controller is also representational of implementing standby 
redundancy for the hardware interface of a singular resource holon (i.e. a resource 
holon that is not a lower order holarchy). 
Following the paper are two additional sections. The first section presents 
supplementary case study details that could not be included in the paper due to 
space limitations. This includes a more detailed description of the case study 
system, its software architecture and the state machine used to achieve its control 
as well as a discussion of the standby redundancy issues that arose during its 
implementation and how they were rectified. 
The second section discusses the handling of process failure due to software errors 
and the handling of Erlang node failure. Software errors that cause controller 
failure are not common in PLCs due to the rigidity of IEC 61131-3 languages. 
Instead, most PLC software errors are in fact incorrect code that results in 
erroneous behaviour. This section was not included in the paper since there isn’t 
software error handling in the PLC solution to benchmark against. 
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4.1. An Evaluation of Erlang for Implementing 
Standby Redundancy in a Manufacturing Station 
Controller 
G Hawkridge, AH Basson, K Kruger 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University 
{hawkridge, ahb, kkruger}@sun.ac.za 
Abstract 
Standby redundancy for controllers is used to improve the availability of many 
manufacturing systems. The software redundancy features offered by typical 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are reviewed. An equivalent Erlang based 
standby redundancy solution is presented in this paper. Erlang is a functional 
programming language designed for the development of fault-tolerant soft real-
time control systems. The Erlang software redundancy solution employs various 
features in Erlang (and its associated library, OTP) that greatly simplify achieving 
standby redundancy. This paper describes an Erlang and OTP approach that 
facilitates implementing standby controller redundancy at a software level for 
devices which do not provide such mechanisms at a hardware level, similar to that 
provided by typical PLCs. 
Keywords: Erlang; Standby Redundancy 
4.1.1. Introduction 
The recent advance towards Industry 4.0, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and the 
Industrial Internet of Things has increased interest in the concepts of distributed 
sensing and control (Brettel et al., 2014). Embedded systems, such as 
microcontrollers, are likely to play a vital role in these distributed systems since 
they are flexible and inexpensive (Wan et al., 2016; Jazdi, 2014). However, in 
manufacturing systems, microcontrollers are often perceived to lack reliability 
since they do not have the track record of PLCs. This perception is often true due 
to the use of lower tier electronics in low cost microcontrollers. 
A lack of reliability, whether perceived or real, will hinder the manufacturing 
industry’s adoption since the failure of one subsystem in a manufacturing system 
can lead to the whole system becoming idle. Therefore, reduced availability of 
critical subsystems (such as controllers) has significant financial implications for 
complex subsystems. Here availability is taken to be the percentage of time for 
which a system is ready to function at the normally expected performance. A 
common method for increasing the availability of a system is the use of standby 
redundancy. The ability to implement standby redundancy using microcontrollers 
could therefore assist in applications where availability is a concern. 
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems (Armstrong, 1996). A key feature of 
Erlang is OTP (Open Telecom Platform), which is a set of libraries that simplifies 
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the development of large complex systems (Armstrong, 2010). Erlang was created 
by Ericsson (Anonymous, s.a. (a)) and has been used to develop several systems 
including the AXD301 ATM switch which is renowned for its reliability (Cesarini & 
Thompson, 2009). Erlang has since seen wide-spread popularity and adoption by 
many companies in the web industry (Anonymous, s.a. (b)).  
Erlang has many features, such as concurrency and scalability, that are attractive 
when implementing holonic manufacturing control systems (Kruger & Basson, 
2017). Another interesting feature that Erlang and OTP provide is the built-in 
mechanism for application failover. This mechanism will restart an OTP application 
on another node if the node upon which it is currently running fails. An OTP 
application is a tree of related Erlang processes that together implement a specific 
functionality. A node refers to an instance of the Erlang runtime, which can be run 
on the same device or on different devices. 
This paper describes the use of the built-in features of Erlang and OTP for 
implementing standby controller redundancy for improved availability in a 
manufacturing station. The performance and features provided by an Erlang based 
approach are compared to those offered by existing solutions. This paper next 
considers the redundancy solution features provided by a typical major 
automation system vendor. This is followed by a description of an Erlang based 
solution. 
4.1.2. Types of Redundancy 
Control redundancy is used to ensure the continued operation of a control system 
in the event of a certain subset of potential faults. This continued operation is 
often required to meet safety or availability requirements. Several terms are used 
when categorising the different forms of redundancy, for this paper we will be 
adopting the terminology used by National Instruments (2008) who divide control 
redundancy into the following categories: N-modular redundancy, 1:N 
redundancy and standby redundancy. 
N-modular redundancy consists of multiple independent controllers which 
execute the same control logic based on the same inputs. The controller outputs 
are sent to an arbitration module which decides the correct system output, 
typically using a majority vote. N-modular redundancy is typically used in safety 
critical systems (i.e. aerospace, military, and nuclear applications). 
1:N redundancy uses a single controller as the backup unit for multiple other 
controllers each controlling different subsystems. When one of the controllers 
fails, the backup takes over from that controller. This redundancy approach has 
limited benefits since it can only handle a single controller failure. This approach 
allows a level of redundancy to be achieved at a low cost. However, if distributed 
I/O is not used, the complexity of multiplexing direct I/O can lead to additional 
expenses. 
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Standby Redundancy appears to be the most prevalent form of controller 
redundancy in the manufacturing industry. It is also commonly referred to as 
mirror mode or shadow mode redundancy. In standby redundancy there are two 
controllers, a primary and a backup. When the primary fails the backup takes over. 
There are three levels of standby redundancy, i.e. cold, warm, and hot. These 
levels are ranked according to their changeover time and the resulting system 
bump. System bump refers to abrupt movements and/or reduction in product 
quality that result from the difference between the system's actual state before 
changeover and the initial state of the backup controller.  
Cold standby is the lowest of the three levels, it is characterised by relatively long 
changeover times and substantial system bump. Typically, the backup controller 
is powered down until it is started by an operator or a watchdog mechanism. In 
contrast, hot standby is characterised by changeover times in the order of 
milliseconds and little or no system bump. Here the backup controller is fully 
operational and processes the same inputs as the primary, except that its outputs 
are disabled. The backup controller compares its own state to that of the primary 
to detect faults in the execution of the primary. Warm standby falls between the 
other two forms. Typically, the backup is powered on and regularly synchronises 
with the primary's state so that changeover is relatively quick and there is minimal 
system bump. The ability to implement standby redundancy using 
microcontrollers could therefore assist in applications where availability is a 
concern. 
4.1.3. Siemens Software Redundancy 
There is not much prior academic research on standby redundancy in 
manufacturing station control, most of the research around this topic exists in the 
commercial domain. Due to the variety of industrial controller suppliers it is not 
feasible to provide a broad review of commercially available controllers in the 
manufacturing industry. Instead, Siemens was selected as benchmark since it is a 
well-known and reputable manufacturer of industrial controllers. Also, due to the 
competitive nature of the industry, it is expected that other leading vendors offer 
solutions with similar performance and features to Siemens. 
Although the Erlang based solution is being compared to one of Siemens’ 
redundancy solution, it is not being proposed as an alternative since PLCs and 
embedded devices, such as microcontrollers, have different use cases. Rather, as 
a similar existing commercial solution, the features provided by Siemens are used 
as a benchmark for the Erlang based system. 
The most appropriate benchmark for the Erlang based system is Siemens software 
redundancy since both approaches implement standby redundancy at a software 
level for standard hardware communicating over a network. (Siemens software 
redundancy uses standard S7-300 or S7-400 systems connected over Siemen’s 
Multi-Point Interface (MPI), PROFIBUS or Ethernet to achieve warm standby 
redundancy (Siemens, 2010)).  
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Siemens software redundancy can handle the following failure mechanisms: 
failure of a power supply, CPU failure due to hardware or software faults, 
communication interruptions or failures between the CPUs, and communication 
interruptions or failures between a CPU and its peripherals (Siemens, 2010). If one 
of these failures occurs in the backup controller and is detected by the primary 
controller then the primary controller continues as the sole controller until the 
fault in the backup is remedied. If a failure occurs in the primary controller, 
changeover occurs, and the backup controller becomes the primary controller and 
continues in stand-alone mode. When the fault in the previous primary controller 
is remedied it becomes the backup controller until changeover occurs once again. 
Changeover can also be triggered manually if maintenance needs to be performed 
on the primary controller.  
4.1.4. Erlang Based Standby Redundancy 
4.1.4.1. Overview 
In this paper, an Erlang based standby redundancy solution consists of two 
controllers that share a TCP/IP connection (Figure 5). The features offered by 
Erlang do not limit this approach to two controllers, a single primary with a single 
backup are used here as they represent the simplest implementation of standby 
redundancy. It is expected that this approach can be extended to handle multiple 
backup controllers. 
To be equivalent to Siemens software redundancy, the Erlang based system must 
be able to handle both hardware failures and communication failures. The system 
must transfer control from the primary controller to the backup controller in a 
stable and safe manner. To facilitate this, the control logic must be implemented 
in a manner that allows re-entry at any point in the control flow. Furthermore, a 
facility must be provided to synchronise data between the primary and backup 
controllers. 
The Erlang based standby redundancy, as described below, uses OTP’s distributed 
application failover and takeover mechanisms to start the control application on 
the backup controller when the primary controller experiences a fault. The control 
application is implemented using an event driven state machine built on the OTP 
gen_statem behaviour. OTP is a set of Erlang libraries that simplify the 
development of large complex systems (Armstrong, 2010). 
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Figure 5: Controller Architecture for Erlang-Based Standby Redundancy 
4.1.4.2. State Machine Implementation 
The control logic for this Erlang based standby redundancy solution is 
implemented using OTP's state machine behaviour. State machines have 
properties that facilitate controller changeover. Using states to represent the state 
of the controller and its outputs provides a concise manner of synchronising the 
primary and backup controllers. Furthermore, when changeover occurs, the 
backup controller can commence control by entering the state machine at the 
required state. Depending on the application, controller changeover may not be 
as simple as the backup controller entering the latest synchronised state. The 
backup controller may first need to perform some prerequisite recovery task, such 
as recalibrating a motion axis, before it can continue operation in the latest state. 
Or, alternatively, it may be necessary for the backup controller to enter an entirely 
different state. 
OTP’s state machine behaviour called gen_statem provides a generic 
framework for implementing event driven state machines. In an event driven state 
machine, actions and state transitions only occur in response to events. This state 
machine framework includes several useful features including self-generated 
events, automatic state entry actions and the ability to postpone events (Ericsson 
AB, 2017 (a)). Configuring a state to postpone certain events can be used to reduce 
the complexity of the state machine. A postponed event is placed in a separate 
queue and then placed back at the front of the event queue once the state has 
changed. This can be used to handle certain race conditions by delaying the 
processing of events which are not relevant in the current state. 
There is an important limitation when using the gen_statem behaviour in a 
redundant application: it is not possible to access the behaviour's internal state, 
which includes timer data, postponed events and internal portions of the event 
queue. Since OTP is open source, the gen_statem behaviour source code could 
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be altered to allow access to this data, but this would negate the benefit of using 
a tried and tested framework.  
To overcome this limitation, in the application presented here, self-generated 
events are disallowed, and timeouts are implemented using external Erlang timers 
instead of internal gen_statem timers. By doing this all event sources are 
external to the state machine and can be accessed by querying the process’s 
message queue. In addition, it is necessary to mirror the postponed events queue 
within user data. Despite these restrictions on the gen_statem behaviour, it is 
still an effective foundation for implementing control logic which facilitates 
standby redundancy. 
4.1.4.3. Failover and Takeover Mechanism 
Controller changeover, i.e. when one controller takes over control from another, 
is here considered to include failover and takeover. Failover is a changeover 
triggered by a failure, while takeover is a changeover initiated by a user/operator 
or a controller of higher priority becoming available (as explained below).  
OTP's distributed application failover and takeover mechanism is a primary 
component of an Erlang-based standby redundancy system. To enable the failover 
and takeover mechanism, an OTP application must be configured as a distributed 
application. This configuration specifies on which nodes the application is 
permitted to run, as well as the priority of each node. OTP will start the application 
on the running node with the highest priority. If this node fails, OTP's failover 
mechanism will restart the application on the running node with the next highest 
priority. On the other hand, if at any time, a node with a higher priority comes 
online, the takeover mechanism executes. The takeover mechanism starts the 
application on the higher priority node and stops the application on the lower 
priority node once the higher priority node is initialised. There is a brief period 
when the application is running on both nodes simultaneously, which must be 
handled to avoid unintended side effects. 
If it was desired, the node priority could be used to give preference to a controller 
with better hardware. However, this should be carefully considered as a failover-
takeover loop could occur if the higher priority device has a fault that continually 
occurs shortly after takeover is complete. To be comparable to Siemen’s software 
redundancy, in the application presented here, the primary and backup controllers 
will have equal priority. Therefore, takeover will only occur when triggered by an 
operator. 
4.1.4.4. Controller Changeover Time 
The changeover time of the Erlang based system is determined by how long it 
takes the failover mechanism to detect that a node has become inaccessible and 
how long it takes the control logic to initialise. The time it takes Erlang to detect if 
a connected node goes down is controlled by the configuration parameter 
net_ticktime (an integer value, in seconds). Erlang claims that an inaccessible 
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node will be detected within an interval of 0.75*net_ticktime to 
1.25*net_ticktime (Ericsson AB, 2017 (b)). 
4.1.4.5. Standby Redundancy Events 
There are three types of events that must be handled by the standby redundancy 
solution: controller failure due to a hardware or power fault, controller isolation 
due to a network fault and operator requested changeover. 
4.1.4.5.1 Power Loss or Hardware Faults.  
Controller failure due to loss of power or hardware fault is the type of redundancy 
event that the failover mechanism handles best. When the backup controller fails 
the primary controller maintains control of the system. Alternatively, when failure 
occurs in the primary controller (Figure 6), the failover mechanism starts the 
distributed application on the backup controller, which then becomes the new 
primary controller. When the failed controller comes back online, it synchronises 
with the primary controller and becomes the backup controller (regardless of 
whether it was previously the primary or the backup).  
 
Figure 6: Primary Controller Failure due to Power Loss or Hardware Fault 
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4.1.4.5.2 Isolation by Network Faults. 
The second type of redundancy event is when either of the controllers becomes 
isolated due to a network problem (Figure 7). This situation can be problematic 
since OTP’s failover mechanism assumes that an inaccessible node has stopped 
functioning (i.e. controller failure due to power loss or a hardware fault). In this 
case, both the isolated controller and the non-isolated controller will perceive the 
network problem as the other controller having failed. The distributed application 
will therefore be started on the backup controller while it is still running on the 
primary controller. 
This is not a problem when the controlled system consists solely of network 
connected components, as is typically the case in the telecom applications for 
which Erlang was designed, since the isolated controller would not be able to 
interact with the system. However, in a manufacturing environment, controllers 
typically use I/O to interact with directly connected system components, in which 
case competing controllers can wreak havoc on a system. 
 
Figure 7: Primary Controller Isolation due to a Network Fault 
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This type of problem is not specific to Erlang and OTP. When Siemens software 
redundancy experiences a fault in the redundant link between the controllers, 
both controllers assume the role of primary controller (Siemens, 2010: 56). To 
prevent the controllers from competing, Siemens software redundancy makes use 
of distributed I/O. This distributed I/O is connected to the controllers on a different 
bus system to the redundant link, so it remains assigned to the previous primary 
controller. This approach essentially changes directly connected system 
components into network connected system components, albeit on a different 
network. 
For systems using the types of devices upon which Erlang based standby 
redundancy would be implemented, it is likely that the use of directly connected 
system components would be unavoidable. To handle network faults when this is 
the case, there must be a method that the controllers can use to determine 
whether they should interact with the system or remain idle. If a higher-level 
controller is present in the system, it is recommended that each controller 
determine if they are isolated by attempting to contact this higher-level controller. 
Additionally, if there are other network connected system components upon 
which the controller relies to perform its control task, then contact with these 
components should also be used. If the controller determines that it is isolated, it 
must switch to an idle state and yield control to the other controller which is 
presumed not to be isolated. There is the possibility that both controllers could 
conclude that they are isolated and become idle, but in such a situation it is 
unlikely that either controller would be able function correctly. 
A shortcoming of OTP's failover-takeover mechanism is that when a controller that 
was previously isolated due to a network problem, is reconnected to the network, 
the controller is not automatically reintegrated into the failover-takeover 
relationship. To work around this, the isolated controller must detect when the 
network connection is re-established and restart the Erlang node so that the 
failover relationship can be synchronised during node start-up. 
4.1.4.5.3 Operator Triggered Changeover. 
The third type of redundancy event is changeover resulting from the operator 
triggering the takeover mechanism. Since this changeover is not the result of a 
fault, data is synchronized directly between the controllers during the overlap 
period when both are operational. Furthermore, if the primary controller is in a 
state where the transfer of control would require a recovery task, then the transfer 
can be delayed until it enters a state which is better suited to transferring control. 
This form of changeover is typically initiated if the controller which is currently the 
primary needs to be brought offline for maintenance. 
4.1.4.6. Data Synchronisation 
To achieve warm standby redundancy, the backup controller needs to regularly 
synchronise data with the primary controller. OTP’s failover and takeover 
mechanism for distributed applications does not provide for the synchronisation 
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of the application’s state. Distributed applications are always (re)started by OTP 
as if for the first time. However, they can be configured so that their initialisation 
function receives an argument indicating whether the application start is normal 
or because of failover or takeover, as well as the node on which the application 
was/is running. 
Since OTP's distributed application framework does not provide a facility for 
synchronising state data, it must be implemented using a different OTP feature 
called mnesia. Mnesia is a distributed database which transparently replicates 
data between nodes. In the present application, mnesia is used to synchronise the 
state, event queue, timer data and user data of the state machine that implements 
the control logic on the primary and backup controllers.  When implementing 
warm standby redundancy, it is important to consider the latency in the link 
connecting the two controllers. This latency limits how often synchronisation can 
be performed and makes it impractical to synchronise user data which changes 
too rapidly. 
When transferring timer data, there are two possible formats which can be used. 
In situations where the clocks of the two controllers can be accurately 
synchronised, it is recommended that timestamps be used for more accuracy after 
changeover. If the clocks of the two controllers cannot be synchronised accurately, 
the time remaining on the timer should be transferred, even though this will be 
less accurate since an unknown duration will have elapsed between changeover 
and the previous synchronisation. 
Mnesia needs to be started and configured on both the primary and backup 
controllers before the redundant application is started. Since the distributed 
application will only start on the backup controller once failover occurs, a possible 
solution is to package the initialisation code for mnesia as a separate application 
which is started when the Erlang node starts. 
4.1.5. Case Study 
A case study was used to evaluate Erlang's supporting capabilities for creating a 
standby-redundant controller architecture within a manufacturing station. The 
significant aspect of the manufacturing station considered here is that it has a 
single controller that interacts with various hardware subsystems and 
synchronizes their actions. 
4.1.5.1. Physical Architecture 
A singulation and feeder station in an assembly cell is used as a case study to 
evaluate the Erlang based redundancy approach. The station consists of a 
singulation unit, a six-axis robot (Figure 8) and a fixture, which is typically on a 
conveyor. The singulation unit takes a batch of unordered parts and presents them 
one-by-one to the robot in collectable orientations. The robot then collects the 
parts and place them in the fixture for processing after all the parts have been 
placed. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
 
 
Figure 8: Feeder Station used as a Case Study 
The Erlang based redundancy solution was used to implement the station level 
control as well as the hardware control logic for the singulation unit. The 
redundant control is executed on two microcontrollers, i.e. a Raspberry Pi 3 model 
B and a Beaglebone Black Rev C. Using two different hardware platforms is 
beneficial from a redundancy standpoint as it decreases the probability of both 
controllers failing simultaneously due to a hardware design fault. Additionally, the 
use of two different microcontrollers evaluates Erlangs portability. Although 
microcontrollers are used here, it is expected that any Windows or Linux based 
computer/controller could be used since Erlang runs on all these platforms. Both 
microcontrollers used here have Linux based operating systems, which allowed 
the use of the erlang_ale library for controlling I/O.  
4.1.5.2. Test Results 
The case study implementation was tested and found to successfully execute 
controller changeover in the event of communication loss between the 
controllers, as well as controller failure due to power loss. It was not possible to 
test the controller’s ability to handle hardware faults, but it is reasonable to expect 
that the redundant controller will handle it in the same way as power loss. 
In the tests, it was found that a net_ticktime (that determines the controller 
changeover time) of 1 second resulted in erratic behaviour due to the resulting 
network load. The net_ticktime was therefore set to 2 seconds. The detection 
interval claimed by Erlang for this configuration is between 1.5 and 2.5 seconds. 
The measured detection interval had an average value of 2.05 seconds with lower 
and upper bounds of 1.76 and 2.24 seconds, respectively. These measurements 
therefore comply with the interval specified by the Erlang documentation, 
mentioned earlier in the paper.  
The changeover duration is the time between a fault occurring in the primary 
controller and the backup controller commencing control. The average 
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changeover duration for this case study was 2.2 seconds. It was found that the 
changeover duration was shorter when the Raspberry Pi 3 was the backup 
controller as it only took an average of 110 ms to initialize the redundant 
application once a fault had been detected. In comparison, an average duration of 
420 ms was required by the Beaglebone Black. System logs showed that this 
variation is related to the time required to re-establish the TCP connections to the 
robot and the camera (the camera is part of the singulation unit and is used to 
identify and determine the pose of parts through computer vision). The cause of 
this variation was not investigated further. 
4.1.6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to evaluate the use of Erlang and OTP’s built in 
features for implementing standby redundancy in a manufacturing station. An 
assessment of the features offered by Siemens software redundancy solution 
revealed that an equivalent Erlang based solution would need to be able to handle 
faults resulting from power loss, network errors and hardware failure. 
The Erlang based solution uses the failover and takeover mechanism of distributed 
OTP applications to detect controller faults and initiate controller changeover. The 
control logic is implemented using a state machine which is facilitated by the 
gen_statem behaviour. Synchronisation of state data is achieved using OTPs 
distributed database mnesia. 
The failover and takeover mechanisms have trouble dealing with network faults 
and is unable to heal itself after their resolution. These issues can be avoided by 
halting controllers that are isolated by network faults and restarting them when 
the faults are resolved. Further research is required to determine whether a 
solution that better handles these scenarios could be implemented using Erlang's 
built in features for node and process monitoring, or by altering the source code 
for the failover and takeover mechanism's implementation (Erlang and OTP are 
open source). This was beyond the scope of this paper which seeks to evaluate 
standard Erlang and OTP features. 
A case study implementation of warm standby redundancy using Erlang/OTP 
achieved an average changeover time of 2.2 seconds. Siemens software 
redundancy claims a changeover time of approximately 1 second (Siemens, 2010). 
Both solutions therefore offer changeover times with a similar magnitude. 
Therefore, using Erlang and OTP is a valid approach for implementing standby 
controller redundancy at a software level for devices which do not provide such 
mechanisms at a hardware level. 
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4.2. Further Case Study Details and Testing 
Methodology 
This section provides additional details that could not be included in the paper 
above due to page limit constraints. This section starts by providing a detailed 
description of the tumbling barrel singulation unit used in the case study system, 
followed by an overview of the software architecture of the Erlang/OTP-based 
standby-redundant station controller. The state machine used to implement the 
singulation unit’s control is then described. Several case-study specific standby 
redundancy implementation details are discussed. Finally, the methodology used 
to test the standby-redundant implementation’s performance is described. 
4.2.1. Tumbling Barrel Singulation Unit Details 
The internal details of the tumbling barrel singulation unit can be seen in Figure 9. 
The annotations on the figure show the trajectory of parts during operation. Figure 
10 illustrates the inner details of the barrel.  
 
  Figure 9: Overview of the Operation of the Singulation Unit (Shown with the Barrel Removed) 
The tumbling barrel singulation unit starts with parts poured into the revolving 
barrel. The barrel contains an internal screw which propels the parts towards the 
scoops on the right (Figure 10). These scoops lift up the parts and deposit them on 
the upper conveyor. As the parts move along the conveyor they are guided into a 
single file line by the singulation gates. The parts then fall onto the lower conveyor 
which travels faster than the upper conveyor to create a gap between the parts. 
Each part triggers a proximity sensor as it falls from the lower conveyor onto the 
turntable. The turntable then rotates, moving the part from the drop zone to the 
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validation zone where computer vision is used to determine whether the part is in 
a collectible position and orientation. If the part's pose is acceptable, the turntable 
moves it into the collection zone and notifies the robot that a part is ready for 
collection. If the part has an unacceptable pose, it remains on the turntable until 
further rotation takes it to the rejection guide, where it falls back into the barrel. 
 
 Figure 10: Sectional View of the Barrel Showing the Screw Mechanism and the Part Scoops 
4.2.2. Software Architecture 
The structure of the Erlang application for this case study is shown in Figure 11. 
The application consists of five processes that form a supervision tree.  
The Redundant Application Supervisor is a top-level supervisor. Its role is to start 
and monitor the other four processes. The Tumbling Barrel State Machine contains 
the control logic state machine, which is described in more detail in the following 
section. 
The other three processes are server processes that implement the Erlang port 
mechanism to interface with C code. This C code is used to interact, respectively, 
with the proximity sensor, turntable motor and conveyor motor, since these 
interfaces rely on drivers which are not directly addressable from Erlang. The 
server processes are case study specific and do not contain any features peculiar 
to standby redundancy. They are therefore not described in more detail here. 
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Figure 11: Structure of the Redundant Application used for the Case Study Implementation 
Erlang processes use message passing to interact with one another. An overview 
of the messages used by the Tumbling Barrel State Machine to interact with the 
other processes, as well as with the robot and camera, is shown in Figure 12. 
Messages sent within the Erlang node are standard Erlang messages, whereas 
messages that cross the node boundary are XML encoded and sent over TCP/IP. 
 
Figure 12: Message Passing Interaction of the Tumbling Barrel State Machine Process 
4.2.3. State Machine Implementation 
The control of the tumbling barrel singulation unit is realized using a state 
machine; the state diagram for the implemented state machine is shown in Figure 
13. Each state is represented by a rectangular box with its name indicated in bold. 
State transitions are denoted by arrows. The trigger for each state transition is 
indicated in uppercase text. Controller actuations are indicated by a forward slash 
(i.e. / actuation) after the events they are in response to.  
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Figure 13: State Machine for the Tumbling Barrel Singulation Unit 
4.2.4. Standby Redundancy Implementation Details 
This section discusses certain standby redundancy implementation details peculiar 
to the case study station controller. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
 
4.2.4.1. Handling Network Failures 
The control system for the tumbling barrel singulation unit has both network-
connected system components (the robot and the camera) and directly connected 
system components (the proximity sensor and the motor drivers for the conveyor, 
turntable and barrel motors). As discussed in Section 4.1.4.5.2, when the 
controllers have directly connected system components, the controllers require a 
method to determine whether they have been isolated by a network fault. The 
controllers in the case study implementation determine whether they are isolated 
by attempting to contact both the camera and the robot, since both connections 
are required for the primary controller to function correctly. When a controller 
determines that it is isolated, it follows the procedure specified in Section 4.1.4.5. 
4.2.4.2. Data Synchronisation 
Ideally, the backup controller should maintain an up-to-date model of the state of 
the primary controller. As explained above, this is facilitated by OTP’s distributed 
database mnesia. However, in some situations, this is not possible, i.e. where the 
information changes so quickly that TCP/IP's communication latencies are 
significant. An example of handling such a situation is the following: 
The rotational position of the turntable is contained in a counter. When the 
turntable is moving, this counter changes too quickly to be synchronised between 
controllers. If failover occurs while the turntable is in motion, there is no way for 
the backup controller to be certain of the turntable’s exact rotational position. This 
is not a problem for parts rotating from the drop zone to the validation zone since 
the part's precise location has not yet been determined. However, for parts 
rotating from the validation zone to the collection zone, this positional uncertainty 
is unacceptable since the robot requires an accurate pick-up position.  
In the case study implementation, a simple, but safe, approach was chosen: when 
changeover occurs, parts that were between the drop zone and the validation 
zone are considered to have arrived at the validation zone, while parts between 
the validation zone and the collection zone are rejected back into the barrel. This 
approach was used since loss in throughput in the case of a changeover is small.  
4.2.4.3. Triggering Physical Subsystems 
Interacting with physical subsystems that need to be triggered by the control 
system, such as the camera and the robot, can complicate state entry after a 
changeover. These devices need to be retriggered after changeover since their 
replies to the previous trigger messages will have been sent to the former primary 
controller.  
The case study implementation showed that performing these triggering actions 
in response to events (Figure 14 (a)) meant that the retriggering had to be done as 
a prerequisite recovery task when entering the state machine after changeover 
(as described in Section 4.1.4.2). It was found that these recovery tasks can be 
avoided if the triggering action is shifted to be a state entry action (Figure 14 (b)). 
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If there are multiple events leading to a state, then this approach can only be used 
when the triggering action is required for every one of these events (Figure 14 (c)), 
since if this is not the case for one or more of these events (i.e. triggering had 
already been performed in an earlier state), then shifting the triggering action to 
be a state entry action would result in a double trigger. In general, therefore, it is 
recommended that, where possible, actions be performed as entry actions, rather 
than event response actions. 
 
Figure 14: Handling Device Triggering 
A further issue that results from the need to retrigger subsystems after 
changeover, is that it could result in the repetition of an already performed task. 
In the case of the camera, this is not a problem since the image capture and 
processing only take a few milliseconds. However, the robot repeating a collection 
sequence for an already collected part would not be ideal, both due to the time 
implications and that it would lead to a miss-feed situation. To prevent this, each 
part is assigned a part number prior to being validated by the camera. A list of 
collected parts is maintained by the robot controller and collection requests are 
checked against this list. 
It is important to note that the ability to retrigger a subsystem is dependent on 
the new primary controller being able to connect to that subsystem after 
changeover. During the case study implementation, it was found that the camera 
system that was used has a simplistic TCP/IP implementation which does not allow 
for much configuration flexibility. As a result, the camera would occasionally 
refuse connection attempts after changeover. It is therefore important that all 
network connected system components either need to be able to handle multiple 
concurrent connections or should be configurable to drop existing connections in 
favour of new connections.  
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4.2.5. Testing Methodology 
The performance of standby-redundant systems is quantified by changeover time 
and system bump (as described in section 4.1.2). System bump is easily quantified 
for continuous systems; however, quantification is difficult for discrete systems 
since it is dependent on the probability of an event occurring during changeover. 
For example, if there are no system events during changeover then there is no 
system bump, but if there is a critical event that is missed then the system bump 
could be substantial. This is further compounded by the fact that certain missed 
events can be recovered (i.e. such as retriggering the camera and robot). Since it 
is so application specific, a quantification of the system bump is not attempted nor 
presented for the case study. The changeover time is used as the sole standby 
redundancy metric since it is generalisable to similar implementations. 
The paper considers two failure scenarios: controller isolation by network faults 
and controller failure due to power loss or hardware failure. The handling of these 
failure scenarios is discussed in section 4.1.4.5. The failure detection and 
changeover times were measured and presented for controller failure due to 
power loss or hardware failure. The detection and changeover times for controller 
isolation due to network faults were not presented since the isolated primary 
controller maintains control until it detects its isolation, leading to a substantially 
shorter period without control. Controller failure due to power loss or fail-stop 
hardware faults was simulated by removing power from the controller in question. 
The Erlang/OTP-based standby-redundant application structure was executed on 
both the Raspberry Pi and the Beaglebone Black. During tests, the first controller 
to initialise started as the primary controller (usually the Raspberry Pi) and once 
the other controller had initialised, it became the backup controller. To avoid 
giving preference to one particular configuration, changeover was performed in 
both directions during tests. The only difference between the Erlang code running 
on the two devices is the pin assignments provided in their configuration files. 
To measure the failure detection time, the code was modified so that each 
controller would set one of its pins high whenever it considered itself to be the 
primary instance. When the controller fault is injected, the controller is no longer 
able to assert that pin and the signal drops low. Then when the backup controller 
detects the failure and assumes the role of primary it will set its own pin high. The 
failure detection time was then measured using an oscilloscope to determine the 
time difference between the falling edge of the failed controller’s signal and the 
rising edge of the new primary controller’s signal. In a similar manner, the 
changeover time was measured between the falling edge of the primary’s signal 
pin and the rising edge of the barrel motor control pin of the new primary (the 
barrel motor control is set after initialisation is complete). The results of these 
tests are presented in section 4.1.5.2. 
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4.3. Handling Process and Node Failure Due to 
Software Issues 
The paper considers two failure scenarios, namely controller isolation by network 
faults and controller failure due to power loss or hardware faults. However, there 
are two further forms of failure that should be considered. This section discusses 
the handling of node and process failures due to software errors. 
To simulate node failure due to software errors, either the BEAM process can be 
terminated, or init:stop can be called. Terminating the process is more 
representative of a true failure but using init:stop enables fault injection at a 
specific point in execution. To simulate process failure, either the process code can 
be written so that an error is generated at the desired instant, or the process can 
be killed from the shell or another process using the kill function. 
Process failure due to software faults are primarily handled by the supervisor 
mechanism. The standby-redundant implementation uses Erlang/OTP’s 
supervision tree concept, as described in section 4.2.2. OTP’s supervisor behaviour 
starts and monitors child processes; if one of the children fails then the supervisor 
restarts it. Testing showed a typical restart time of 1.2 ms. If restarting corrects 
the error then operation continues normally, but if failure continues to occur at a 
rate that exceeds the one specified in the supervisor's callback then it too fails. 
Several supervisors are often stacked to create supervision trees where top-level 
supervisors supervise lower-level supervisors. When failure occurs in a supervision 
tree, it propagates through the supervision tree until enough of the application’s 
processes have been restarted to rectify the error, or alternatively the top-level 
supervisor fails. When the top-level supervisor fails, the node will terminate if that 
application is configured as permanent or transient. When top-level supervisor 
failure causes a distributed application to fail, the distributed application is not 
restarted by the failover mechanism. This may be considered a shortcoming since 
manual intervention is required to restart the application. However, it appears to 
be a design decision. If the failover mechanism restarts the application, only to 
have it fail shortly afterward, then it could lead to each node in the system being 
terminated one-by-one. Distributed applications used to achieve standby 
redundancy should therefore be developed such that the top-most supervisor will 
only fail due to an irrecoverable error. 
Software-caused node failure can occur for several reasons in Erlang/OTP. For the 
standby-redundant approach described above, this node failure is detected in the 
same way as other failure conditions and is handled the same way as controller 
failure due to power loss or hardware faults. The only difference is that the failure 
detection time is shorter because the operating system of the host device is still 
operational so the TCP/IP connection between the primary and backup nodes is 
terminated correctly. Erlang/OTP includes a heartbeat mechanism that can be 
used to automatically detect and restart nodes that fail. This mechanism is 
described in greater detail in appendix A.3. 
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5. Erlang/OTP-Based Standby Redundancy for 
Distributed Holonic Cell Control  
This section presents the development of a standby-redundant holonic cell 
controller. The section is comprised of three papers. 
The first paper, “Conversation Recovery after Failover for Contract Net Protocol 
Communication in an Erlang-Based Holonic Architecture” (Hawkridge et al., 2018 
(b)) is presented in section 5.1. The paper reviews and evaluates the various 
rollback recovery protocols in terms of the conversation recovery requirements of 
a holonic architecture. Recovery mechanisms enable the communication within 
holonic systems to withstand standby redundancy events. The paper presents an 
Erlang/OTP implementation of a pessimistic logging form of rollback recovery. This 
implementation is evaluated using the case of order-resource holon interaction in 
a holonic singulation and feeder cell. 
The second paper, “An Erlang-based Standby-Redundant Distributed Holonic 
Controller for a Manufacturing Cell” (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (c)) is presented in 
section 5.2. The paper first evaluates the redundancy requirements of a PROSA-
based holonic architecture. An Erlang/OTP implementation of standby 
redundancy for a holonic cell is then described. The case study of holonic 
singulation and feeder cell is used to evaluate the implementation. 
The third paper, “Extensible Callback Module Layering in Erlang” (Hawkridge et al., 
2018 (d)) is presented in section 5.3. The paper presents an approach for achieving 
process specialisation using Erlang’s behaviour mechanism. This approach was 
used to facilitate modularity and code re-use in the development of the 
Erlang/OTP standby-redundant holonic cell implementation. 
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5.1. Conversation Recovery after Failover for Contract 
Net Protocol Communication in an Erlang-Based 
Holonic Architecture 
G Hawkridge, AH Basson, K Kruger 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University 
Abstract 
The reliability or availability of complex systems encountered in Industry 4.0, 
cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is a 
significant concern. This paper considers situations where three approaches are 
combined to enhance the availability of such systems: holonic architectures, 
standby controller redundancy and using the Erlang programming language. The 
benefits of holonic architectures include their suitability for complex control 
situations and their fault tolerance. Both of these aspects are supported by the 
use of the contract net protocol (CNP). Standby redundancy is a well-known 
approach to improve the availability of systems. Erlang is a functional 
programming language designed for the development of fault-tolerant soft real-
time control systems. Erlang and its associated library OTP contain features that 
simplify the implementation of standby redundancy. Erlang/OTP also has many 
features, such as concurrency and scalability, that are attractive when 
implementing holonic control systems. 
This paper presents an approach for the recovery of CNP conversations between 
holons that implement standby redundancy. A recovery mechanism is needed to 
ensure that these conversations can continue in the presence of failover events. 
The various forms of rollback conversation recovery protocols are reviewed based 
on the requirements of a holonic system. This review also considers the need to 
interact with parties that are external to the holonic system, including interaction 
with the physical world through controller I/O. It is concluded that a pessimistic 
logging form of rollback recovery is well suited to standby-redundant holonic 
systems. The complex multi-party communication structure within a holarchy is 
decomposed into several simpler parallel one-to-one conversations using certain 
properties of the contract net protocol and holonic control. An Erlang/OTP 
implementation of a pessimistic logging form of rollback recovery is described. A 
case study is used to validate the Erlang/OTP implementation. 
Keywords: Contract Net Protocol; Standby Redundancy; Erlang; Conversation 
Recovery 
5.1.1. Introduction 
Modern manufacturing paradigms are becoming increasingly distributed and 
complex. This is particularly evident in the recent focus on Industry 4.0, cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) (Brettel et al., 
2014; Bi, Xu & Wang 2014; Gerbert et al., 2015). The reliability or availability of 
such complex systems is a significant concern. Availability here refers to the 
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percentage of time for which a system is ready and able to perform its expected 
functions. This paper considers situations where three approaches are combined 
to enhance the availability of such systems: holonic architectures, standby 
controller redundancy and using the Erlang programming language. 
Holonic systems have been highlighted as promising tools for managing 
complexity, changes and disturbances in systems (Monostori et al., 2016). The 
holonic manufacturing paradigm maintains the global control and optimisation 
potential of hierarchical structures, while leveraging the improved flexibility and 
fault-tolerance of a heterarchical structure. This improved fault-tolerance is due 
to the collaborative nature of holons which facilitates having multiple holons 
capable of performing each task thereby avoiding potential single points of failure. 
Single points of failure are system elements where failure of one element results 
in system failure, which should obviously be avoided in large complex systems.  
Even though holonic architectures in general will continue operating even if some 
holons fail, the failure of a holon will reduce the functionality or capacity of the 
system. An approach that can be used to improve the availability of individual 
holons is standby controller redundancy, which has traditionally been used to 
improve the availability of hierarchical or monolithic control systems. A key aspect, 
when standby controller redundancy is used within holonic architectures, is the 
facilitation of inter-holon communication when failover events occur. Failover 
here is the process by which a standby subsystem takes over when the primary 
subsystem fails.   
Inter-holon communication is necessary for collaboration between holons and is 
typically formulated as negotiation mechanisms such as the contract net protocol 
(CNP). This paper focuses on implementing failover during conversations that are 
built around the CNP. In addition to the conversations between parties of the CNP, 
consideration must also be given to two other types of conversations in these 
situations: firstly, the conversations between the software elements of holons and 
their corresponding hardware elements; and secondly, conversations between 
holons and other parties that are external to the holonic system, here referred to 
as “outside world processes” (OWPs). 
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems (Armstrong, 1996). The Open 
Telecom Platform (OTP), a key feature of Erlang, is a set of libraries that simplifies 
the development of large complex systems (Armstrong 2010: 73). Erlang has many 
attractive features, such as concurrency and scalability, that are useful when 
implementing holonic manufacturing control systems (Kruger & Basson, 2017). An 
interesting feature that Erlang and OTP provide is the built-in mechanism for 
application failover. This mechanism will restart an application on another node if 
the node upon which it is currently running fails (the meanings of “application” 
and “node” are described later in the paper). This mechanism has been used to 
implement standby controller redundancy in a monolithic station controller 
(Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). 
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This paper investigates the adaptation of the CNP for use within a holonic control 
architecture where certain holons implement standby redundancy. This includes 
conversation recovery in the presence of failures and the use of Erlang/OTP 
specific mechanisms to avoid certain potential shortcomings of the CNP. 
Conversation recovery with OWPs is also considered. Although this paper focuses 
on a holonic control architecture, it is expected that the key elements of the 
approach will be applicable to other architectures which make use of the CNP 
and/or standby redundancy. 
This paper next provides some background on Erlang and OTP, holonic control 
architectures, the CNP and rollback recovery protocols followed by a description 
of the approach used to enable CNP conversation recovery. A case study is then 
used to validate the recovery solution. 
5.1.2. Erlang Background 
The Erlang programming language was designed for applications which require 
concurrency, fault tolerance and distribution (Anonymous, s.a. (a)). It is these 
features that make it an attractive solution for the implementation of holonic 
control systems (Kruger & Basson, 2017). This section introduces foundational 
concepts in Erlang that are referred to later in the paper. 
5.1.2.1. Concurrency 
Erlang programs are built up by independent concurrent processes which 
cooperate with one another to achieve overall goals. Erlang processes have the 
following properties: processes have sole access to their internal state, processes 
influence one another through asynchronous message passing and processes have 
the capability to spawn further processes (Armstrong 2010: 70).  
Erlang code runs within its own virtual machine, known as BEAM (Bogdan/Björn's 
Erlang Abstract Machine). In Erlang, a node refers to an instance of BEAM, which 
handles scheduling, memory management and message passing for the Erlang 
processes. Additionally, BEAM supports symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) which 
enhances process concurrency on multicore processors (Lundin 2008). BEAM 
provides Erlang with processes that are lightweight, which facilitates the large 
number of processes required to implement complex systems (Larson, 2009: 55).  
5.1.2.2. Distribution 
Distribution flows naturally from Erlang's concurrency model. Since processes 
communicate through message passing and there is no shared state, the only 
difference between process communication within a node and process 
communication between nodes is latency. As a result, it possible to develop an 
Erlang program on a single device and deploy it to a cluster with minimal code 
modification (Armstrong 2010: 70).  
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5.1.2.3. Process Identifiers and Named Processes 
For a process to send a message to another process, it must know the process’ pid 
(process identifier). A pid can be thought of as the address of the process. Pids are 
unique within and between different nodes. When a process sends a message to 
another process, it typically includes its own pid so that the other process can 
reply. There are two mechanisms that can be used to obtain another process’ pid. 
Firstly, it can be passed as an argument when the process is spawned. The second 
and more common mechanism is registered names. Erlang provides the 
mechanism for processes to register themselves under a certain name. Other 
processes can use this name to query the name registry and obtain the 
corresponding pid. There are two different name registries: the local registry and 
the global registry. The local registry only has scope for its node, i.e. it maps 
processes within a node to names that are unique within that node. The global 
registry has scope for and is synchronised across all nodes that belong to the same 
global group. 
5.1.2.4. Process Monitoring, Supervision Trees and OTP Applications 
Erlang’s process model provides process isolation, which contributes to its fault-
tolerance. Process isolation means that if an Erlang process is killed, whether by 
an error or by another process, it will by default not cause an error in any of the 
other processes. 
To handle situations where processes are reliant on other processes to be able to 
fulfil their function, Erlang provides mechanisms for process linking and process 
monitoring. If two processes are linked, the death of the one will result in the 
death of the other. Alternatively, if a process is monitoring another process, it will 
receive a message if the other dies. These features are used by OTP to implement 
supervisor processes.  
A supervisor process starts and monitors its child processes and restarts them if 
they fail. If the failure rate exceeds a specified frequency, the supervisor fails, and 
all its children are killed. The children of a supervisor process can include other 
supervisor processes. This leads to a supervision tree. The principle behind a 
supervision tree is that, if an error occurs, it will propagate through the supervision 
tree until it reaches the point where all the processes required to rectify that error 
have been restarted. In this way, an error can be contained in the region which it 
affects. 
An OTP application is a supervision tree where all the children are 
implementations of standard OTP behaviours. A behaviour is an abstraction that 
implements the generic portions of a common model or pattern. The standard 
behaviours include gen_server (that implements a client-server relationship), 
gen_event (that implements a publish-subscribe mechanism), gen_statem 
(that implements an event driven state machine) and the supervisor model. 
The application specific logic for these behaviours is implemented in the form of 
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callback modules. An advantage of using these behaviours is that they have been 
thoroughly tested in many software products. 
5.1.2.5. Failover and Takeover Mechanisms 
OTP's distributed application failover and takeover mechanisms are key 
components in an Erlang/OTP based redundancy system. To enable the failover 
and takeover mechanism, an OTP application must be configured as a distributed 
application. This configuration specifies on which nodes the application is 
permitted to run, as well as the priority of each node. OTP will start the application 
on the running node with the highest priority. If this node fails, OTP's failover 
mechanism will restart the application on the running node with the next highest 
priority. On the other hand, if at any time a node with a higher priority comes 
online, the takeover mechanism executes which starts the application on the 
higher priority node and stops the application on the lower priority node once the 
higher priority node is initialised. There is a brief period when the application is 
running on both nodes simultaneously, which must be handled to avoid 
unintended side effects. 
The time it takes Erlang to detect that a connected node has gone down is 
controlled by the configuration parameter net_ticktime (an integer value, in 
seconds). Erlang claims that an inaccessible node will be detected within an 
interval of 0.75*net_ticktime to 1.25*net_ticktime (Ericsson AB, 2017 
(a): 7). 
Another situation that should be considered is when a node is isolated due to 
communication loss, but the node remains operational. If communication is re-
established in this situation, the distributed application framework does not re-
establish the failover/takeover relationships for the reconnected node. A 
workaround for these situations is that when a node determines that it has been 
reconnected, it brings any physical devices related to it to a safe state and then 
restarts (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). Restarting the node will re-establish the 
failover/takeover relationships. 
5.1.2.6. Mnesia 
Mnesia is a distributed database management system that is suitable for Erlang 
applications that require continuous operation and exhibit soft real-time 
properties (Ericsson AB, 2017 (b): 2). Mnesia can be used for transparently 
replicating data across Erlang nodes. A useful feature of Mnesia is the ability to 
store Erlang datatypes such as records and references.  
5.1.3. Holonic Background and Architecture 
The holonic control paradigm is based on the concept of a holon which was 
devised by Koestler (1989) to describe how biological and social systems are 
organised. The word holon refers to something which is simultaneously a 
complete whole and part of a larger whole (Van Brussel, 1994). In the control 
context, holons are independent units of control which communicate and 
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cooperate with one another to achieve the system’s goals. A grouping of related 
holons is called a holarchy. Holonic systems typically have a fractal nature: any 
holon in a holarchy can internally contain a lower-order holarchy. An example of 
this is where a cell controller views a station controller as a holon, while the station 
controller itself is a set of holons that control that station.  
Reference architectures are used to facilitate the implementation of holonic 
manufacturing systems by providing a framework for the classification of holons 
and holarchies. The PROSA architecture is a popular and prevalent reference 
architecture. The PROSA reference architecture specifies four categories of holon, 
namely product holons, order holons, resource holons and staff holons (Van 
Brussel et al., 1998). 
A product holon contains the process and product knowledge required to produce 
a specific product. Product holons represent the model of the product type and 
not specific instances of the product. Order holons represent any task that must 
occur within the manufacturing system. An order holon is responsible for 
negotiating with other holons to ensure that the task it represents gets completed 
correctly and on time. Order holons are often used to represent instances of 
products. Resource holons represent the manufacturing resources which drive 
production.  
Even though this discussion is frames in terms of a manufacturing situation, PROSA 
can naturally be extended to other scenarios, even with virtual “products” and 
“resources”. 
The interaction between these three holons is shown in Figure 15. The order 
holons exchange production knowledge with the product holons (i.e. what is the 
procedure for producing this product), the order holons exchange production 
execution knowledge with the resource holons (i.e. negotiation of scheduling) and 
the resource holons exchange process knowledge with the product holon (i.e. how 
to perform the required operation on the product instance). Staff holons are 
optional holons which assist other holons in performing their roles by providing 
“expert” advise. 
The recent book by Valkenaers and Van Brussel (2015) provides an excellent 
reference for holonic manufacturing systems, as well as the PROSA reference 
architecture and its recent extension into the ARTI reference architecture. ARTI 
seeks to generalise PROSA for non-manufacturing applications. Even though 
PROSA is used as context in this paper, the work presented here is applicable to 
other holonic architectures too. 
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Figure 15: Interaction between Order, Product and Resource Holons in a PROSA Architecture 
5.1.4. The Contract Net Protocol 
In control architectures, such as the heterarchical and holonic architectures that 
utilise autonomous entities, collaboration and cooperation is required to achieve 
the systems goals. To facilitate this cooperation a negotiation mechanism is 
required. The CNP is a prominent example of such a negotiation mechanism (Van 
Brussel et al., 1998).  
The CNP is a one-to-many protocol in which a single entity negotiates with 
multiple others to arrange for the supply/consumption of a specific resource 
(virtual or physical) or to offer/request the performance of a task. A primary 
advantage of such a negotiation process is that the unavailability of a resource 
does not negatively impact the overall system as another resource can be selected 
instead.  
Due to the CNPs use in a variety of fields, many different terms are used to 
describe the two classes of participants. For example, Smith (1980) uses the terms 
manager and contractor, whereas FIPA (2002) use the terms initiator and 
participant. For this paper, the generalised terms initiator and responder will be 
used, where the initiator is the entity that starts the conversation by requesting 
bids and the responders are those that submit bids for consideration by the 
initiator. 
The protocol consists of four phases as shown in Figure 16. The first phase is 
announcement, where the initiator sends a call for proposals (CFP) to one or more 
responders. This CFP may be requesting a service to be performed or offering the 
use of a resource.  
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Figure 16: The Fundamental Phases of the Contract Net Protocol  
The second phase is bidding. In the bidding phase, the responders formulate 
responses to the CFP and bid on it by responding with proposals or reject it by 
responding with refusals. A proposal indicates the responder’s intention to 
provide/utilise what is being bid upon and specifies any conditions or limitations 
that apply to the acceptance of the bid.  
The third phase is selection. Once the initiator has received responses from all the 
responders, or it has reached the bid deadline specified in the CFP, the initiator 
evaluates the received proposals. Based on the received proposals, the initiator 
may accept bids from one or more responders by sending them proposal 
acceptance messages. Typically, the initiator will send proposal rejection 
messages for all unsuccessful bids. The CNP does not assume that this is 
guaranteed so responders usually implement a selection deadline.  
When responders are only able to partially satisfy the CFP, the initiator may 
choose to select multiple proposals which can be combined so satisfy the original 
request. Due to the complexity that can arise when combining multiple proposals, 
many implementations of the CNP choose to constrain selection to a single 
proposal by decomposing the original request into multiple simpler requests, each 
of which can be completely fulfilled by a single responder (Smith, 1980). This is 
commonly the approach used in holonic systems since order holons typically 
execute sequentially.  
The fourth phase is delivery. A contract has now been formed between the 
initiator and the responders whose bids were accepted and these responders now 
deliver on their proposals. Depending on the scenario, this phase may consist of a 
single response indicating completion or failure, or it may consist of a more 
elaborate conversation.  
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5.1.5. Standby Controller Redundancy 
5.1.5.1. Comparison with Other Forms of Redundancy 
Control redundancy is used to ensure the continued operation of a control system 
in the event of a certain subset of potential faults. This continued operation is 
often required to meet safety or availability requirements. Several different terms 
are used when categorising the different forms of redundancy, but this paper 
adopts the terminology used by National Instruments (2008) who divide control 
redundancy into the following categories: N-modular redundancy, 1:N 
redundancy and standby redundancy.  
N-modular redundancy consists of multiple independent controllers which 
execute the same control logic based on the same inputs. The controller outputs 
are sent to an arbitration module which decides the correct system output, 
typically using a majority vote. N-modular redundancy is typically used in safety 
critical systems. 
For a 1:N redundancy setup there is a single backup unit for several controllers 
each performing different control tasks. This redundancy approach has limited 
benefits since it can only handle a single controller failure. The approach requires 
input and output multiplexing to allow the backup controller to takeover control 
from any of the other controllers. This approach allows a level of redundancy to 
be achieved at a low cost. However, if distributed I/O is not used, the complexity 
of multiplexing direct I/O can lead to additional expenses.  
Standby Redundancy appears to be the most common form of redundancy in the 
manufacturing industry. In standby redundancy there are two controllers, a 
primary and a backup, and when the primary fails the backup takes over. There 
are three levels of standby redundancy, i.e. cold, warm and hot. These levels are 
ranked according to their switchover time and the resulting system bump. System 
bump refers to abrupt movements and reduction in product quality that result 
from the difference between the system's actual state before changeover and the 
initial state of the backup controller. Cold standby is the lowest of the three levels 
and is characterised by relatively long changeover times and substantial system 
bump. Typically, the backup controller is powered down until it is started by an 
operator or a watchdog mechanism. In contrast, hot standby is characterised by 
changeover times in the order of milliseconds and little or no system bump. Here 
the backup controller is fully operational and processes the same inputs as the 
primary, except that its outputs are disabled. The backup controller compares its 
own state to that of the primary to detect faults in the execution of the primary. 
Warm standby falls between the other two forms: typically, the backup is powered 
on and regularly synchronises with the primary's state so that changeover is 
relatively quick and there is minimal system bump. 
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5.1.5.2. Standby Redundancy in Holonic Systems 
Holonic, and heterarchical, architectures are considered to inherently provide 
greater potential for availability as resources are dynamically selected. They also 
facilitate the dynamic addition and removal of resources. This enables a form of 
resource redundancy, whereby the system can easily have multiple resources 
capable of performing each task. This paper considers a scenario where resource 
holons also implement standby redundancy.  
Guessoum et al., (2002) present a solution for the dynamic replication of agents 
according to their criticality and load. This approach is suitable for scenarios where 
agents are purely software entities and the use of replication corresponds to 
assignment of additional computational resources. However, in the holonic 
manufacturing context there is a direct mapping between certain holons, such as 
resource and order holons, and the instances which they represent. In these 
scenarios standby redundancy is better suited as it maintains the one-to-one 
mapping. 
This replication approach could be used to provide improved availability and load 
distribution for holons that are not instance specific such as product holons and 
certain staff holons. However, care should be taken to ensure consistency 
between replicas. 
5.1.6. Conversation Recovery Background 
The ability to re-establish a conversation when one of the parties is restarted after 
failing is a critical component of message passing for systems that implement 
standby redundancy. In this section an application context is first presented and 
then rollback recovery, as an approach to conversation recovery, is discussed. 
5.1.6.1. Holonic Cell Context 
This paper uses the context of a holarchy in which the resource holons and the 
order holons may implement standby redundancy. In this holarchy, the 
negotiation and exchange of production execution knowledge between these 
holons is based on the CNP. It should be noted that standby redundancy can also 
be applied to other types of holons by straight-forward adaptation of what is 
presented here. However, when holon communication is stateless (i.e. the reply 
from the holon is entirely based on the contents of the original request), such as 
between order and product holons, it does not require a recovery mechanism as 
requests can simply be retried. 
The holarchy in Figure 17 is considered here: Order holons are created to handle 
a request from a higher-level controller/customer. These order holons interact 
with resource holons using a CNP based protocol. A resource holon may be a single 
controller corresponding to a physical device or a lower-level holarchy responsible 
for a set of manufacturing hardware. The resource holons interact with their 
corresponding hardware through some form of I/O. In this holarchy, the 
manufacturing hardware, and in some scenarios the higher-level controller, are 
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modelled by special conversation members known as Outside World Processes 
(OWPs). An OWP is a conversation member which is not capable of storing state 
or rolling back to a historical state and is therefore unable to participate in the 
recovery process (Elnozahy et al., 2002).  
It should be noted that in the pure PROSA approach the manufacturing hardware 
is considered to be part of the resource holon, but here the hardware is considered 
to be separate to simplify the discussion. 
 
Figure 17: Example Communication Structure within a Holarchy 
5.1.6.2. Rollback Recovery Overview 
Rollback recovery refers to a class of protocols used to recover conversations 
when one or more of the parties fail and are restarted in multiparty message 
passing based distributed systems (Elnozahy et al., 2002). The objective of rollback 
recovery is to minimise lost work and avoid state inconsistencies which could lead 
to deadlock. 
In a rollback recovery protocol, each party periodically saves data to stable 
storage. Stable storage may refer to the parties’ onboard persistent storage or it 
may refer to a distributed data store. When a failed party is restarted, the rollback 
recovery mechanism uses this stored data to rollback any or all the parties to a 
point where their collective states are consistent. 
The precise meaning of state consistency is highly dependent on the assumptions 
made about the system and the recovery protocol used. However, in general it 
refers to a collective state from which the distributed system can continue 
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operating normally. The domino effect is a phenomenon which rollback recovery 
protocols seek to avoid. The domino effect is when the only way the recovery 
mechanism can achieve state consistency is by rolling all the parties back to their 
initial state. 
Elnozahy et al., (2002) divide rollback recovery protocols into two subcategories: 
checkpoint-based and log-based protocols. For checkpoint-based protocols, each 
party only saves the information necessary to restart it in its current state. 
Checkpoint-based protocols are further categorised according to how the instance 
at which to make a checkpoint is selected.  
Log-based protocol can be considered an extension of checkpoint-based 
protocols. For log-based protocols, each party saves both a checkpoint of its state 
and a log of the information required to replay any non-deterministic events (i.e. 
the sending and receiving of messages). Log-based rollback-recovery assume that 
a party’s execution can be modelled as a sequence of deterministic states, each 
starting with the execution of a nondeterministic event (i.e. the receipt of a 
message). Therefore, by replaying events, a log-based protocol is typically able to 
achieve a recovered state that is closer to the pre-failure state than the last 
checkpoint. Log-based protocols are further categorised according to which party 
logs what and whether logging is synchronous (blocking) or asynchronous (non-
blocking).  
5.1.7. Holarchy Conversation Decomposition 
When adding rollback recovery to a holarchy, a valid approach is to treat all 
communication within the holarchy as a single conversation. However, this 
approach could have a substantial performance impact on the system due to the 
potentially large number of holons and the frequency with which they 
communicate (in the simple case in Figure 17 there are 10 parties, 4 of which are 
potentially OWPs).  
Rollback recovery protocols ideally should be transparent, which means that they 
are application independent and can be implemented without the application 
requiring any knowledge of them. This transparency is especially important for the 
delivery phase of the CNP since the communication structure used here is highly 
application specific. Therefore, transparency ensures that a prescribed approach 
will not limit the holonic architectures to which it is applied. 
By using certain properties of the holonic paradigm, the PROSA architecture and 
the CNP, it is possible to simplify the rollback recovery implementation. The use of 
these assumptions reduces the transparency of the recovery implementation 
since it is then limited to applications for which the assumptions hold. The 
simplification is derived from separating communication within the holarchy into 
several smaller independent conversations each implementing a separate 
instance of the recovery mechanism. This is only possible when the recovery 
implementation ensures that non-failed parties remain operational and do not 
rollback. 
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The first property that can be used is that in a PROSA architecture, each order 
holon corresponds to a single task (comprising a sequence of processing steps). 
Therefore, in the classical situation, there is no need for one order holon to 
interact with another order holon. In more complex scenarios (e.g. requiring the 
combination of two or more components into a single assembly), an order holon 
can spawn two or more subsidiary order holons to produce components for the 
assembly, followed by an assembly process controlled by the original order holon.  
Further, due to the hierarchical/fractal nature of a holarchy, resource holons can 
be assumed to never interact directly with the higher-level controller. Also, the 
manufacturing hardware does not interact with any party other than its 
corresponding resource holon. In certain holonic implementations it is necessary 
for resource holons to communicate with one another. For example, in a feeder 
cell, a pick and place robot may need to notify a singulation unit once it has 
completed part collection. This can be implemented using direct resource-to-
resource communication, but that would require that additional conversations 
implement recovery mechanisms, which adds complexity. To reduce the number 
of types of conversations, and by extension the complexity, all inter-resource 
communication is channelled through the relevant order holon. In this way the 
existing recovery mechanism for resource-order conversations can be used. 
Since the CNP is a one-to-many protocol (as opposed to a multiparty protocol) it 
can be treated as several parallel one-to-one conversations. The implication of this 
is that a conversation between a particular resource and an order holon will not 
affect the conversations between that order holon and other resource holons. 
Therefore, without loss of generality, the communication within the holarchy can 
be separated into the following independent conversations (Figure 18):  
• Each order holon can have a conversation with the higher-level controller; 
• Each order holon can have a conversation with each relevant resource 
holon; and 
• Each resource holon can have a conversation with its corresponding 
manufacturing hardware. 
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Figure 18: Separating the Holarchy Communication into Multiple One-to-One Conversations 
Using these properties, communication within the holarchy can be decomposed 
from a single many-to-many conversation into multiple concurrent one-to-one 
conversations, each of which can implement a rollback recovery mechanism. This 
compartmentalisation simplifies recovery as only two parties need to be 
considered. This approach is also well suited to Erlang’s process-centric 
programming model. A disadvantage of this approach is that it could limit the 
number of failures that can be handled for protocols such as causal logging, in 
which a portion of the recovery data resides in the transient memory of an active 
party member. This does not apply to pessimistic logging since all recovery data 
resides in stable storage. 
5.1.8. Conversation Recovery with Outside World Processes 
Handling failover during conversations with OWPs introduce aspects different 
from CNP conversations. OWP conversations are therefore considered in this 
section. Although the conversation between a resource holon and its hardware is 
the focus in this section, this section also applies to the conversation between an 
order holon and a higher-level controller. 
5.1.8.1. Outside World Processes Peculiarities 
The presence of OWPs in a system limits the available protocols since the protocol 
must ensure that messages sent to/received from an OWP are not irrecoverably 
lost. It is assumed that an OWP is not able to reproduce messages sent to other 
conversation members and the system typically needs to ensure that it does not 
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resend an already sent message to an OWP, since the OWP may not identify it as 
the same message which could result in undesired side effects. There are some 
scenarios where OWPs may be able to reproduce messages or handle repeated 
messages (such as the re-reading of a sensor). In such scenarios message 
loss/repeat is less significant but still generally undesirable. 
In the application scenario shown in Figure 17, it is particularly important that 
messages between the manufacturing hardware and the resource holons are not 
lost since the state of the resource holon does not exist purely in software but 
must corresponds to the physical reality of the manufacturing hardware. Message 
loss is analogous to system bump as it can lead to a difference between the 
system's apparent state in the resource holon and the system's physical state. It is 
therefore desirable that the selected recovery protocol roll back as little as 
possible, ideally no further than the last checkpoint.   
It should be noted that rollback recovery protocols assume that OWPs do not fail. 
Practically it is possible for an OWP to fail. However, since an OWP is incapable of 
participating in the recovery process, this assumption holds because OWP failures 
are not handled by the recovery protocol but are instead handled at an application 
level. 
Regardless of the form of rollback recovery used, messages sent from OWPs to 
parties that are offline or in the process of being restarted by the standby 
redundancy mechanism will inevitably be lost if the OWP does not have the ability 
to replay messages. 
5.1.8.2. Checkpointing with Outside World Processes 
Checkpointing protocols are usually not suitable for scenarios with OWPs since 
recovery often requires multiple parties to rollback by one or more checkpoints 
which could result in a substantial system bump. One exception is coordinated 
checkpointing which uses a two-phase commit initiated by one of the parties to 
ensure that there are no in transit messages at the time of checkpointing, so 
rollback extends no further than the last checkpoint. To prevent messages being 
lost, a checkpoint is made immediately after any interaction with an OWP. 
Unfortunately, this checkpointing tends to have a significant performance impact 
since the two-phase commit blocks execution of all conversation members until 
the checkpoint is finalised. This is particularly problematic if OWP interaction is 
frequent. 
5.1.8.3. Log Based Protocols with Outside World Processes 
Log based protocols are the preferred form of rollback recovery when dealing with 
OWPs (Elnozahy et al., 2002). By logging messages sent to OWPs and logging 
messages from OWPs as soon as they arrive, log-based protocols reduce the 
likelihood of messages being lost or re-sent (due to race conditions, resending is 
usually still a possibility). There are three forms of log-based rollback recovery 
optimistic logging, pessimistic logging and causal logging.  
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5.1.8.3.1 Pessimistic Logging 
Pessimistic logging assumes that failure may occur after every non-deterministic 
event. Therefore, pessimistic protocols save sufficient information to replay every 
message (known as the message’s determinant) to stable storage before it is 
permitted to influence execution. An advantage of pessimistic logging is that, since 
all message determinants and checkpoints are immediately saved, recovery will 
only rollback the restarted party to its last checkpoint, therefore parties need only 
maintain their last checkpoint in stable storage. Furthermore, interaction with 
OWPs requires no additional mechanisms since interactions are immediately 
logged. The disadvantage of pessimistic logging is that regular blocking saves to 
stable storage can affect the performance of the system. 
5.1.8.3.2 Optimistic Logging 
Optimistic logging protocols log message determinants to volatile storage which is 
periodically or asynchronously flushed to stable storage. These protocols are 
termed optimistic since they assume that the logs will probably be written to 
stable storage before failure occurs. Since optimistic logging logs to volatile 
storage it has less of a performance impact on the system. Recovery can be 
complicated for optimistic logging protocols since parties may have checkpoints 
and logs that were not saved to stable storage. Therefore, dependencies between 
the parties need to be tracked to ensure that each party is rolled back sufficiently 
so that no party is left isolated. Furthermore, interaction with OWPs is problematic 
since coordination between parties, similar to coordinated checkpointing, is 
needed to ensure that knowledge of that interaction is not lost during rollback.  
5.1.8.3.3 Causal Logging 
Causal logging is similar to optimistic logging since message determinants exist in 
both volatile and stable storage. However, in causal logging each party ensures 
that the determinants that causally precede its current state are either logged to 
stable storage or exist in the volatile memory of that party. Causally precedent 
determinants refer to all message delivery and receipt events that led up to the 
party’s current state. Figure 19 illustrates a scenario with three parties. In this 
scenario, messages 1,2,3,4 and 5 causally precede the state of party A. When a 
party fails, the volatile determinants that would be lost if optimistic logging were 
used, exist in the volatile memory of other parties. This is achieved by parties 
appending volatile message determinants onto the messages they send to other 
processes. The advantage of causal logging is that it shares the performance 
benefits of optimistic logging while maintaining the OWP interaction benefits of 
pessimistic logging. However, the complexity of precedence tracking and recovery 
can be prohibitive. 
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Figure 19: Messages with Causal Precedence for Party A 
5.1.8.3.4 Conclusion 
All the presented forms of rollback recovery are feasible for handling OWP 
interaction in a holonic manufacturing system. However, the performance impact 
of coordinated checkpointing, given the frequent interaction with the higher-level 
controller and manufacturing hardware which are considered OWPs, make it an 
unattractive solution. Recovery for optimistic logging requires rollback of non-
failed parties which conflicts with the requirements for the holarchy conversation 
decomposition considered in this paper. Furthermore, similar to coordinated 
checkpointing, frequent OWP interaction will limit its performance. 
Both pessimistic logging and causal logging meet the requirements prescribed for 
the holarchy considered in this paper. Implementation and recovery are simpler 
for pessimistic logging than for causal logging. Pessimistic logging has more of a 
performance impact that causal logging, but this may not be significant since many 
manufacturing control scenarios only require responsiveness in the order of tens 
or hundreds of milliseconds. For the scenario considered in this paper, a 
pessimistic logging form of rollback recovery is recommended. 
5.1.9. Contract Net Protocol with Failover in Erlang 
This section describes the implementation, using Erlang/OTP, of a pessimistic 
logging form of rollback recovery for the CNP based interaction between order 
and resource holons. Standby redundancy is implemented using OTP’s failover 
mechanism as detailed by Hawkridge et al. (2018 (a)).  The changeover time for an 
Erlang/OTP based standby-redundant application is bounded if the initialisation 
time of the redundant application is bounded. 
5.1.9.1. Architecture 
The architecture of the order and resource holons for this Erlang implementation 
is shown in Figure 20. To make best use of Erlang's process model, the classical 
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PROSA order and resource holons are each implemented using multiple Erlang 
processes. Each holon has a dispatcher process that spawns conversation handler 
processes in response to requests. Each conversation handler for an order holon 
and a resource holon is an independent Erlang process, which is responsible for 
one side of a single conversation. These handler processes are transient, i.e. once 
their conversation is complete they terminate, and all related data is removed. 
This is generally considered to be good practice in Erlang as it compartmentalises 
functionality and simplifies garbage collection. 
 
Figure 20: Architecture of an Erlang Holarchy 
5.1.9.2. Stable Storage 
Stable storage for the recovery mechanism is provided by OTP’s distributed 
database mnesia. Mnesia can be used to replicate data across several Erlang 
Nodes. Mnesia supports ACID transactions (Ericsson AB, 2017 (b): 20). ACID stands 
for Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability. The Atomicity property is 
important for this application since it means that a transaction which saves a new 
checkpoint will either occur successfully on all replicas or it will not occur on any 
(i.e. the previous checkpoint will remain). 
5.1.9.3. Checkpoint Selection 
The logic for both the initiator and the responder portions of the CNP based 
conversation are implemented by state machines. Using state machines simplifies 
code re-entry when an application is restarted (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). The 
checkpointing mechanism is implemented between OTP’s gen_statem 
behaviour and the CNP based application. A checkpoint contains the state 
machine's state and application data. A checkpoint is made whenever the state 
machine enters/re-enters a state.  
To avoid redoing work, checkpoints should at a minimum occur at the beginning 
of each phase of the CNP. However, a typical state machine implementation would 
divide the protocol into states corresponding to waiting to receive a message, 
processing a message and sending a message which would result in many more 
checkpoints. 
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It is worth noting that, since the duration of a CNP is short compared to the 
conversations for which rollback recovery is typically used, a naïve approach would 
be to use the initial conversation state as the sole checkpoint and reconstruct the 
pre-failure state through message replay. This approach would use more system 
resources since all non-selected responders would need to remain alive until the 
order has been completed so that their bids could be replayed if necessary. 
Furthermore, potentially non-deterministic aspects of the protocol must be 
mitigated to ensure that reconstruction does not result in a different state (i.e. 
storing timestamps of received messages to ensure that a potentially winning bid 
that originally arrived after the deadline is not selected during recovery).  
5.1.9.4. Message Logging 
For a pessimistic logging, rollback recovery protocol messages are logged to stable 
storage before they are allowed to affect execution. This implementation uses 
sender-based message logging (Elnozahy et al., 2002). This means that messages 
are logged on the sender side. The receiving party may store the received message 
at an application level (i.e. the responder may need to be store the CFP for later 
use), but this is not required by the recovery mechanism. 
5.1.9.5. Conversation Identifiers 
When a holon is restarted by the standby redundancy mechanism, the process 
identifiers (pids) of the Erlang processes in the new instance of the holon will be 
different to the pids in the previous instance. This means that pids are not a 
reliable method of identifying conversation members when redundancy is present 
in a system. Erlang’s feature for global name registration could be considered to 
simplify the handling of this case, since the new holon’s processes could reregister 
themselves once restarted. However, global name lookup would have to be 
performed for every message transmission which would impact performance. The 
case where pids alone are used for process addressing is therefore preferred here 
since it is the more general case. 
In this Erlang implementation, a conversation handler process is spawned to 
handle new CFPs. This means that for an initiator to keep track of which 
responders have replied to a CFP, the initiator cannot use the sender pid of a 
proposal message to identify which responder sent the proposal since the pid of 
the conversation handler will be different from that of the dispatcher to which the 
initial CFP was sent. 
To handle pid changes during failover and the use of conversation handler 
processes, a conversation identifier is introduced. Erlang's mechanism for the 
generation of unique identifiers, known as references, is used in the present 
implementation. A new reference is generated to serve as a conversation 
identifier for the conversation between each initiator-responder pair. This 
conversation identifier can then be used by initiators to keep track of replies. 
Additionally, the conversation identifier is saved to stable storage by both 
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members of the conversation so that it is available to verify the conversation 
membership of a restarted party.  
5.1.9.6. Recovery 
Here it is important to note that Erlang messages are asynchronous, which implies 
that the sending party is unaware of whether its messages have been delivered or 
read, unless some form of acknowledgement reply is implemented. During failure 
free operation, Erlang messages are guaranteed to arrive in the message queue of 
the receiving process (Anonymous, s.a. (b)). Furthermore, messages sent from one 
process to another are guaranteed to arrive in the order they are sent 
(Anonymous, s.a. (b)). These properties of Erlang’s message passing are used in 
the recovery mechanisms described below. 
5.1.9.6.1 Recovery of Alternating Contract Net-based Conversations 
This section considers recovery when the CNP based conversation is alternating. 
An alternating conversation here refers to the case where communication is 
initiated by a single message and is continued by successive singular responses. In 
other words, the two parties alternate between active and waiting states. During 
an active state the party is preparing to send a single message to the other party 
(in response to a received message). During a waiting state the party is waiting to 
receive a message/response from the other party. Alternating communication 
simplifies recovery because only the last sent message needs to be maintained in 
stable storage for possible resending, since receipt of previous messages is implied 
by receiving subsequent responses. 
The first three phases of the CNP are inherently alternating, so whether a CNP 
based conversation can be considered alternating is dependent on the delivery 
phase. The simplest case is when the delivery phase consists of only a single result 
message (Figure 21). There are two recovery cases that must be considered for an 
alternating conversation: failure of the active party and failure of the waiting 
party. 
 
Figure 21: An Example Alternating Contract Net Protocol Conversation 
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Failure of the active party is the simpler recovery case (Figure 22). Although the 
restarted active party has a new address, the address of the waiting party is still 
the same. Once the active party has finished preparing its response, it sends the 
response to the waiting party using the correct conversation identifier. The waiting 
party updates its record of the active party’s address and execution continues 
normally. 
 
Figure 22: Handling Failure of the Active Party 
Failure of the waiting party is more complicated since it may miss the active party’s 
response during the recovery period (Figure 23). To account for this possibility, 
when a failed party is restarted in a waiting state, it sends an address update to 
the active party. If the address update is received before the active party has sent 
its response, then the active party stores the new address and sends the response 
to that address when it is ready. If the address update is received after the active 
party has sent the response (unsuccessfully) and transitioned to the next waiting 
phase, then the response (which has been logged to stable storage) is resent to 
the waiting party and execution continues normally. 
An undelivered response does not necessarily mean that the waiting party failed 
before receiving it; the failed party may have received the message but failed 
before saving it to stable storage. The message is therefore not available once the 
party has restarted. So, as far as the restarted party is concerned, the message 
was not successfully delivered. If the party had been able to save the message to 
stable storage before failing, then the restarted party would transition to the 
active state and the case where the failed party is in the active state would apply.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
 
Figure 23: Handling Failure of the Waiting Party 
5.1.9.6.2 Recovery of Generic Contract Net-based Conversations 
This section considers recovery when the implemented CNP based protocol does 
not require have an alternating nature. These non-alternating conversations could 
be made alternating through the addition of acknowledgements. However, these 
acknowledge messages add additional overhead and could slow execution, 
particularly in scenarios where there is a lot of one-sided communication such as 
the transmission of progress updates. Additionally, not having this requirement 
provides flexibility for the implementation of the delivery phase. 
The recovery mechanism is shown in Figure 24. To provide for non-alternating 
conversations, each sent message is assigned a message identifier which is unique 
and ascending. This identifier is added to the message. Each party stores all their 
sent messages mapped to the corresponding message identifiers. Additionally, 
each party stores the identifier of the last received message. Since Erlang 
messages from one process to another are guarenteed to arrive in the order they 
are sent, storing the latest message identifier implies receipt of all previous 
messages. 
When a failed party (here called A) is restarted, A sends an address update (using 
the original conversation identifier) to the other party (here called B). Added to 
this address update are the identifiers of A's last sent message and last received 
message. When receiving the address update, B compares the received identifier 
in the update message to its own latest sent identifier. If A’s received identifier is 
earlier than B's sent identifier, B resends, in order, all the messages sent after A's 
last received message. 
B then also compares its own received identifier with the sent identifier in the 
update message from A. If A’s sent identifier is later than B's received identifier, 
the B sends an address update of its own to A to trigger the resending of those 
messages. 
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Figure 24: Recovery of a Non-Alternating Conversation 
5.1.9.7. Contract Net Protocol Deadlines 
The CNP has two key deadlines, that is the bid deadline and the selection deadline. 
These deadlines ensure that the system continues to operate if there are nodes 
which are unable to respond since they have gone down or are busy.  
The length of these deadlines can have a substantial impact on the performance 
of a CNP based system (Valckenaers & Van Brussel, 2005). If a deadline is too short, 
it increases the likelihood of missing bid or award messages. If the deadline is too 
long, then it can slow the system down. For example, if one of the responders is 
down, every initiator that requests a bid from it will wait the full bid deadline 
before continuing. 
Erlang offers two features that can be used to handle these cases which impact 
the CNP. First, Erlang’s concurrency and light weight processes enable responders 
to create conversation handler processes to handle each new CFP. These handlers 
respond with refusals if the responder is busy so that the initiator does not wait 
for their response. Secondly, Erlang’s built in functionality for monitoring other 
processes enables the detection of nodes which are offline or go down during the 
CNP. This detection can be used to add extra layers of intelligence to the protocol. 
Consider a standby redundancy scenario where a responder goes down before 
sending their bid and the initiator has received all other bids: the initiator could 
choose to reduce the remaining bid deadline to a little longer than the maximum 
restart duration (if this is shorter than the remaining bid deadline) so that, if the 
responder is restarted, it will still be able to submit its bid, while, if the responder 
is not restarted, the time the initiator spends waiting is reduced (Figure 25). 
Alternatively, the initiator could choose not to wait for proposals from failed 
responders if it has already received enough proposals. Proposals from responders 
which go down after sending their bid could also be removed from consideration 
so that the proposal from a failed responder is not selected. 
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Figure 25: Erlang’s Monitor Functionality used to Reduce Time Spent Waiting for Bids 
5.1.9.8. Ending the Conversation 
There is a potential issue that can occur when ending the conversation since 
parties terminate once they have completed their portion of the protocol in this 
Erlang implementation. If a party fails while waiting for the last message of the 
conversation and is restarted after it has been sent, then the other party will have 
terminated, and recovery will not be possible. 
To avoid this, an acknowledge message is added at the end of the conversation 
(Figure 26). This ensures that recovery is possible since both parties remain alive 
until receipt of the last critical message is acknowledged. It is possible that a party 
could fail while waiting for the acknowledge message; however, it is then 
reasonable to assume, after a timeout longer than the changeover time, that the 
other party received the last critical message and terminated. 
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Figure 26: Extension of the Contract Net Protocol to include an Acknowledge Message 
5.1.10. Case Study 
The case study considers a feeder cell containing a robot and multiple singulation 
units which supply the same part. The cell is responsible for placing the supplied 
parts in a fixture on a conveyor. This type of scenario typically precedes an 
assembly operation. Each order placed with the feeder cell corresponds to the 
feeding and placement of a single part. Products that require multiple parts place 
multiple orders. This case study assumes that the robot is not a bottleneck and 
therefore each order holon utilizes the CNP to select the singulation unit which 
will maximise throughput. 
5.1.10.1. Contract Net-based Negotiation Protocol 
The CNP based conversation between the order holon and the respective resource 
holons representing the singulation units is shown in Figure 27. Once the 
announcement, bidding and selection phases have been completed, the delivery 
phase commences. The protocol used for this case study allows for the use of 
forecast scheduling. This is only a possibility when the singulation rate is 
deterministic. When a singulation unit’s proposal is accepted, it sends a booking 
confirmation message. Then, once the singulation unit begins singulating the part 
for the order, a started message is sent to assure the order holon that the booking 
is being honoured. Once singulation is complete, the singulation unit sends the 
collection position to the order holon as part of the inform result message. The 
order holon passes this information to the robot and, when the robot informs the 
order holon that it has collected the part from the singulation unit, the order holon 
sends a progress update to the singulation unit informing it that collection is 
complete. The singulation unit then informs the order holon that it has completed 
the requested task. The order holon acknowledges receipt of the completion 
message and the conversation is complete. 
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Figure 27: CNP Conversation Structure between Order and Resource Holons 
5.1.10.2. Test Procedure 
Testing was performed for the case where an order holon with standby 
redundancy fails and for the case where a resource holon with standby 
redundancy fails (Figure 28). Failure was induced at the points shown in Figure 29. 
The implemented recovery mechanism was successful in handling failures at all 
the test points. 
 
Figure 28: Test Cases Considered - (a) Failure of a Redundant Order Holon (b) Failure of a 
Redundant Resource Holon 
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Figure 29: Conversation Failure Test Points 
5.1.11. Conclusions 
This paper considers an Erlang/OTP based holonic system where the order and 
resource holons may implement standby redundancy. The CNP is used to facilitate 
negotiation between the order and resource holons. A recovery mechanism is 
needed to ensure that conversations between order and resource holons can 
continue in the presence of redundancy events. This paper also considers recovery 
of conversations with OWPs, i.e. between resource holons and their physical 
device, as well as between the order holons and a higher controller. 
Certain properties of the CNP, holonic manufacturing systems and the PROSA 
architecture were used to decompose the complex multi-party communication 
structure within a holarchy into several simpler parallel one-to-one conversations.  
The various forms of rollback conversation recovery protocols were reviewed 
based on the requirements of a holonic system. It was concluded that both the 
pessimistic and causal logging forms of rollback recovery can meet these 
requirements. A pessimistic logging form of rollback recovery was then selected 
for this implementation due to its simpler implementation and recovery. 
An Erlang/OTP based implementation of a pessimistic logging form of rollback 
recovery for the CNP is described. The implementation provides for both a simple 
alternating conversation structure and a generic one-to-one conversation. The 
implementation also showcases the use of Erlang's monitor functionality to avoid 
the unnecessary waiting that plagues many CNP implementations. A case study 
implementation for a feeder cell, where both the order and resource holons 
implement standby redundancy, was used to validate the proposed solution.  
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5.2. An Erlang-Based Standby-Redundant Distributed 
Holonic Controller for a Manufacturing Cell  
G Hawkridge, AH Basson, K Kruger 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University 
Abstract 
This paper evaluates the ability to increase availability through an Erlang 
implementation of redundancy within a distributed holonic cell controller. 
Distributed control is prominent in modern manufacturing systems and holonic 
architectures are a popular approach for the implementation of distributed 
control. Holonic control typically contains holons that represent single points of 
failure and are therefore susceptible to controller failures. This paper proposes a 
redundant distributed holonic architecture for a manufacturing cell controller. The 
redundancy implementation is separated into a holon redundancy level and a 
controller platform level. The holon redundancy level ensures the availability of 
the software entities used to implement holons. The forms of redundancy that are 
best suited to different types of holons are discussed. The controller platform 
considers the control hardware to maintain the availability of computational 
capacity used to execute holons. Three controller platform architectures are 
discussed: the split resource approach, the self-contained approach and the mesh 
approach.  
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems. The Erlang solution employs various 
features in Erlang (and its associated library, OTP) that greatly simplify both 
distribution and achieving standby redundancy. The controller architecture 
presented here can utilise all the controllers in a cell, in a mesh approach, 
distributing the computational work dynamically amongst controllers that have 
the capacity and capability to contribute. A case study implementation is used to 
evaluate the proposed controller architecture. This paper shows that Erlang and 
OTP provide an attractive platform for implementing redundancy in a distributed 
holonic cell controller. The combination of the proposed standby-redundant, 
distributed holonic architecture and the Erlang/OTP standby redundancy 
implementation approach can improve the availability of a manufacturing cell by 
enabling it to withstand a selection of controller failure modes. 
Keywords: Erlang; Standby Redundancy; Holonic Architectures;  
Distributed Control 
5.2.1. Introduction 
In the past decades the manufacturing sector has been characterised by intense 
competition resulting from globalisation and shifting customer requirements. To 
handle this competition, the manufacturing sector has been pursuing 
manufacturing systems and paradigms which provide shorter lead times, 
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increased product customisation, flexible production capacity, real-time feedback, 
lower costs and improved resource efficiency (Bi et al., 2008; Lasi et al., 2014).  
Various paradigms, such as flexible manufacturing systems (FMSs) and 
reconfigurable manufacturing systems (RMSs), have been investigated with 
varying levels of success. This investigation continues with the recent focus on 
Industry 4.0, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and the Industrial Internet of Things 
(IIoT) (Brettel et al., 2014; Bi, Xu & Wang 2014; Gerbert et al., 2015). A common 
element amongst these paradigms is the distributed nature of their control.  
The holonic manufacturing paradigm is a control approach that offers flexibility 
and the ability to manage disturbances in an efficient manner (Van Brussel et al., 
1998). Holonic control is also well suited to distributed control. Holonic systems 
are built from holons that are independent autonomous units of control which 
collaborate to achieve the desired functionality. Holonic control offers increased 
availability by reducing (but not eliminating) the effect of certain single points of 
failure through functional redundancy. Availability here refers to the percentage 
of time for which a system is ready and able to perform its expected function. 
Single points of failure are system elements where failure of the element results 
in system failure. Functional redundancy here refers to the use of multiple holons 
that can perform a certain task. Even though holonic systems will, in general, 
continue operating in the presence of holon failure (for holons that have 
functional redundancy), this holon failure will reduce the functionality or capacity 
of the system, leading to bottlenecks and possible system failure. Additionally, 
functional redundancy is not always possible for all types of holon. Standby 
redundancy is an approach that can be used to improve the availability of 
individual holons. Standby redundancy has traditionally been used to improve the 
availability of hierarchical or monolithic control systems.  
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems (Armstrong, 1996). The Open 
Telecom Platform (OTP) is a key feature of Erlang, is a set of libraries that simplifies 
the development of large complex systems (Armstrong 2010: pg. 73). Erlang has 
many attractive features, such as concurrency and scalability, that are useful when 
implementing holonic manufacturing control systems (Kruger & Basson, 2017). An 
interesting feature that Erlang and OTP provide is the built-in mechanism for 
application failover. This mechanism will restart an application on another node if 
the node upon which it is currently running fails (the meanings of "application" 
and "node" are described later in the paper). This mechanism has been used to 
implement standby controller redundancy in a centralised station controller 
(Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). 
This paper proposes an architecture for implementing redundancy in a distributed 
holonic cell controller and investigates the use of Erlang’s and OTP’s built-in 
features to facilitate the implementation of redundancy in this architecture. 
Although this paper focuses on redundancy in a holonic control architecture, it is 
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expected that elements of this work could also be applicable to both hierarchical 
and heterarchical architectures. 
This paper next provides a background on holonic control architectures, followed 
by a description of the redundant distributed holonic architecture considered in 
this paper. Following this, some background information on Erlang and OTP is 
provided, followed by a description of the Erlang/OTP based implementation of 
the proposed holonic architecture. A case study of the redundant holonic 
architecture in an assembly cell is then used to evaluate the Erlang/OTP 
implementation. 
5.2.2. Holonic Control Review 
5.2.2.1. Background 
The holonic control paradigm is based on the concept of a holon which was 
devised by philosopher Arthur Koestler (1989) to describe how biological and 
social systems are organised. The word holon refers to an entity which is 
simultaneously a complete whole and part of a larger whole (Van Brussel, 1994). 
In the manufacturing context, holons are independent units of control which 
communicate and cooperate with one another to achieve the systems goals. A 
grouping of related holons is called a holarchy. Holonic systems are developed 
using a fractal approach, which implies any holon in a holarchy is either a singular 
entity or a lower-order holarchy. An example of this is where a cell controller views 
a station controller as a holon, while the station controller itself may be a set of 
holons that control that station.  
5.2.2.2. Control Architectures 
Holonic control seeks to combine the advantages of both hierarchical and 
heterarchical architectures (Van Brussel et al., 1998).  Hierarchical control 
arranges the system into levels with strict master slave relationships. These strict 
relationships can diminish availability since a controller fault results in the portion 
of the hierarchy that is subordinate to that controller becoming frozen (Dilts, Boyd 
& Whorms, 1991). This is particularly detrimental if the faulty controller is high up 
in the hierarchy. Heterarchical control seeks to entirely avoid master-slave 
relationships by using controllers that are autonomous cooperative peers. The 
advantage of this is that it leads to an inherent level of fault tolerance since the 
interdependency between controllers is reduced. Similarly, holonic control 
exhibits an inherent fault tolerance since holons are independent and cooperative. 
An advantage of the master-slave relationships in hierarchical architectures is that 
they facilitate achieving a global system view which simplifies global optimisation. 
In heterarchical architectures, each control element maintains its own local 
system view. The benefit of this is that control elements are not dependant on 
some central state repository. However, the lack of global system view in 
heterarchical systems limits the implementation of global optimization and 
coordination (Leitão, 2009). For holonic systems, a global system view is achieved 
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through the fractal hierarchy of holarchies. Each holon is the single source of truth 
about its own state and maintains a local system view to facilitate fault tolerance 
and autonomy. Global optimisation is assisted using advisory holons which suggest 
optimal solutions that other holons may choose to accept. 
Hierarchical control elements are problematic from a system availability 
standpoint as they are often single points of failure (Colombo, Schoop & Neubert, 
2006). Although holonic control seeks to limit hierarchical relationships to advisory 
relationships, these single points of failure are sometimes still present.  
5.2.2.3. The PROSA Reference Architecture 
Reference architectures facilitate the implementation of holonic manufacturing 
systems by providing a framework for the classification of holons. The PROSA 
architecture is a popular and prevalent reference architecture. The PROSA 
reference architecture specifies four categories of holon, i.e. product holons, 
order holons, resource holons and staff holons (Van Brussel et al., 1998). 
A product holon contains the process and production knowledge required produce 
a specific product. Product holons represent the model of the product type and 
not specific instances of the product. Order holons represent system activities and 
are responsible for ensuring that these activities get completed on time. Order 
holons often represent the production of a product instance. Each product 
instance negotiates with other holons to get themselves produced. Resource 
holons represent the manufacturing resources present in the system. These three 
classes of holons are sometimes referred to as the standard holons.  
The order holons exchange production knowledge with the product holons (i.e. 
what is the procedure for producing this product), the order holons exchange 
production execution knowledge with the resource holons (i.e. negotiation of 
scheduling) and the resource holons exchange process knowledge with the 
product holon (i.e. how to perform the required operation on the product 
instance). (The interaction between the standard holons can be seen in the 
proposed architecture in Figure 31). Staff holons are optional holons which assist 
the standard holons by providing “expert” advice. 
A key concept when implementing a PROSA based holarchy is self-similarity (Van 
Brussel et al., 1998). Self-similarity states that all holons of the same type should 
expose a common interface regardless of whether they are singular or composite 
holons and regardless of the “hierarchical” level of the holarchy to which they 
belong. 
The recent book by Valkenaers and Van Brussel (2015) provide an excellent 
reference for holonic manufacturing systems, as well as the PROSA reference 
architecture and its recent extension the ARTI reference architecture. 
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5.2.2.4. Contract Net Protocol (CNP) 
Holonic (and heterarchical) architectures inherently provide a greater potential for 
availability than hierarchical architectures, since resources are dynamically 
selected through negotiation protocols. This enables a form of functional 
redundancy for resources, since the system can have multiple resources capable 
of performing each production step. If one of these resources goes down, it 
becomes unresponsive and is no longer selected. The system can continue 
operating if other resources are available that can provide the required service. 
The contract net protocol (CNP) is recommended as a negotiation mechanism for 
use in holonic systems (Van Brussel et al., 1998). The contract net protocol is a 
one-to-many protocol in which an initiator negotiates with one or more 
responders to arrange for the supply/consumption of a specific resource (virtual 
or physical) or to offer/request the performance of a task.  
 
Figure 30: The Phases of the Contract Net Protocol  
The protocol consists of four phases as illustrated in Figure 30. First, during the 
announcement phase, the initiator sends a call for proposals (CFP) to one or more 
responders. Next, during the bidding phase, the responders process the CFP and 
bid on it by responding with proposals or refusals. A proposal indicates a 
responder’s intention to provide/utilise what is being bid upon and specifies any 
conditions or limitations that apply to the acceptance of the bid. Third, once the 
initiator has received responses from all the responders or it has reached the 
response deadline specified in the CFP, the selection phase begins. During the 
selection phase, the initiator selects the best suited proposal and sends an 
acceptance message to the relevant responder. The other unsuccessful bidders 
are then sent rejection messages. Finally, a contract has been formed between the 
initiator and a responder. The responder now delivers on their proposal. 
Depending on the application, this phase may consist of a single response 
indicating completion or failure of the contract or it may contain more extensive 
communication between the contract members.  
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5.2.3. Redundant Distributed Holonic Controller Architecture 
The availability of a distributed holonic system is here considered as two layers: 
the holon redundancy layer and the controller platform layer. The holon 
redundancy layer ensures the availability of the software entities used to 
implement the holons. The controller platform layer considers the control 
hardware in the distributed system and ensures that the computational capacity 
required to execute the holonic controller is available.  
For a system to exhibit high availability, it would be necessary to add redundancy 
to other system elements (such as power and network infrastructure, etc.), but 
these aspects are not considered in this paper. This section starts with an overview 
of the holarchy considered in this paper followed by descriptions of the holon 
redundancy and controller platform layers. 
5.2.3.1. Holarchy Structure 
This section describes the PROSA-based distributed holonic architecture 
developed for this research (Figure 31). Apart from the standard PROSA holons, 
this architecture features three architectural resource holons, namely the gateway 
holon, the order manager holon and the service directory. These architectural 
holons do not represent manufacturing resources, but rather software resources 
that are necessary to provide the desired functionality.  
 
Figure 31: Architecture of the Redundant Distributed Holonic Controller 
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5.2.3.1.1 Gateway Holon 
The gateway holon is the communication interface between the higher-level 
controller (HLC) and the holarchy. The gateway holon serves as a middleman 
which forwards messages between the HLC and holons within the holarchy. The 
gateway holon can act as a reverse proxy and rewrite the source address of 
outgoing messages to hide the internal structure of the holarchy. If the HLC is also 
a holonic controller then the single point of contact provided by the gateway holon 
contributes to the holarchy appearing as a single resource holon to the HLC. As the 
single point of contact, the gateway holon is responsible for advertising the 
holarchy’s capabilities with the HLC (should the HLC provide such a mechanism). 
If the holarchy and the HLC use different messaging schemes, the gateway holon 
can be used to translate between these messaging schemes. This may include 
translating between different encodings (i.e. from XML encoded text to Erlang 
records), performing encryption/decryption or converting between different 
transmission media (i.e. from TCP/IP to RS-232).  
5.2.3.1.2 Order Manager Holon 
The order manager holon dispatches order holons to handle new requests from 
the HLC (i.e. in response to a CFP, if the CNP is used for HLC interaction). The order 
manager holon can be used to limit the number of active orders to prevent the 
holarchy from being flooded by requests. When the number of active orders 
reaches a specified limit, the order manager holon queues additional requests and 
dispatches them when current active orders are completed. 
5.2.3.1.3 Service Directory 
The service directory is an architectural resource holon that assists both resource 
and order holons. By allowing resource holons to advertise their capabilities, the 
service directory helps each order holon find resource holons with the capabilities 
required for the next stage of that order's production procedure. A service 
directory can contribute to the modularity and reconfigurability of a holarchy since 
a resource can be added to or removed from active use by registering or 
deregistering with the service directory without directly affecting the remainder 
of the holarchy. This service directory functionality is sometimes integrated into 
the product holons rather than implemented as a separate architectural resource 
holon. 
5.2.3.1.4 Product Holons 
Each product holon contains the production procedure, product model and 
parameters required to produce an instance of that product. Typically, when 
products have many possible alternative procedures, the complete production 
procedure is stored in a top-level product holon, while the local product holons 
maintain a subset of the complete procedure based on the capabilities present 
within their holarchy. If the holarchy's capabilities change or the top-level product 
holon is updated, then the local product holons are updated. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
5.2.3.1.5 Resource Holons 
The resource holons in this holarchy are standard PROSA resource holons. They 
may be singular holons or they may represent lower order holarchies. Resource 
holons can represent both hardware and software resources. Examples of 
resources include interchangeable machine tools, storage slots, specialised 
software, conveyor intersections, execution time on specialised hardware and 
robotic arms. 
5.2.3.1.6 Order Holons 
Each order holon is responsible for managing the production of a single instance 
of a product. In this paper, interaction between the order and product holons is 
based on the NEU interaction protocol (Valkenaers & Van Brussel, 2015). NEU is 
an acronym for the phases of the protocol: Next-Execute-Update. In the NEU 
protocol, each order holon serves as repository for the state data of their product 
instance. When an order holon is initialised, it requests the initial state data for its 
product from the relevant product holon. The order holon then loops through the 
NEU phases. 
First, the order holon sends a next request to the product holon. Contained in this 
request is the order holon’s state data for its product instance. Based on the 
order's state, the product responds with a list of candidate next production steps. 
The order holon then selects and executes one of the candidate production steps. 
When the production step is complete, the order holon sends the execution result 
along with the product state to the product holon for updating. The product holon 
responds with an updated version of the state data. These three phases are 
repeated until the order is complete. An advantage of this approach is that it 
enables generic, product-agnostic order holons, since state data and result 
messages are handled exclusively by the product holons (but stored in the order 
holons).  
5.2.3.2. The Holon Redundancy Layer 
In a holonic manufacturing cell controller, holons are autonomous software 
entities. The holon redundancy layer considers the availability of holons at a 
software level. While the heterarchical aspects of holonic control limit the 
interdependence of holons, certain holons require redundancy to ensure that they 
do not represent single points of failure when experiencing software or controller 
faults.  
For the holarchy considered in this paper, there are multiple critical holons that 
represent potential single points of failure. The gateway holon is critical since 
unavailability would suspend all communication between HLC elements and 
holons in the holarchy. The order manager holon is critical since unavailability 
would prevent the dispatching of new orders. The unavailability of a product holon 
would halt order holons attempting to produce an instance of that product. Order 
holons need redundancy to ensure that the state of the in-progress products they 
represent is not lost in the event of failure. If the service directory is the sole 
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method of resource discovery, then it is also a single point of failure since 
unavailability would result in the order holons being unable to locate viable service 
providers. In general, redundancy is required for all resource holons that are the 
sole provider of a particular service. This architecture does not include any staff 
holons, but if it did then they would not require redundancy since their role should 
be purely advisory.  
5.2.3.2.1 Forms of Redundancy 
When considering the forms of redundancy that are applicable to a holon, it is 
important to identify whether the holon is entirely software based or if it is 
physically coupled. Physically coupled holons are holons which are required to 
execute on a specific controller or set of controllers. The resource holon 
corresponding to a machine tool is an example of an uncoupled resource holon; 
the resource holon is simply a software representation of the properties and 
allocation of the machine tool and can therefore execute anywhere. Resource 
holons are often physically coupled by controller I/O; resource holons may control 
the manufacturing equipment they represent directly using controller I/O and are 
therefore restricted to executing on controllers that are connected to their 
manufacturing equipment. This is the case for the singulation station controller 
presented in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (a)). 
Holons may also be physically coupled by communication infrastructure. In such a 
case, holons would be restricted to executing on controllers that are able to meet 
their communication requirements. For resource holons this may occur when the 
manufacturing equipment they represent has a dedicated low-level control unit. 
The resource holon corresponding to a robotic arm is an example of such a 
resource holon. If the resource holon can communicate with the robot control unit 
from any of the controllers in the system (i.e. over TCP/IP), then the resource 
holon is uncoupled. However, if the resource holon can only communicate with 
the robot control unit from specific controllers (i.e. only certain controllers have 
RS-232 connections to the control unit), then the resource holon is coupled to 
those controllers. 
For physically coupled holon, the redundancy implementation is highly dependent 
on the number of controllers to which the holon is coupled. In general, the 
approaches discussed below for uncoupled holons are expected to be applicable 
to coupled holons, particularly those that are coupled by communication 
infrastructure, however the application specific nature of a holon’s coupling may 
give rise to additional complications or limit the holon to a particular form of 
redundancy. 
For uncoupled holons (i.e. holons that are entirely software based), additional 
instances can be created as required, provided that the necessary computational 
capacity is available. This paper will consider two forms of redundancy for 
uncoupled holons, i.e. replication and standby redundancy.  
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Replication of uncoupled holons, here refers to the creation of multiple replicas of 
a holon within the holarchy. All replicas of the holon are active so should one of 
the replicas fail, the other replicas are still available. Replication facilitates load 
balancing since other holons may interact with any of replicas. However, 
consensus algorithms may be required to maintain consistency between all 
replicas. This approach is common in multi-agent systems, for example Guessoum 
et al. (2002) present an approach for dynamic replication in a multi-agent system 
according to agent criticality and load. 
Standby redundancy of software holons refers to the scenario where there is a 
single primary instance. The primary instance is the only instance that performs 
any interaction with other holons. Upon failure of the primary instance, a backup 
instance takes over as the new primary. This backup instance may have existed in 
an idle state prior to taking over from the primary or it may be created when 
failure of the primary is detected. 
Standby redundancy is more suitable for holons, such as resource and order 
holons, that exhibit a one-to-one mapping between the holons software instance 
and the role/functionality/entity it represents. Standby redundancy maintains this 
one-to-one mapping. In contrast, replication is well suited for holons that are not 
instance specific, such as product holons and certain staff holons. For example, 
standby redundancy preserves the gateway holon as a single point of contact for 
the holarchy, whereas replication would lead to multiple gateways which breaks 
this single point of contact property and the singular appearance of sub-
holarchies. 
For the holonic architecture considered here, standby redundancy is implemented 
by the gateway holon, the order manager holon, the order holons, the service 
directory and resource holons that are not functionally redundant and are not 
limited by physical coupling. Replication will be implemented by the product 
holons. 
5.2.3.2.2 Managing Conversations 
A fundamental characteristic of holonic manufacturing systems is the interaction 
between holons. The correct functioning of this inter-holon communication is 
critical to the stability of any holarchy. Systems which contain holon redundancy 
need to implement some form of conversation recovery to handle communication 
interruptions caused by redundancy events. These interruptions can include 
message loss during changeover and changes to the execution location (i.e. 
message destination address) of affected holons. 
The complexity of recovery is dependent on whether the interaction protocol is 
stateful or stateless. Stateless protocols typically exhibit a request-response 
pattern where responses are dependent solely on the content of the request. The 
NEU protocol, used for interaction between the order and product holons, is an 
example of a stateless protocol since all necessary state is contained in each 
request. 
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In contrast, for stateful protocols the content of a response depends on the 
delivery/receipt of prior messages and on a shared knowledge of the conversation 
state. The contract net protocol is an example of a stateful protocol since 
communication is expected to follow a prescribed pattern and the delivery/loss of 
a message can alter the subsequent behaviour of the conversation members. 
Recovery for stateless protocols is achieved by resending the request if no 
response is received (within a specified timeout). For example, when a product 
holon instance fails, an order holon can resend an unanswered request to another 
instance of that product holon and receive a response that should be identical to 
the response that the original product holon would have given. Recovery of 
stateful protocols requires more advanced recovery mechanisms such as the 
pessimistic logging-based approach used by Hawkridge et al. (2018 (b)) for CNP-
based conversations. 
5.2.3.3. The Controller Platform Layer 
The controller platform layer is responsible for ensuring the availability of the 
computational capacity required to execute the holons. Figure 32 shows the 
controllers present in a typical distributed holonic cell. The holarchy contains a cell 
controller and several dedicated controllers for certain resources. The resource 
controllers have traditionally had minimal computational capacity (essentially 
representing a form of distributed I/O). However, the current trend exhibited in 
the Industry 4.0 paradigm is for these edge devices to contain more and more 
computational capacity.  
 
Figure 32: Typical Controller Structure in a Distributed Holonic Cell 
Although a cell holarchy is considered in this paper, it is expected that these 
approaches are applicable to higher level holarchies where resource controllers 
would have even greater computational capacity. This section considers three 
different approaches for holon assignment or mapping within the holarchy’s 
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controllers: the split-resource approach, the self-contained resource approach 
and the mesh approach. 
5.2.3.3.1 The Split Resource Approach 
In the split resource approach, the physically coupled resource holons are divided 
into holon logic and hardware interface portions. The hardware interface portions 
execute on the resource controllers, while the resource holon’s logic portions and 
the other holons execute on the cell controller (Figure 33). A frequent example of 
this split resource approach is when a multi-agent system (typically running on a 
PC) is used to implement the holon-level logic while the hardware interface is 
implemented on a PLC using an IEC 61131-3 language (Leitão, 2009). In this case 
the resource holon logic would implement standby redundancy while the 
hardware interfaces utilise the redundancy approach implemented by the 
respective resource controllers (if any). 
 
Figure 33: The Split Resource Approach for Holon Assignment 
5.2.3.3.2 The Self-Contained Resource Approach 
In the self-contained resource approach, the entire resource holon (both 
hardware interface and control logic) is implemented on the resource controller 
of each physically coupled resource (Figure 34). This approach is advantageous 
from a modularity and reconfigurability standpoint since resources are no longer 
computationally dependant on the cell controller. A key aspect of the self-
contained approach is that it shifts computational load from the cell controller to 
the resource controllers. This may allow a less powerful cell controller to be used, 
but it may require more powerful resource controllers. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
 
Figure 34: The Self-Contained Resource Approach for Holon Assignment 
5.2.3.3.3 The Mesh Approach 
The mesh approach takes the self-contained approach a step further and uses 
spare computational capacity on the resource controllers to provide redundant 
execution for other holons as well (Figure 35). In other words, the resource 
controllers form a mesh that serves as the backup for the cell controller. An 
advantage of this approach is that the cell controller can be eliminated as a single 
point of failure using the controllers already present in the system, thus avoiding 
the cost of additional controllers. Additionally, if there is enough computational 
capacity available in the resource controller mesh, the holons could be executed 
exclusively on the resource controller mesh and a dedicated cell controller would 
not be required. This approach could improve the scalability of the holarchy since 
the computational capacity of a controller mesh has the potential to exceed the 
capacity attainable in high-end singular controllers. 
 
Figure 35: The Mesh Approach for Holon Assignment 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
The mesh approach is not well suited to scenarios where the gateway holon is 
physically coupled to the cell controller. This can occur when the connection used 
to communicate with higher-level controllers is only available on the cell controller 
(i.e. if gateway-to-HLC and gateway-to-resource communication use different 
communication networks). In these scenarios the mesh approach can still be used 
to provide redundant execution for other holons, but it may be necessary to add 
additional cell controllers to ensure that the gateway holon is not a single point of 
failure. 
5.2.3.3.4 Further Considerations 
5.2.3.3.4.1 Network Load 
A key difference between the above approaches is the associated network loads. 
The split resource approach has a lower network load since most of the holon 
interaction occurs within the cell controller. The self-contained approach has a 
higher network load since the interaction between physically coupled resource 
holons and other holons occurs over the network. The mesh approach tends to 
have the highest network load since it shifts almost all the holon interaction onto 
the network. It could be possible to reduce the network impact of the mesh 
approach by ensuring that holons which interact frequently are located on the 
same controller (i.e. placing an order holon on the controller of the resource which 
it has selected). However, this will not be further considered in this paper, since it 
is expected that high capacity networks will become more prevalent in 
manufacturing systems with the recent popularity of the Industrial Internet of 
Things (IIoT) and Industry 4.0 paradigms. 
5.2.3.3.4.2 Failure Scenarios and their Mitigation 
Two failure scenarios for the holonic system are considered here. The first scenario 
is due to the unavailability of resource holons. This occurs when all the resource 
controllers corresponding to some essential (physically coupled) resource 
capability fail. Consider the assembly of a product which requires the insertion of 
Part A into Part B: if all the resources that can perform this operation are offline, 
then the product cannot be produced. The likelihood of this failure scenario can 
be reduced by adding extra resources for critical capabilities or by implementing 
standby redundancy for critical resources.  
The second failure scenario is due to the unavailability of uncoupled software 
holons. For the split resource and self-contained resource approaches this occurs 
when the cell controller fails (i.e. the order and product holons, which were 
executing on that controller, are now unavailable).  For the mesh approach this 
occurs when controller failures (cell or resource) degrade the available capacity 
across the controller mesh to the point at which holon execution is no longer 
effective or even possible.  
Reducing the likelihood of this failure scenario for the mesh approach requires the 
addition of more controllers or the use of controllers with more computational 
capacity. For the split resource and self-contained resource approaches, 
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redundancy between two or more cell controllers is needed. The cell controllers 
may be high-reliability embedded PCs or PLCs which will make failures less 
frequent, but this may not negate the need for redundancy since failure is always 
a possibility.  
Cell controller redundancy, for the split resource and self-contained approaches, 
can be implemented using standby redundancy or parallel execution. For standby 
redundancy, one of the controllers is the primary which executes the holons 
exclusively and the other controllers are standby controllers which wait to 
takeover when the primary fails. For parallel execution, all the cell controllers are 
active and the holons are distributed across them. Standby redundancy keeps 
uncoupled holon interaction within the primary controller, whereas some of this 
interaction occurs on the network with parallel cell controllers. Parallel controllers 
are advantageous when considering changeover time since only the holons which 
were executing on the failed controller need to be restarted. Furthermore, parallel 
cell controllers are preferable when there are holons which are replicated since 
replicas can be assigned to different cell controllers.  
5.2.3.3.4.3 Selection 
The abovementioned split resource, self-contained resource and the mesh 
approaches each have their merits. The split resource approach is well suited to 
systems where the resource controllers have limited computational capacity or 
where the software development platforms of the resource controllers are not 
conducive to implementing holon level logic. This approach is also well suited to 
heterogeneous environments where each resource controller has a different 
software platform. The self-contained resource approach provides modularity by 
implementing the whole resource holon on the resource’s controller. This 
approach takes some of the computational load off the cell controller which can 
improve scalability. The mesh approach has the potential to be more scalable and 
handle more failures by utilising the computational capacity of all the controllers 
in the holarchy. In a heterogeneous environment, this approach is not practical if 
the logic for each holon must be separately developed for every controller 
software platform in the system. 
For the remainder of this paper, the considered holarchy will use the mesh 
approach for the controller platform since the mesh approach places the fewest 
restrictions on the locations of various holons. The mesh approach, therefore, also 
showcases the ease with which Erlang/OTP based holons can be redundantly 
distributed and the portability of Erlang/OTP (i.e. it’s ability to run on 
heterogeneous hardware). 
5.2.4. Erlang Background 
The Erlang programming language is designed for applications that require 
concurrency, fault tolerance and distribution (Anonymous s.a. (a)). It is these 
features which make it an attractive solution for the implementation of holonic 
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control systems (Kruger & Basson, 2017). This section introduces foundational 
Erlang concepts for the sake of readers not familiar with the language. 
5.2.4.1. Concurrency 
Erlang programs are built up by independent concurrent processes which 
cooperate with one another to achieve the systems goals. Erlang processes have 
the following properties: processes have sole access to their internal state, 
processes influence one another through asynchronous message passing and 
processes have the capability to spawn further processes (Armstrong 2010: 70).  
Erlang code runs within its own virtual machine, known as BEAM (Bogdan/Björn's 
Erlang Abstract Machine), which handles scheduling, memory management and 
message passing for the Erlang processes. Additionally, BEAM supports symmetric 
multiprocessing (SMP) which enhances process concurrency on multicore 
processors (Lundin 2008). BEAM provides Erlang with processes that are 
lightweight, which facilitates the large number of processes required to 
implement complex systems (Larson, 2009: 55). Furthermore, BEAM can run on 
most Unix, Linux and Microsoft Windows based operating systems which 
enhances the portability of Erlang code (Anonymous s.a. (b)). An instance of BEAM 
is referred to as a node. 
5.2.4.2. Distribution 
Distribution flows naturally from Erlang's concurrency model. Since processes 
communicate through message passing and there is no shared state, the only 
difference between process communication within a node and process 
communication between nodes is latency. As a result, it possible to develop an 
Erlang program on a single device and deploy it to a cluster with minimal code 
modification (Armstrong 2010: 70). 
5.2.4.3. Supervision Trees and OTP Applications 
Erlang’s process model provides process isolation, which contributes to its fault-
tolerance. Process isolation means that if an Erlang process is terminated, whether 
by an error or by another process, it will not cause an error in any of the other 
processes. 
To handle situations where processes are reliant on other processes to be able to 
fulfil their function, Erlang provides mechanisms for process linking and process 
monitoring. If two processes are linked, the death of the one will result in the 
death of the other. Alternatively, if a process is monitoring another process, it will 
receive a message if the other dies. These features are used by OTP to implement 
supervisor processes.  
A supervisor process starts and monitors its child processes and restarts them if 
they fail. If the failure rate exceeds a specified frequency, the supervisor fails, and 
all its children are terminated. The children of a supervisor processes can include 
other supervisor processes. This leads to a supervision tree. The principle behind 
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a supervision tree is that, if an error occurs, it will propagate through the 
supervision tree until it reaches the point where all the processes required to 
rectify that error have been restarted. In this way, an error can be contained in the 
region which it affects. 
An OTP application is a supervision tree where all the children are 
implementations of standard OTP behaviours. A behaviour is an abstraction that 
implements the generic portions of a common model or pattern. The standard 
behaviours include gen_server (that implements a client-server relationship), 
gen_event (that implements a publish-subscribe mechanism), gen_statem 
(that implements an event driven state machine) and the supervisor model. 
The application specific logic for these behaviours is implemented in the form of 
callback modules. An advantage of using these behaviours is that they have been 
thoroughly tested in many software products. 
5.2.4.4. Failover and Takeover Mechanisms 
OTP's distributed application failover and takeover mechanisms are key 
components in an Erlang/OTP based redundancy system. To enable the failover 
and takeover mechanisms, an OTP application must be configured as a distributed 
application. This configuration specifies on which nodes the application is 
permitted to run, as well as the priority of each node. OTP will start the application 
on the running node with the highest priority. If this node fails, OTP's failover 
mechanism will restart the application on the running node with the next highest 
priority. On the other hand, if at any time, a node with a higher priority comes 
online, the takeover mechanism executes. The takeover mechanism starts the 
application on the higher priority node and stops the application on the lower 
priority node once the higher priority node is initialised. There is a brief period 
when the application is running on both nodes simultaneously, which must be 
handled to avoid unintended side effects. 
The time it takes Erlang to detect that a connected node has gone down is 
controlled by the configuration parameter net_ticktime (an integer value, in 
seconds). Erlang claims that an inaccessible node will be detected within an 
interval of 0.75*net_ticktime to 1.25*net_ticktime (Ericsson AB, 2017 
(a): 7). 
Another situation that should be considered is when a node is isolated due to 
communication loss, but the node remains operational. If communication is re-
established in this situation, the distributed application framework does not re-
establish the failover/takeover relationships for the reconnected node. A 
workaround for these situations is that when a node determines that it has been 
reconnected, it brings any physical devices related to it to a safe state and then 
restarts (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). Restarting the node will re-establish the 
failover/takeover relationships. 
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5.2.4.5. Mnesia 
Mnesia is an Erlang/OTP-based distributed database management system that is 
designed for Erlang applications that require continuous operation and exhibit soft 
real-time properties (Ericsson AB, 2017 (b): 2). For data redundancy, mnesia can 
be configured to transparently replicate all stored data across a specified set of 
Erlang nodes. A useful feature of Mnesia is the ability to store Erlang datatypes 
such as records and references.  
5.2.5. Erlang Implementation 
This section describes the Erlang/OTP implementation of the holonic architecture 
considered in this paper. The architecture is implemented across a controller 
mesh. To achieve this, each controller executes an instance of BEAM and is 
therefore an Erlang node.   
5.2.5.1. OTP Application Architecture 
OTP applications (hereafter referred to as applications) are used to package 
supervision trees that implement specific functionalities. In this paper, most 
holons are packaged as applications. The failover/takeover mechanism of 
distributed applications restarts an application on another node if the node on 
which it is running goes down. The failover/takeover functionality and OTP’s 
distributed database (mnesia) are used to implement standby redundancy for 
holons that require it. If the system contains dedicated cell controllers (i.e. to add 
additional capacity to the controller mesh), the node priority feature of OTP’s 
distributed application framework can be used to ensure that uncoupled software 
holons will prioritise execution on these controllers whenever they are online and 
that resource controllers in the mesh will only be used as redundant backups. 
Holons which implement replication are packaged as standard applications and 
these applications are started on each node where a replica is required. 
Erlang/OTP does not contain a built-in feature for managing the replication of 
applications at runtime (such as the ability to specify a required number of active 
replicas within a pool of nodes). It is expected that such a feature could be 
developed using Erlang’s core functionalities, but this is left for future work. 
Each Erlang node hosts multiple applications, including an instance of the mnesia 
application. Holons that implement standby redundancy, such as the gateway 
holon, service directory and uncoupled resource holons, are packaged as 
distributed applications. The order holons also implement standby redundancy, 
but a different implementation approach is used as explained below. A node may 
also host replicas of product holons. If a node is on the controller of a physically 
coupled resource, then the node will also host that resource holon application 
(Figure 36). If the physically coupled resource implements Erlang-based standby 
redundancy using the approach proposed in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (a)), this 
application will be distributed and configured to only run on the controllers 
corresponding to that resource.  
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Figure 36: OTP Application Architecture for a Resource Node 
5.2.5.2. Erlang Process Architectures for Each Holon Type 
5.2.5.2.1 Gateway and Order Manager Holons 
The gateway holon and the order manager holon are implemented by single Erlang 
processes. Each of these holons is implemented under its own distributed 
application. 
5.2.5.2.2 Service Directory 
An Erlang/OTP service directory can either be active or passive. A passive service 
directory is implemented by a mnesia table in which resource capabilities are 
stored. Mnesia replicates this table across a specified list of nodes. When a holon 
searches the table for a certain resource capability, mnesia will automatically 
redirect the query to a remote replica if there is not a local replica on that node. 
This approach is termed passive since the service directory does not manage the 
registered capabilities. For example, if lease times are used, this approach does 
not have the ability to automatically remove expired entries. 
An active service directory is achieved by adding a distributed application 
alongside the replicated mnesia table, which provides more functionality. For 
example, Erlang’s process monitoring mechanism can be used to monitor 
resources that have registered capabilities with the service directory and 
automatically remove their entries if they go down. Additionally, an intelligent 
subscription mechanism based on OTP’s gen_event behaviour can be 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
94 
 
implemented to allow subscribed parties to receive notifications about events that 
match their specified criteria. The redundancy approach used here is a hybrid 
between replication and standby redundancy: replication is used by mnesia to 
ensure the availability of the table containing the capabilities, while standby 
redundancy is used for the application which actively manages the service 
directory. 
5.2.5.2.3 Resource Holons 
The Erlang process architecture of a device level resource holon considered in this 
paper (Figure 37) is adapted from the model for Erlang/OTP resource holons 
proposed by Kruger and Basson (2017). Kruger and Basson’s communication 
component has been replaced by a gateway server which dispatches individual 
conversation handlers.  
 
Figure 37: Process Architecture of a Singular Erlang/OTP Resource Holon 
An important characteristic of holonic control systems is self-similarity. This means 
that holons of the same type should have similar interfaces and similar behaviours 
(Van Brussel et al., 1998). Therefore, the resource holons in a holarchy should 
expose the same interface regardless of whether they are a singular holon or a 
lower order holarchy. The gateway server process achieves this objective for 
singular holons by serving as the single point of contact for the holon and by 
mirroring the functionality that the gateway holon provides in a holarchy.  
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The gateway server has similar responsibilities to the gateway holon. It is 
responsible for advertising the capabilities of the holon and for forwarding 
messages between external holons and the resource holon’s internal processes. It 
also dispatches conversation handler processes to respond to new requests. These 
handler processes are analogous to the order holons of a lower order holarchy. 
By creating a new Erlang process to handle each conversation, this architecture 
ensures that conversations are isolated from each other. This contributes to fault 
tolerance since failure of one conversation handler will not affect other 
conversations. It also improves responsiveness by leveraging the concurrency of 
Erlang processes. These conversation handlers implement the pessimistic logging 
form of rollback recovery described in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (b)) to ensure that 
the contract net protocol-based conversations they manage can recover from 
redundancy events. 
5.2.5.2.4 Order Holons 
In multi-agent system (MAS) based holonic implementations it is often necessary 
to constrain the number of agents to avoid overloading the controller with too 
many threads. For this reason, MAS-based order holons typically use a single agent 
which execute their production procedure sequentially. In contrast, for an 
Erlang/OTP holonic implementation, Erlang’s light-weight processes allow order 
holons to be implemented using multiple processes. A multi-process order holon 
architecture facilitates the concurrent execution of any parallel portions in a 
product’s production procedure. 
The multi-process order holon architecture is shown in Figure 38. It contains a 
gateway server, an HLC conversation handler, an agenda manager and one or 
more sub-order executors. The gateway server is the single point of contact for 
the order holon. The conversation handler manages all interaction between the 
order holon and the HLC. The agenda manager orchestrates the production 
procedure obtained from the relevant product holon and is responsible for 
spawning and managing sub-order executors. Each sub-order executor executes a 
single step in the production procedure by negotiating with the relevant resource 
holons. 
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Figure 38: Process Architecture of an Erlang/OTP Order Holon 
5.2.5.2.5 Product Holons 
The holarchy’s product holons are contained in an application which is started on 
each node in the mesh. There is therefore a replica of each product holon on each 
node. It is expected that mnesia’s features for data consistency could be used to 
ensure that each product holon’s production procedure remains up-to-date, but 
this is not considered nor tested in this paper. 
5.2.5.3. Order Holon Distribution 
Order holons are dispatched by the order manager holon to handle new requests 
from higher-level controllers. Execution of the order holons requires a substantial 
amount of computational capacity since a holarchy can often have multiple active 
order holons and the multi-process order holon architecture considered here 
allows for concurrent execution of production steps. It is therefore undesirable, in 
general, for all the order holons to execute on a single node since this could 
unnecessarily overburden that node while other nodes may have available 
capacity.  
Distributing order holons across the controller mesh can help to evenly distribute 
the computational load placed on the controllers. A further advantage of 
distributing order holons is that it reduces the number of order holons for which 
recovery must be performed after a node failure since only a subset of the 
holarchy’s order holons execute on each node. For systems which utilise dedicated 
cell controllers, it may be desirable to prioritise/restrict the distribution of the 
order holons to the cell controllers while they are online. 
5.2.5.3.1 Redundancy Implementation Implications 
An Erlang implementation of standby redundancy for distributed order holons 
presents a challenge. Implementing each order holon as a distributed application 
is not suitable since only a single instance of an application is permitted on each 
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Erlang node. This limitation can be bypassed by dynamically loading an application 
with a unique name into the application controller for each order holon. However, 
the data type required for an application name is an atom. Atoms are not garbage 
collected so the dynamic creation of atoms can crash the Erlang runtime if the 
atom count reaches the pre-set limit (analogous to a memory leak). 
It is therefore preferable to implement each order holon as its own tree of 
processes which is spawned on the required node. Since these order holon process 
trees are not part of a distributed application, standby redundancy must be 
implemented using a top-level managing process which restarts order holons as 
required. This top-level manager process should implement redundancy to ensure 
its continued availability. For the holarchy considered here, this role is 
incorporated into the order manager holon since it is responsible for initial 
creation of the order holons and already implements standby redundancy. 
OTP’s supervisor behaviour would appear to be a natural fit for implementing this 
functionality in the order manager, but unfortunately certain properties make it 
unsuitable. Child processes are attached to supervisor processes using Erlang’s link 
mechanism. This means that when one process terminates, an exit signal is sent 
to the other. Supervisors are configured to receive exit signals as normal 
messages; however, when standard processes receive exit signals they are 
terminated by the Erlang runtime. In the context of this holarchy, if an order 
manager holon process goes down, then all the holarchy’s order holons would 
receive exit signals and terminate. This is clearly undesirable; only the order holons 
that were executing on the failed controller should be affected, while the other 
order holons should continue executing normally. 
A further reason for the supervisor behaviour’s unsuitability is that it does not 
distinguish between different error reasons. If a child process fails for any reason 
other than a normal termination, then it is restarted. For this scenario, it is 
desirable that the order manager holon would only restart order holons if they 
terminate due to node failures, while termination due to other reasons can be 
handled separately in an application dependant manner.  
It is therefore necessary to move away from OTP’s provided behaviours and 
develop the desired functionality using Erlang's monitor mechanism. Process 
monitoring is unidirectional, i.e. the monitoring process is notified if the 
monitored process goes down. If bidirectionality is required, then it can be 
achieved using two monitors, one from each process to the other. A key difference 
between this and process linking is that it does not generate exit signals, only 
failure messages. 
The monitor mechanism is used to implement a “monitor tree”. Each order holon 
spawned by the order manager is monitored, if it goes down due to a node failure 
then it is restarted, but if it fails for another reason then this can be handled 
accordingly. If the order manager holon goes down, it is restarted by the failover 
mechanism (as part of a distributed application). It then re-monitors the order 
holons that were on other nodes and recreates the order holons that were on the 
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same node as it was. This monitor tree approach is not only used by the order 
holon manager to provide standby redundancy for the order holons, but also by 
each order holon’s agenda manager to manage the sub-order executors (although 
the communication levels between these two parties make distribution 
undesirable). 
Since a monitor tree is used, order holon processes are not attached (through 
links) to applications. It is not necessary for processes to belong to applications, 
but it is considered good practice for all non-transient processes to be contained 
in an application’s supervision tree. An advantage of complying with this practice 
is that processes which belong to applications are easier to find, manage and 
debug using OTP’s built in tools. For this reason, an order holon host application is 
started on each node to which order holons will be dispatched. The process trees 
of order holons are attached to the host supervisor process of the node to which 
they are dispatched. This host supervisor does not manage or restart the hosted 
order holons, but it simply serves as an attachment point. The resulting application 
and process structure is shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: Order Holon Distribution Architecture 
5.2.5.3.2 Distribution Implementation 
As the party responsible for distributing the order holons, the order manager 
holon needs to do so in a fair manner. Computational load distribution is a 
complex task since past and present load are often poor indicators of future load. 
OTP provides the pool module for distributing processes across a pool of nodes. 
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The pool module uses the run queue length on each node as an indicator of the 
load on that node. Load balancing is an active research topic and it is therefore 
expected that more advanced mechanisms can be found/developed if required. 
However, this is not considered further in this paper. The holonic paradigm could 
be used to address this issue by representing the available computational capacity 
using resource holons and having these resource holons manage allocation, but 
this is left for future work. 
5.2.6. Case Study 
The exhaustive evaluation of a complex architecture, such as that described 
above, is beyond the limited scope of a paper. However, a case study 
implementation is a feasible means of demonstrating and evaluating some of the 
functionality of the architecture. Although the case study, by its nature, provides 
a restricted context, the key results of the study should be transferable to other 
situations if the case study contains the typical elements of practical applications. 
That is the aim in this section. 
5.2.6.1. Physical Architecture 
A singulation and feeder cell in an assembly line is used as a case study to evaluate 
the Erlang/OTP redundant distributed holonic architecture. The cell contains two 
singulation units, two simulated magazine tables, a six-axis robot and a fixture 
(which would typically be on a conveyor in a practical situation) as shown in Figure 
40.  
Each singulation unit takes a batch of unordered parts and presents them one-by-
one to the robot in collectable orientations. Magazine stations are attractive 
alternatives to singulation units where labour is inexpensive. In the case study, it 
is assumed that a worker fills the magazine with parts and then places it in a fixture 
on a table that allows the robot to collect parts from known positions. Once the 
magazine is empty, it would be removed and replaced with a full magazine by a 
worker.  
In the case study, the singulation and feeder cell provides components for a range 
of product types and for multiple products at the same time. The parts are placed 
in fixtures in the "Part Fixture" area shown in Figure 40. Each product type requires 
specific quantities of parts A and B. To present a complex situation to the 
controller, in the case study each part type is provided by both a singulation unit 
and a magazine. When an order is placed for a product, the required quantities of 
A and B are individually transported by the robot from the singulation units and 
magazines to the fixture for further processing after all the parts have been placed. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
 
Figure 40: Physical Layout of Case Study Cell 
5.2.6.2. Controller Architecture 
To illustrate that cell controllers are optional if there is enough available 
computational capacity on the resource controller mesh, this case study was 
implemented without a dedicated cell controller. Instead, the uncoupled holons 
are implemented in a distributed manner across the resource controllers (as 
described in section 5.2.3.3.3). Also, to illustrate that the architecture can be 
implemented on dissimilar controllers, two different microcontrollers and two 
Windows-based PCs are used for resource controllers 
The singulation units are controlled using two embedded Linux microcontrollers, 
a Raspberry Pi 3 model B for singulation unit A and a Beaglebone Black Rev C for 
singulation unit B. The simulated controllers for the magazine tables operate 
within two separate Erlang nodes on a Microsoft Windows PC. The resource holon 
for the robot is implemented on a second Microsoft Windows PC. In total there 
are five Erlang nodes, each responsible for a single resource holon, with the 
uncoupled holons distributed across them. The Erlang code for the uncoupled 
holons is identical for all the nodes, which highlights Erlang’s portability.  
The holonic architecture described in section 5.2.3.1 was implemented for the 
case study. The only specialisation required was for the product and resource 
holons. The product holons were specialised to contain the production plan 
considered in this case study. The execution manager components of the resource 
holons were specialised according to the manufacturing equipment to which each 
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resource corresponds. Additionally, the portion of the agenda manger relating to 
how proposals are formulated was specialised. Specialisation was performed using 
the approach presented in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (d)). 
5.2.6.3. Managing Parallel Orders 
To facilitate the concurrent execution of production steps by the order holons, 
product holons need a production procedure representation that can model 
dependencies between production steps. Concurrent production steps are 
common in assembly operations since assemblies require the production of 
independent subsystems which are only integrated later in the procedure. 
In this case study, production procedures were modelled using directed graphs. 
OTP includes the digraph module which provides a directed graph 
implementation. The production procedure for a product that needs a single 
instance of both part A and part B is shown in Figure 41. Using graph theory 
terminology, each vertex in the graph represents a production step and each edge 
indicates the dependency relationship between the two steps. The dependency 
specifies which the stage the step from which the edge departs must have 
completed before the step to which it arrives can begin. Production is complete 
when the end vertex is reached i.e. all the prerequisites for the end vertex have 
been completed. 
 
Figure 41: Production Procedure for a Product that Requires 1x Part A and 1x Part B 
In the example shown, the order holon starts by creating two sub-order executors 
to negotiate the feeding of each of the parts. Once a sub-order executor has 
booked the feeding of a part, the order holon can create a sub-order executor to 
negotiate the collection and placement of that part. The creation of this pick-and-
place sub-order executor is delayed because there is a dependency between the 
pick-and-place operations and the feed operations in the production plan. This 
dependency exists because a booking cannot be negotiated with the robot until 
the sub-order executor carrying out the feed step has booked a feed source, since 
the booking with the robot will depend on which feed source it is collecting from. 
In scenarios where feeding is probabilistic or if the exact pickup location is 
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necessary for the booking, this dependency could even be stricter and require that 
the part has already been fed before the pick-and-place operation is negotiated. 
Concurrent sub-order executors do not only exist for parallel production steps, but 
they can also exist when there is concurrent execution of sequential steps due to 
booking overlaps. In the context of this case study, there is a potential booking 
overlap when the robot collects a part from one of the singulation units, since the 
singulation unit may not be able to continue feeding parts until the robot has 
collected the part and has exited the singulation unit’s workspace. The robot 
would not necessarily have the required expertise to determine when it has left a 
singulation unit’s workspace. Therefore, it should send progress updates to the 
singulation unit from which it is collecting so that the singulation unit can decide 
when it is safe to resume operation.  
These progress updates are not required when the robot is collecting from a 
magazine table since the magazine is static. Therefore, a subscription mechanism 
was implemented so that specific resource holons can decide which other 
resources they need progress updates from. Although progress updates could be 
sent directly from resource holon to resource holon, it was decided to channel 
these updates through the relevant order holon since it reduced the number of 
conversations which needed to implement recovery mechanisms. 
5.2.6.4. Test Results 
The case study was tested for three different node failure cases: node failure due 
to software faults; node isolation by network faults; and controller failure due to 
power loss or hardware faults. These failure cases were simulated using the 
following fault injection approaches: node failure due to a software fault was 
simulated by terminating the node’s host process; node isolation was simulated 
by removing the network cable from the host device; and controller failure was 
simulated by removing power from the device. 
The tests showed that the case study implementation can handle all three failure 
cases. When an order holon is terminated by a node failure, the order manager 
holon is notified and restarts the order holon on another node. The order holon 
then retrieves its latest state from mnesia and performs conversation recovery for 
all ongoing conversations, including the CNP-based conversation with the HLC. 
Once conversation recovery is complete, the order holon resumes operation. 
When the order manager holon is terminated by a node failure, it is restarted by 
OTP’s failover mechanism. Order holons that are not terminated by the node 
failure are not affected by the order manager’s failure and therefore continue to 
execute. When the order manager is restarted it retrieves its state from mnesia 
and checks the status of all active order holons listed in that state. Order holons 
that are still alive are re-monitored and order holons that were terminated by 
node failures are restarted. 
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Standby redundancy for the gateway holon and service directory is achieved using 
OTP’s failover and takeover mechanisms for distributed applications and mnesia 
in a similar manner to the order manager holon. A know issue with the failover 
and takeover mechanisms is that they do not allow for reintegration of nodes that 
were isolated by network faults. The workaround proposed by Hawkridge et al. 
(2018 (a)), where the isolated node is restarted, can still be used. However, in this 
case, the distributed application is not the only application executing on each 
node. For this approach to be used, the resource to which the controller belongs 
must be brought to a controlled stop before the node is restarted. 
These tests were performed with Erlang’s net_ticktime parameter set to 5 
seconds. For this value of net_ticktime, the failover detection interval for 
distributed applications is specified by Erlang documentation to be between 3.75 
and 6.25 seconds. This detection interval was satisfactory for the case study. 
5.2.7. Conclusions 
This paper presents a redundant architecture for a holonic cell controller and 
investigates the benefits of using of Erlang’s and OTP’s built-in features to 
implement this architecture. A distributed holonic architecture based on the 
PROSA reference architecture is described. Within this architecture, redundancy 
is divided into a holon redundancy level and a controller platform level. The holon 
level ensures the availability of the software entities used to implement holons. It 
is concluded that standby redundancy is best suited to holons that are instance 
specific as it maintains the one-to-one mapping between the holon and the entity 
it represents. Holons that are not instance specific may benefit from the use of 
replication.  
The controller platform considers the allocation of holons to control hardware to 
ensure the continued availability of the computational capacity required to 
execute the holons. Three approaches for holon allocation are discussed: the split 
resource approach, the self-contained approach and the mesh approach. Each 
offer different compromises between the network load and the required 
computational capacity of the cell and resource control hardware. The mesh 
approach was further considered in this paper since it places the fewest 
restrictions on holon execution location. Additionally, it highlights the ease of 
distribution and portability of Erlang/OTP. Furthermore, the mesh approach is well 
suited to the use of more powerful edge controllers and higher capacity networks 
envisioned by the Industry 4.0 and IIoT paradigms. 
An Erlang/OTP implementation of the proposed holonic architecture is described. 
Erlang’s distributed application framework was used to provide standby 
redundancy for holons which require it. To allow the order holons to be distributed 
across the controller mesh, a standby redundancy approach for the order holons 
was developed based around a supervisory tree that uses Erlang’s process 
monitoring capability. The data for these redundant entities is replicated across 
the relevant controllers using OTP’s distributed database called Mnesia. 
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A case study that implemented the Erlang/OTP redundant holonic architecture on 
a set of heterogeneous controllers showed that the architecture could handle: 
node failure due to software faults; node isolation by network faults; and 
controller failure due to power loss or hardware faults. The case study also showed 
that restarted holons, such as order holons, were able to resume operation from 
their prior state. The case study further illustrated that this distributed 
architecture can be implemented without a dedicated, stand-alone cell controller. 
This paper therefore demonstrates that standby redundancy is useful for 
counteracting the single points of failure represented by the hierarchical elements 
within holonic control architectures. Further, it shows that Erlang and OTP provide 
a suitable platform for implementing redundancy within distributed holonic cell 
controllers. This proposed Erlang/OTP standby redundancy approach can improve 
the availability of a manufacturing cell by enabling it to withstand a selection of 
controller failure modes. 
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Abstract 
Intelligent manufacturing control is a key aspect of the Industry 4.0 paradigm. 
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of soft 
real-time control systems. Erlang has many characteristics that are attractive 
when implementing manufacturing control. These characteristics include fault 
tolerance and ease of distribution. Erlang programs are built from multiple 
concurrent processes which interact through message passing. Code abstraction 
is provided by Erlang's behaviour mechanism, which separates code into a generic 
portion (the behaviour) and an application specific callback module. This paper 
presents an approach for the development of layered callback modules. Layered 
callback modules can be used to achieve process specialisation. To effectively layer 
callback modules, it is important that each layer be extensible. Extensible layers 
are callback modules that do not limit the functionality of subsequent layers. Some 
best practices relating to message handling and state access are presented. These 
best practices facilitate the development of callback modules that can be layered 
in a manner that assists modularity and code reuse. It is expected that this 
approach for process specialisation will be beneficial in Erlang based IIoT 
applications since many of the “things” in these systems will share common base 
functionality. 
Keywords: Erlang; Code Abstraction; Software for Manufacturing 
5.3.1. Introduction 
Current progression, by both industry and academia, towards the realisation of 
Industry 4.0 has highlighted the need for intelligent manufacturing control (Brettel 
et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2015; Lasi et al., 2014; Zhong et al., 2017). Key aspects of 
intelligent manufacturing control include decentralisation, cyber-physical systems 
(CPS) and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) (Lasi et al., 2014). 
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems (Armstrong, 1996). OTP (Open 
Telecom Platform) is a set of libraries included in Erlang that simplify the 
development of large complex systems (Armstrong, 2010: 73). Erlang has many 
attractive features, such as concurrency, scalability and fault tolerance, that are 
useful when implementing intelligent manufacturing control systems (Kruger & 
Basson, 2017). Erlang has been used to implement standby redundancy on 
embedded systems for a manufacturing station (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). 
Code abstraction is a necessary feature when developing the control software for 
large systems. Erlang provides for code abstraction with the behaviour mechanism 
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which separates code into a generic portion (the behaviour) and an application 
specific callback module. 
This paper proposes an approach to achieve process specialisation in Erlang 
through callback module layering and recommends some best practices for 
improving the extensibility of callback layers. This paper begins with some 
background on Erlang followed by an overview of the behaviour mechanism. 
Callback layering is then described and some best practices for message handling 
and state access are discussed.  
5.3.2. Erlang Background 
The Erlang programming language is designed for applications that require 
concurrency, fault tolerance and distribution (Anonymous, s.a.). Erlang programs 
are built up as independent concurrent processes which cooperate with one 
another to achieve the systems goals. Erlang processes have the following 
properties: processes have sole access to their internal state, processes influence 
one another through asynchronous message passing and processes have the 
capability to spawn further processes (Armstrong, 2010: 70).  
This section introduces foundational concepts used in Erlang for the sake of 
readers not familiar with the language. 
5.3.2.1. Syntax Overview 
An overview of Erlang’s syntactic conventions is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Overview of Erlangs Syntactic Conventions 
 
5.3.2.2. Functional Purity 
Erlang is a functional programming language; however, it is not necessarily pure. 
In a pure functional language, the output of a function is entirely dependent on 
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the input arguments (i.e. it does not access global state). Furthermore, the effects 
of function execution are contained within the function. Therefore, pure functions 
do not permit side effects such as global state modification or I/O operations. An 
advantage of pure functions is that their code is easy to reason through and their 
correct functioning can be validated. 
Since many practical applications require side effects, Armstrong (2003) 
recommends separating Erlang code into sections that are pure (calculations and 
data manipulation) and impure (message passing, file access, etc.). In this way the 
pure code can be validated, and the impure code can be thoroughly tested to 
ensure it functions as intended. 
5.3.2.3. Dynamic Typing 
Erlang is a dynamically typed language. Dynamic typing means that types are 
checked at run time instead of at compile time. Erlang typing is strict which means 
that type mismatches (i.e. a character used in a mathematical expression) will 
generate exceptions. Figure 42 shows Erlang's dynamic typing used in a function 
that prints the value of the argument with which the function is called. This 
example shows that dynamic typing lets a single function definition serve multiple 
variable types. 
01. Function Definition: 
02. print_function(Var) -> 
    io:format(“The value is ~p”,[Var]). 
03. Example Usage: 
04. > print_function(true). 
The value is true 
05. > print_function(3.14). 
The value is 3.14 
Figure 42: Dynamic Typing Example 
5.3.2.4. Pattern Matching 
A core feature of Erlang is pattern matching. In pattern matching the input 
expression is compared to a pattern, and if the two are equivalent then the match 
succeeds. Pattern matching can be used to extract certain entries from a data 
structure as shown in Figure 43 (a). In a pattern, underscores (_) and variable 
prefixed by underscores (_Var) are “match-any” wildcards that will match any 
entry. Pattern matching is frequently used in function heads as shown in the 
recursive factorial function in Figure 43 (b). The input arguments are applied to 
the first function head that the pattern successfully matches. For the example, this 
means that while N does not match 0 the second function head matches and is 
executed. When N is 0, the first function head matches and returns 1. 
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01. a) Expression Pattern Matching:  
02. {a,A,_,B}={a,b,4,1.2}. 
% A=b, B=1.2 
03. b) Function Pattern Matching:  
04. factorial(0) -> 
    1; 
factorial(N) ->  
    N*factorial(N-1). 
Figure 43: Pattern Matching Examples 
5.3.2.5. Data Structures: Records and Maps 
Erlang provides many different data structures; however, records and maps are 
usually the preferred options since their contents can be pattern matched in 
function heads. A record is a fixed length data structure which stores entries in 
named fields. A map is a dynamically sized key-value store. A significant difference 
between records and maps is that record field names are checked at compile time 
whereas incorrect map keys are only evident through incorrect behaviour or 
runtime errors. 
5.3.3. Behaviours 
5.3.3.1. Background 
A behaviour is an abstraction that implements the generic portions of a common 
model or pattern. OTP provides some standard behaviours including 
gen_server (that implements a client-server relationship), gen_event (that 
implements a publish-subscribe mechanism), gen_statem (that implements an 
event-driven state machine) and the supervisor model (that supervises child 
processes according to a selected restart policy). The application specific logic for 
these behaviours is implemented in the form of callback modules. An advantage 
of using these standard behaviours is that they have been thoroughly tested in 
many software products. 
5.3.3.2. Behaviour and Callback Structure 
The coupling between behaviour and callback modules is loose. Typically, the 
name of the callback module is passed to the start function of the behaviour 
module (which starts the process). The callback module name is stored in the 
process’ state and is used to make calls to functions in that module using 
reflection.  
This paper uses the agenda manager of a singulation unit as an example. The 
agenda manager is responsible for managing the singulation unit’s bookings. Since 
booking management is a common element in manufacturing systems, that 
portion of the functionality can be implemented in a behaviour module while the 
singulation unit specific aspects can be placed in a callback module (i.e. how 
estimates are calculated when preparing proposals). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
 
Figure 44 shows the code structure for a simple implementation of this example 
using the behaviour-callback pattern. The process is created when the start 
function in the callback module is called (Line 2). This function calls the start 
function of the behaviour module (Line 8) with the callback module's name 
(singulation_am) as an argument.  
01. -module(singulation_am). %Callback 
02. start(Args) -> 
03.   generic_am:start(singulation_am, Args). 
04. get_estimate(RequestInfo) -> 
05.   Estimate = %Calculate Estimate, 
06.   Estimate. 
 
07. -module(generic_am).     %Behaviour 
08. start(CBMod,Args) -> 
  %Spawns a new process 
09.   spawn(generic_am, setup, [{CBMod,Args}]). 
10. setup({CBMod,Args}) -> 
11.   InitialState = %Form Initial State, 
12.   loop(CBMod,InitialState). 
13. loop(CBMod, State) -> 
14.   receive 
15.     {request_proposal,Info} -> 
16.       Estimate = CBMod:get_estimate(Info), 
17.       %Create Proposal and Reply 
18.       loop(CBMod,NewState); 
19.     {request_booking,Details} -> 
20.       NewState = %Add booking, 
21.       loop(CBMod,NewState); 
22.     _ -> 
23.       loop(CBMod,State) 
24.   end. 
Figure 44: Example Behaviour and Callback Modules for a Simple Agenda Manager 
The behaviour module's start function spawns the new process (Line 9). The 
process starts execution with the setup function (Line 10) and then enters the loop 
function with the callback module and initial state as arguments (Line 12). The 
loop function (Line 13) enters a receive statement (Line 14) where it waits until a 
message is received. Received messages are matched against the specified 
patterns (Lines 15, 19 & 22). For certain messages, the behaviour module will 
handle the message internally. In the example, this happens when a booking 
request is received since it does not require application specific information (Line 
19). If message handling requires application specific information, then this is 
obtained from one of the callback functions in the callback module. In the example 
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this occurs when a proposal request is received (Line 15) and the behaviour calls 
the get_estimate function (Line 4) to obtain a performance estimate. 
Once a message has been processed, the loop function recursively calls itself with 
the updated state in the arguments (Lines 18, 21 & 23) (Erlang features optimised 
tail recursion, so this does not lead to stack overflow). To ensure that the process’ 
message queue does not get overloaded, the last entry in the receive statement is 
usually a “match-any” pattern (Line 22) so that messages that do not match any 
prior patterns are removed and ignored. 
5.3.3.3. Behaviour and Callback Module Attributes 
The behaviour module usually trusts that the callback module implements all the 
required callback functions: however, this can be checked using 
erlang:function_exported before making the callback function call. This 
capability can also be used to implement optional callback functions. 
To help ensure that callback modules implement the required callback functions, 
Erlang provides the behaviour and callback module attributes. The behaviour 
module attribute is used to indicate the behaviour modules for which a callback 
module implements callback functions. The callback module attribute is used to 
specify which callback functions a behaviour module expects to be implemented.  
These attributes are used to generate compiler warnings for modules that do not 
implement the specified callback functions; however, these attributes are not 
required for a behaviour-callback pattern to be implemented. 
5.3.3.4. Callback Layering 
The behaviour-callback pattern is not limited to the case where there is a single 
behaviour module and a single callback module. A module can be implemented as 
both the callback module for a behaviour and act as the behaviour module for a 
different callback module. Several of such modules can then be layered to create 
a stack of layered callback modules with a single foundational behaviour at the 
bottom. Each layered callback module should be used to enhance the functionality 
provided by the layer below it. In this way, the layers form a stack of increasing 
specialisation.  
Figure 45 illustrates how callback module layering can be applied to the agenda 
manager example. Since the agenda manager can be considered a server which 
provides bookings for clients, the gen_server behaviour is used as the 
foundation of the stack. It is recommended that the foundational behaviour in the 
stack be a standard OTP behaviour since these behaviours are compatible with 
OTP’s built in debugging tools. The generic agenda manager functionality is built 
on top of the gen_server behaviour as a callback module. The singulation unit 
specific functionality is then added on top of the generic agenda manager layer.  
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Figure 45: Callback Module Layering 
To start a process which executes a layered callback stack, the start function of the 
top layer is called. Each callback module’s start function calls the start function of 
the layer below it with the calling module’s name as an argument. In this way each 
layer specifies the layer below it. Execution begins with the behaviour's 
initialisation function which calls the initialisation function of the layer above it. 
These calls are propagated up the stack with the return value of each layer being 
integrated into the return value of the layer below. Execution then enters the 
behaviour's primary loop. From the primary loop, callback functions are called in 
response to messages. These calls propagate up the stack until they reach the layer 
that provides the required level of specialisation. When the process is stopped, 
the terminate function is called in a manner similar to the initialisation function. 
Callback layering contributes to code modularity since code for a specific 
functionality is contained within a single layer. Furthermore, a layer module can 
be replaced with a different module that exposes and requires the same interfaces 
without influencing the remainder of the stack. Callback layering also facilitates 
code reuse since processes with different roles can start with different top layer 
modules and converge to the same layers lower down in their behaviour stacks. 
(i.e. the agenda manager for a robotic arm could build on top of the generic 
agenda manager layer). 
5.3.3.5. Behaviour and Callback Extensibility 
Often when a behaviour is developed, the developer has a clear understanding of 
the functionality that will be implemented in the callback functions. It is therefore 
tempting, and often easier, to cater directly to that expected functionality. 
However, when that behaviour is later reused, the behaviour may need to be 
altered to facilitate additional functionality. This can be particularly problematic if 
the behaviour is not editable by the developer (i.e. part of a closed source 3rd party 
library). 
Therefore, to maximise the modularity and code re-use benefits of using layered 
callback modules, each layer module should be extensible. The extensibility of a 
layer module here refers to the degree to which that module facilitates the 
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implementation of additional functionality within the subsequent callback layers. 
In other words, a highly extensible callback layer does not make limiting 
assumptions about the implementation of the layer above it. 
Two categories of assumptions that limit or prevent the implementations of 
layered callback modules have been identified. These two categories are: 
assumptions about the message handling requirements of subsequent layers and 
assumptions about the state access requirements of subsequent layers. The 
following sections will discuss these assumptions in greater detail. 
5.3.4. Message Handling 
Interprocess communication is a foundational aspect of Erlang programs. It is 
therefore understandable that a behaviour that limits the message handling 
capabilities available to its callback module will limit the functionality that can be 
implemented in that callback module. For a layered callback module to be 
extensible, it must therefore not restrict the ability of the layer above it to send 
and receive messages. In the case of the agenda manager example, the 
singulation_am layer may need to request information from another 
process before it can generate a performance estimate. 
Sending messages from different layers does not cause complications, as long as 
layers have access to all the data needed to formulate and send the required 
messages. However, complications arise if layers implement their own message 
receiving. 
The presence of multiple receive statements in a layered callback stack can result 
in hanging or poor responsiveness (i.e. when blocking receive statements are used 
to achieve synchronous calls). Furthermore, there needs to be a “match-any” 
pattern in at least one of the receive statements so that messages that do not 
match any of the receive statements do not overload the message queue. 
However, this has the potential to erroneously remove messages that are 
intended for other layers. (i.e. a receive statement in singulation_am 
removing a booking request for generic_am). 
Therefore, the recommended approach is to have a single receive statement in 
the foundational behaviour module. If a received message does not match any of 
the patterns for that module then the message should be passed on to the next 
layer in the stack using a predefined callback function (i.e. handle_message). 
The next layer then attempts to match it against its own patterns and passes it on 
upwards using a similar callback function if no match is found. If a message reaches 
the top of the stack without matching, it can then be safely ignored. This leads to 
a hierarchy since lower layers have message handling precedence over higher 
layers. Care should be taken to avoid (unintended) message pattern overlaps 
between layers. 
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If having additional receive statements within layers is unavoidable, then these 
receive statements should be non-blocking and only match messages intended for 
that layer. 
A further advantage of having every layer in the stack use only the foundational 
behaviour's receive statement is that more of the callback functions in higher layer 
modules can be functionally pure and therefore easier to validate. 
5.3.5. State Access 
State is a representation of a process' current condition. The ability to maintain 
state is a necessary requirement for any non-trivial process since it allows past 
events to influence the handling of future events. Erlang processes typically rely 
on local state. This local state is implemented as an argument to the foundational 
behaviour’s primary loop. If a function requires access to this state, then it is 
passed as an argument to that function. Erlang provides facilities for a global 
process state (i.e. the process dictionary); however, the use of global state is 
generally discouraged as it leads to code that is functionally impure and therefore 
difficult to validate.  
If a callback module does not have the facility to maintain its own local state, then 
it will either limit the functionality that can be implemented in that module or 
force the callback module to use global state. An extensible layer module should 
therefore provide local state storage facilities for the layer above it (regardless of 
whether that layer currently requires state storage).  
In the case of the agenda manager example, the gen_server module provides 
the generic_am module with state storage facilities which are used to store the 
booking list, etc. However, if the generic_am module does not provide the 
singulation_am module with state storage facilities then this would limit that 
layer. For example, it would not be possible to implement functionality whereby 
the singulation_am receives status updates from the singulation unit’s 
execution manager and stores the current status for consideration when 
generating performance estimates. 
Erlang’s dynamic typing is helpful in this regard. A layer can allocate a term in its 
own local state for the local state of the layer above without knowing the format 
or contents of that layer’s state. This callback-state is then included as an 
argument whenever the layer calls a callback function in the layer above. Since 
function arguments are passed by value, callback functions should return an 
updated state, which the lower layer uses to replace the previous callback-state. 
Another way that the achievable functionality of a layer can be limited is when the 
layer below it only includes certain state elements in callback function arguments. 
This may be because only a specific subset of the layer's state was required for the 
initial callback implementation.  
In terms of extensibility, it may be desirable for a layer to have as much access to 
the state of the layers below it as possible. However, this will be detrimental to 
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the modularity of the callback layer, since it could require knowledge of the state 
structure of lower layers. If a layer incorporates references to the layer below it, 
these interfaces would need to be validated if changes were made to that lower 
layer. Erlang maps are helpful in this regard since they do not require the higher 
layer to import a definition header file, but this advantage of maps comes with the 
risk of run-time errors, as pointed out Section 5.3.2.5.  
Access to another layer's state here implies read access, since it is recommended 
that layers have sole write access to their own state. This prevents modifications 
in other layers from creating state inconsistencies. If modification of a state entry 
by higher layers is desired, then this can be implemented by allowing modify 
requests to be included in the return values of callback functions.  
5.3.6. Conclusions 
This paper proposes an approach for achieving process specialisation in Erlang 
through callback module layering. The use of extensible layers can improve the 
ease of development, modularity, code re-use and ease of modification of layered 
callback modules.  
Extensible message handling is facilitated by limiting layers to using the 
foundational behaviour's receive statement. Extensible state access is facilitated 
by providing each layer with a mechanism for storing local state and by providing 
each layer with access to the relevant state of the layer below it. These best 
practices facilitate the development of extensible callback module layers. 
Erlang has a strong heritage in telecom and internet applications. It is expected 
that this approach for process specialisation will be beneficial in Erlang based IIoT 
applications since many of the “things” in these systems will share common base 
functionality. 
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6. Standby Redundancy in JADE 
To evaluate the Erlang/OTP standby redundancy implementation for a holonic cell 
controller, it is compared with a JADE implementation. JADE is a popular 
framework for MAS implementations, which has in many respects become the de 
facto standard for holonic control implementations in academic research. This 
section presents an implementation approach for standby redundancy using 
JADE’s standard features. 
The implementation approach is presented in a paper titled “JADE for 
Implementing Standby Redundancy in a Distributed Holonic Architecture” 
(Hawkridge et al., 2018 (e)). The paper evaluates the effectiveness of JADE’s 
features for the detection and handling of failure conditions. A case study of a 
generalised distributed holonic cell controller is used to validate the approach. 
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JADE for Implementing Standby Redundancy in a 
Distributed Holonic Architecture 
G Hawkridge, AH Basson, K Kruger 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University 
Abstract 
This paper presents and evaluates an approach for using the JADE multi-agent 
platform to develop a distributed holonic controller that includes standby 
redundancy to improve the controller's availability. 
Distributed control is prominent in modern manufacturing systems and holonic 
architectures are popular approaches for the implementation of distributed 
control. Holonic control typically contains holons that represent single points of 
failure and are therefore susceptible to failures. Standby redundancy is a common 
approach for improving the availability of systems. Availability here refers to the 
percentage of time for which a system is ready and able to perform its intended 
function.  
JADE is a popular framework for implementing multi-agent systems. This paper 
presents an approach for implementing standby redundancy using standard JADE 
features. The proposed approach uses JADE’s Main Container Replication Service 
to ensure that the main container is not a single point of failure. JADE’s Agent 
Replication Service is used to facilitate primary holon selection and the creation of 
backup holons. JADE’s UDP Node Monitoring Service is used to detect container 
failures as it offers performance that is superior to JADE’s default remote method 
invocation-based approach.  
The proposed approach can handle four categories of faults: agent failure due to 
software faults, container shutdown or failure due to software faults, container 
isolation by network faults and control device failure due to power loss or fail-stop 
hardware faults. An issue with the UDP Node Monitoring Service is identified 
which results in delayed failure detection for container isolation and control 
device failure. A case study of a generalised distributed holonic cell controller is 
used to validate the proposed approach. The case study implementation achieves 
changeover times in the order of 20-40 seconds, depending on the specific failure 
scenario. The JADE standby redundancy implementation can successfully handle 
all types of failures that are typically expected from a software based standby 
redundancy solution. However, the achievable changeover times may be 
unacceptable for many manufacturing cell control applications. 
Keywords: Standby Redundancy; JADE; Holonic Control 
6.1. Introduction 
In the past decades the manufacturing sector has been characterised by intense 
competition resulting from globalisation and shifting customer requirements. To 
handle this competition, the manufacturing sector has been pursuing 
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manufacturing systems and paradigms which provide shorter lead times, 
increased product customisation, flexible production capacity, real-time feedback, 
lower costs and improved resource efficiency (Bi et al., 2008; Lasi et al., 2014).  
Various paradigms, such as flexible manufacturing systems (FMSs) and 
reconfigurable manufacturing systems (RMSs), have been investigated with 
varying levels of success. This investigation continues with the recent focus on 
Industry 4.0, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and the Industrial Internet of Things 
(IIoT) (Brettel et al., 2014; Bi, Xu & Wang 2014; Gerbert et al., 2015). A common 
element amongst these paradigms is the distributed nature of their control.  
The holonic manufacturing paradigm is a control approach that offers flexibility 
and the ability to manage disturbances in an efficient manner (Van Brussel et al., 
1998). Holonic control is also well suited to distributed control. Holonic systems 
are built from holons that are independent autonomous units of control which 
collaborate to achieve the desired functionality. Holonic control offers increased 
availability by reducing (but not eliminating) the effect of certain single points of 
failure through functional redundancy. Availability here refers to the percentage 
of time for which a system is ready and able to perform its expected function. 
Single points of failure are system elements where failure of the element results 
in system failure. Functional redundancy here refers to the use of multiple holons 
that can perform a certain task. Even though holonic systems will, in general, 
continue operating in the presence of holon failure (for holons that have 
functional redundancy), this holon failure will reduce the functionality or capacity 
of the system, leading to bottlenecks and possible system failure. Additionally, 
functional redundancy is not always possible for all types of holon. Standby 
redundancy is an approach that can be used to improve the availability of 
individual holons. Standby redundancy has traditionally been used to improve the 
availability of hierarchical or monolithic control systems. Standby redundancy is 
well suited for improving the availability of holons that are instance specific (such 
as resource and order holons in the PROSA reference architecture) as it maintains 
the one-to-one mapping between the software element and the entity it 
represents (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (c)). 
JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) is a popular Java-based framework 
that facilitates the implementation of multi-agent systems. The multi-agent 
system (MAS) is a computational paradigm in which systems are composed of 
many intelligent agents which interact with one another. MASs are typically used 
in distributed systems where the size and complexity of the system discourage the 
use of centralized computational approaches. MASs are frequently used when 
implementing holonic manufacturing systems due to the similarities between 
agents and holons (Babiceanu & Chen, 2006).  
This paper evaluates an approach for implementing standby-redundant holons 
using JADE’s built in functionality. This paper next provides a background on 
holonic control architectures followed by an overview of software-based standby 
redundancy. Following this, some background information on MASs and JADE is 
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provided, followed by a description of the JADE standby redundancy 
implementation. A case study of the redundant holonic architecture is then used 
to evaluate the implementation. 
6.2. Holonic Control 
6.2.1. Background 
The holonic control paradigm is based on the concept of a holon which was 
devised by philosopher Arthur Koestler (1989) to describe how biological and 
social systems are organised. The word holon refers to an entity which is 
simultaneously a complete whole and part of a larger whole (Van Brussel, 1994). 
In the manufacturing context, holons are independent units of control which 
communicate and cooperate with one another to achieve the systems goals. A 
grouping of related holons is called a holarchy. Holonic systems are developed 
using a fractal approach, which implies any holon in a holarchy is either a singular 
entity or a lower-order holarchy. An example of this is where a cell controller views 
a station controller as a holon, while the station controller itself may be a set of 
holons that control that station. 
6.2.2. Control Architectures 
Holonic control seeks to combine the advantages of both hierarchical and 
heterarchical architectures (Van Brussel et al., 1998).  Hierarchical control 
arranges the system into levels with strict master slave relationships. These strict 
relationships can diminish availability since a controller fault results in the portion 
of the hierarchy that is subordinate to that controller becoming frozen (Dilts, Boyd 
& Whorms, 1991). This is particularly detrimental if the faulty controller is high up 
in the hierarchy. Heterarchical control seeks to entirely avoid master-slave 
relationships by using controllers that are autonomous cooperative peers. The 
advantage of this is that it leads to an inherent level of fault tolerance since the 
interdependency between controllers is reduced. Similarly, holonic control 
exhibits an inherent fault tolerance since holons are independent and cooperative. 
An advantage of the master-slave relationships in hierarchical architectures is that 
they facilitate achieving a global system view which simplifies global optimisation. 
In heterarchical architectures, each control element maintains its own local 
system view. The benefit of this is that control elements are not dependant on 
some central state repository. However, the lack of global system view in 
heterarchical systems limits the implementation of global optimization and 
coordination (Leitão, 2009). For holonic systems, a global system view is achieved 
through the fractal hierarchy of holarchies. Each holon is the single source of truth 
about its own state and maintains a local system view to facilitate fault tolerance 
and autonomy. Global optimisation is assisted through the use of advisory holons 
which suggest optimal solutions that other holons may choose to accept. 
Hierarchical control elements are problematic from a system availability 
standpoint as they are often single points of failure (Colombo, Schoop & Neubert, 
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2006). Although holonic control seeks to limit hierarchical relationships to advisory 
relationships, these single points of failure are sometimes still present. 
6.2.3. The PROSA Reference Architecture 
Reference architectures facilitate the implementation of holonic manufacturing 
systems by providing a framework for the classification of holons. The PROSA 
architecture is a popular and prevalent reference architecture. The PROSA 
reference architecture specifies four categories of holon, i.e. product holons, 
order holons, resource holons and staff holons (Van Brussel et al., 1998). 
A product holon contains the process and production knowledge required produce 
a specific product. Product holons represent the model of the product type and 
not specific instances of the product. Order holons represent system activities and 
are responsible for ensuring that these activities get completed on time. Order 
holons often represent the production of a product instance. Each product 
instance negotiates with other holons to get themselves produced. Resource 
holons represent the manufacturing resources present in the system. These three 
classes of holons are sometimes referred to as the standard holons. 
The interaction between the standard holons is shown in Figure 46. The order 
holons exchange production knowledge with the product holons (i.e. what is the 
procedure for producing this product), the order holons exchange production 
execution knowledge with the resource holons (i.e. negotiation of scheduling) and 
the resource holons exchange process knowledge with the product holon (i.e. how 
to perform the required operation on the product instance). Staff holons are 
optional holons which assist the standard holons by providing “expert” advice. 
 
Figure 46: Interaction between the Standard Holons in a PROSA Architecture 
The recent book by Valkenaers and Van Brussel (2015) provide an excellent 
reference for holonic manufacturing systems, as well as the PROSA reference 
architecture and its recent extension the ARTI reference architecture. 
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6.3. Software-Based Standby Redundancy 
6.3.1. Background 
This paper considers redundancy of the control elements in a manufacturing cell. 
Redundancy is a mechanism for improving the availability of a system, typically to 
avoid the financial implications of unplanned downtime.  
In standby redundancy for control elements, there is a primary instance and one 
or more backup instances. When the primary instance fails, one of the backup 
instances takes over as the primary instance – this is referred to as changeover. 
When dealing with software entities, the backup instances may exist in an idle 
state prior to changeover or they may be created when failure of the primary is 
detected. 
Standby-redundant control elements are categorised based on their changeover 
time and the resulting system bump. Changeover time refers to the time between 
failure of the primary instance and one of the backup control elements beginning 
to execute as the new primary. System bump refers to the impact on the 
controlled system due to the period of control inactivity, as well as the impact 
caused by differences between the backup controller’s version of the system state 
and the actual system state. 
6.3.2. Handled Fault Types 
Software-based standby redundancy for software control elements can be used to 
handle certain computational hardware, software and network faults. In terms of 
computational hardware, it can handle fail-stop faults. These are faults that cause 
the computational hardware to stop operating. Similarly, for software faults, 
standby redundancy can be used to handle software faults that cause the control 
element to stop working; however, it is not able to mitigate faults that cause the 
control software to behave incorrectly. Standby redundancy can handle network 
faults that isolate control elements from the rest of the distributed system; 
however, it is not a suitable mechanism for handling data corruption or complete 
network failure. 
6.3.3. Redundancy in Holonic Manufacturing Controllers 
Holonic and heterarchical architectures are considered to inherently provide 
greater potential for availability as resources are dynamically selected. They also 
facilitate the dynamic addition and removal of resources. This enables a form of 
functional redundancy, whereby the system can easily have multiple resources 
capable of performing a given function. However, there are often other system 
elements, particularly architectural resources, that represent single points of 
failure. 
In the holonic manufacturing context there is a direct mapping between certain 
holons, such as resource and order holons, and the entities which they represent. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
In these scenarios standby redundancy is well suited as it maintains this one-to-
one mapping between the software element and the represented entity 
(Hawkridge et al., 2018 (c)). For holons that are not instance specific, such as 
product holons, replication is a useful alternative since it allows for load balancing, 
however care must be taken to ensure consistency between replicas. 
6.4. MAS and JADE 
This section provides some background on agents, multi-agent systems (MASs), 
the standards defined by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), 
Agent Platforms (APs) and JADE for readers not familiar with these concepts. 
6.4.1. Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 
Agents are software entities that are autonomous, proactive, reactive and 
cooperative/collaborative (Bellifemine et al., 2007; Poslad, 2007). Autonomy 
means that agents can execute independently. Since agents are proactive, they 
will automatically take the initiative to start achieving their goals. Reactivity refers 
to the fact that agents are aware of their surrounding environment and will react 
to changes. Agents are cooperative since they will help other agents to achieve 
their goals when those agents’ goals do not conflict with their own. Agents being 
collaborative means they will work together with one another when their goals 
are the same/similar.  
To exhibit these characteristics, agents need to communicate with one another. 
Each agent also has a set of internal behaviours that define the agent’s goals, how 
it reacts to external stimuli and the degree to which it will cooperate/collaborate 
with other agents (Poslad, 2007). 
A multi-agent system (MAS) refers to a system that contains several agents. The 
interaction of these agents leads to an emergent system behaviour. In this way the 
agents are collectively able to solve problems that would not be solvable 
individually. 
6.4.2. FIPA Standards 
FIPA is an international standards organisation which focuses on the facilitation of 
agent interoperability within heterogeneous environments. FIPA has developed 
several standards that enable agents developed using different frameworks and 
residing on different Agent Platforms to communicate in a vendor neutral manner. 
These include specifications related to agent naming, address resolution, expected 
message fields and message encoding. 
6.4.3. Agent Platform 
An Agent Platform (AP) refers to the infrastructure required to facilitate agent 
execution. This includes both the computational hardware and the software 
framework, which can be distributed over multiple hardware devices. The 
minimum requirements for an AP are specified in FIPA00023 (FIPA, 2004).  Every 
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AP must have an Agent Management System (AMS) and a Message Transport 
System (MTS). Optionally an AP can also include a Directory Facilitator (DF). The 
AMS is the authority regarding which agents are permitted to join or be started in 
the AP. The AMS assigns agent identifiers (AIDs) and maintains a list of active 
agents and their transport addresses. The MTS is the default mechanism for inter-
agent communication within the AP. The DF provides a mechanism for agents to 
register the services they provide and search for providers of required services. 
6.4.4. JADE 
JADE is an open source, FIPA compliant MAS framework originally developed by 
Telecom Italia. One of JADE’s strengths is its portability; since JADE is Java based, 
it can run on any device or operating system (OS) capable of executing an instance 
of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). 
Another strength of JADE is distribution, which JADE facilitates through the 
concept of containers. Each JADE AP contains one or more containers. A container 
is any JVM instance that executes JADE. This leads to the concept of the main 
container, which is where the AMS (and DF) reside. When JADE is distributed, 
multiple containers are started on different devices. The main container is started 
first and all subsequent containers register with it when they start (the main 
container’s network address is provided as a boot argument). JADE agents interact 
through the sending and receiving of messages.  Each JADE agent has the ability 
to execute a number of behaviours which govern its actions. 
6.5. Standby Redundancy in JADE 
6.5.1. Overview 
When implementing holonic systems in JADE, a single agent is typically used for 
each singular holon. Therefore, implementing holon standby redundancy requires 
the ability to implement agent standby redundancy. In this paper, agent standby 
redundancy is considered within a distributed JADE application with two or more 
control devices that each execute a JADE container (Figure 47). This is the simplest 
scenario in which standby redundancy can be implemented. The proposed agent 
standby redundancy solution, as described below, is built upon JADE’s Agent 
Replication Service (ARS). The ARS provides the ability to create backup replicas 
and synchronise state across them. JADE’s Main Container Replication Service 
(MCRS) is used to handle scenarios where the main container fails. The control 
logic is implemented using classes that inherit from JADE’s finite state machine 
behaviour to facilitate state entry after changeover. The following sections provide 
more detail on each of the individual components and how they facilitate the 
implementation of standby-redundant agents. 
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Figure 47: Controller and Container Architecture for JADE Agent Standby Redundancy 
6.5.2. Main Container Replication 
The AMS represents a significant single point of failure since there is only one AMS 
instance in an AP and it fulfils a critical role. When the AMS goes down it results in 
the unavailability of many vital services, including agent creation and name 
resolution. To mitigate this failure scenario, JADE provides main container 
replication through the MCRS (Bellifemine et al., 2007). The MCRS allows multiple 
containers to be started as main containers.  
Only one of these main containers will be designated as the master (and host the 
AMS and DF), while all the others are designated as backup main containers. The 
MCRS arranges the main containers into a ring. Each main container monitors the 
next main container in the ring. If one of the main containers fail, then the main 
container that was monitoring it notifies all the others. If the failed container was 
the master, then the backup main container that was monitoring it is selected as 
the new master. 
When an AP that uses the MCRS is created, the first container to be started is 
configured as a normal main container, but with the MCRS enabled in the boot 
arguments. This container becomes the first master main container. Each 
subsequent container, whether in an initial start or a post-crash restart, must be 
configured as a backup main container with MCRS enabled (including a restarted 
first container).  
In an AP that does not make use of the MCRS, normal containers register with the 
main container when they are launched. For an AP that uses the MCRS, containers 
must register with the master main container. If a backup main container receives 
a registration request, it forwards it to the master.  When the master main 
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container goes down, the normal containers become orphaned and must re-
register with the new master. If an orphaned container is not able to reconnect, 
the agents executing on it become isolated. To reregister, normal containers need 
a list of all the main containers. This list can either be provided as a boot argument 
or updated dynamically using the Address Notification Service (Bellifemine et al., 
2007).  
The present authors recommend that the MCRS be used for all implementations 
of agent standby redundancy in JADE, since there is little value in improving the 
availability of application agents if the main container remains a single point of 
failure. The number of containers that are configured as backup main containers 
will determine how many container failures the resulting system can withstand. 
For the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that every container in the AP is 
configured as a backup main controller so that application agent failure becomes 
the primary potential cause of unavailability. 
6.5.3. DF Persistence and Synchronisation 
Since the DF executes on the main container, using the MCRS to ensure AMS 
availability also ensures that the DF is available. However, DF entries are not 
synchronised across the backup main containers. So, when the DF is restarted on 
a new master main container, it is started from scratch without any entries. This 
is problematic since it could prevent agents from finding other agents that provide 
required services. 
A partial remedy to this issue is to enforce short lease times for DF registrations 
using the jade_domain_df_maxleasetime configuration parameter. This 
ensures that registered agents regularly renew their registrations. Therefore, 
when the DF is restarted on a new main container, all active agents’ DF 
registrations will have been renewed within a period of “max lease time” after DF 
start up. The potential problem with this approach is that, to reduce the time 
during which DF entries are unavailable, the max lease time must be short which 
may have an impact on performance during normal operations (since registered 
agents must continually renew their registrations). 
An alternative approach for addressing DF entry synchronisation could be 
achieved using JADE’s included DF persistence functionality. This functionality 
allows the DF contents to be stored in a relational database instead of the default 
in-memory approach. Bellifemine et al. (2007) state that DF persistence provides 
scalability and fault tolerance. Storing the DF contents in a relational database 
does improve the number of entries that can be stored in the DF. However, it only 
makes the DF tolerant against JADE container faults – the system is still susceptible 
to the database server experiencing hardware or network faults. Fortunately, 
since the DF persistence mechanism uses standard SQL instructions and the Java 
DataBase Connectivity (JDBC) interface, it would be possible to use a high 
availability clustered database solution to achieve true fault tolerance. 
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6.5.4. Agent Replication Service 
The Agent Replication Service (ARS) facilitates fault tolerance in JADE by allowing 
an agent to be replicated. The functionality of the ARS revolves around the 
concept of the master replica. This master replica is the only replica with the 
authority to interact directly with the ARS. The first instance of a replicated agent 
is automatically designated as the master replica. If the master replica fails, then 
one of the other replicas is selected as the new master (if there is another replica). 
Additional replicas are created by the ARS when requested by the master replica. 
When a replica creation request is received, the ARS creates a clone of the master 
replica using the agent name and container specified in the request. The ARS and 
the Agent Mobility Service (which facilitates agent cloning) must be enabled for 
every container that will execute a replica. Each new replica is a fully operational 
agent capable interacting with other agents. When the master replica is cloned all 
the non-transient class variables are copied to the new replica (all non-transient 
variables must be serializable). When a replica is created, its scheduler contains all 
the behaviours that the master replica was executing when cloned. By default, this 
new replica will therefore continue to execute the behaviours with which it was 
cloned. 
The ARS includes an event listener interface. If this interface is implemented, 
replicas are notified whenever new replica creation succeeds or fails and 
whenever one of the other replicas is removed. This interface will also notify a 
replica when it becomes the new master replica. 
A useful feature provided by the ARS is the ability to create a virtual AID for the 
replicated agent. Creation of a virtual AID can be requested by the master replica 
and is typically used instead of using the master replica’s own AID when registering 
services with the DF. A virtual AID is handled by the ARS and always redirects 
messages to one of the active replicas. How messages are redirected depends on 
whether the virtual AID is configured for cold replication or hot replication. When 
cold replication is configured, the virtual AID always redirects to the current 
master replica. When hot replication is configured, messages are evenly 
distributed across all the active replicas. This would typically be used in a load 
balancing scenario. 
Another useful mechanism is the ability for the master replica to request 
replicated method calls. When a replicated method call is requested, the ARS uses 
reflection to call the required method with the given arguments on each replica. 
Replicated calls to methods that update class variables can be used to synchronise 
state across all replicas.   
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Although the ARS is included as a standard feature in JADE, there is certain 
necessary functionality which is not yet implemented1, such as the ability to get a 
list of currently active replicas. Furthermore, it is difficult to find documentation 
about its use; the JADE API documentation does not contain entries for any of the 
classes included in jade.core.replication. Most of the information in this 
section has been obtained from the virtual replicated agents tutorial included in 
the JADE documentation and by examining the source code of the relevant classes. 
6.5.5. Standby Redundancy Implementation 
For an agent to implement standby redundancy there must be a single primary 
agent and one or more idle backup agents. It is desirable to be able to specify a list 
of containers on which the primary agent and its backups are permitted to execute 
as part of the agent’s configuration. In the research presented here, using Java’s 
object-oriented principle of inheritance, a base standby-redundant agent class 
was developed that inherits from JADE’s agent class and from which standby-
redundant application agents can inherit. This allows the functionality to be 
developed once and minimises the level of knowledge about the ARS required 
when developing standby-redundant agents. The standby-redundant agent class 
handles the creation of backup replicas and provides mechanisms for state storage 
and synchronisation. 
The following sections provide details on specific aspects of the standby-
redundant agent class’ implementation. These aspects include primary agent 
selection, backup agent creation, state synchronisation and conversation 
recovery. This is followed by a section detailing the potential issues and 
shortcomings of standby-redundant agent base class implementation. 
6.5.5.1. Primary Agent Selection and Backup Creation 
The standby-redundant agent class uses the master replica selected by the ARS as 
the primary standby-redundant instance. To start a standby-redundant agent, an 
instance is started on one of the AP’s containers. This instance is automatically 
selected as the primary instance. The primary agent then requests a list of active 
containers from the AMS and creates backup replicas of itself on all active 
containers that are in its permitted container list. The primary agent also 
subscribes to platform events to detect when containers are added to the AP. The 
primary agent can then create additional backup replicas whenever a container in 
its permitted container list comes online. It is not possible to implement container 
priorities in the permitted container list for standby-redundant agent execution 
since the ARS does not provide a mechanism for specifying which replica becomes 
the next master replica. 
                                                     
 
1 in JADE 4.50 
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When a primary agent (master replica) fails, the ARS selects a new master replica 
which becomes the new primary agent. This new primary is notified of its new 
status using the ARS’s event listener functionality. The ARS’s event listener 
functionality is also used to detect the successful creation of backups, as well as 
to detect the failure of backup agents so that they can be recreated if their host 
container is still operational.   
When using the ARS’s replication functionality to create backup agents, it is 
problematic that these additional replicas are created by cloning the master 
replica. Backup agents are meant to be idle, but when a cloned replica is created 
it continues to execute the behaviours that were copied from the master replicas 
scheduler. To solve this, it was necessary to overload the addBehaviour and 
removeBehaviour methods in the standby-redundant agent class so that a list 
of currently executing behaviours could be maintained. This list is then used in the 
start-up procedure of backup agents to remove all added behaviours and leave 
these agents idle. When an agent becomes the primary, the required behaviours 
are added again. 
6.5.5.2. Container Monitoring 
As mentioned in the previous section, to create backup agents it is necessary for 
the primary agent to monitor the addition and removal of containers in the AP. 
This is achieved using JADE’s platform events, which include events for the 
creation and death of agents, the addition and removal of containers and when 
agents are moved or cloned (these are the same events used to implement JADE’s 
remote management agent). The primary agent subscribes to platform events by 
sending a subscription request to the AMS and then filters the received events for 
events pertaining to container addition or removal. 
6.5.5.3. State Synchronisation 
To facilitate agent state storage, the base standby-redundant agent class uses 
Java’s Generics feature to allow the definition of an application state class. This 
application state class must inherit from a base redundant state class to ensure it 
is serializable. The base redundant state class also contains state entries used by 
the redundant agent base class that require synchronisation (such as the list of 
containers executing standby agents). An instance of the application state class is 
created by the standby-redundant agent base class and synchronised using the 
ARS’s replicated method call functionality when requested in the application agent 
code. 
6.5.5.4. Communication Recovery 
Cooperation and collaboration are key aspects of both holonic and multi-agent 
systems. Therefore, it is important that the communication between 
holons/agents can be recovered after a changeover event. If the communication 
is stateful (i.e. the contents of responses are dependent on the receipt of prior 
messages), as is the case with contract net protocol-based communication, it is 
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necessary to implement some form of rollback recovery mechanism. This is 
discussed in detail in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (b)).  
The ARS’s virtual AID functionality can be helpful when implementing a 
conversation recovery mechanism. The standby-redundant agent class uses a 
virtual AID, configured for cold replication, for all interaction with other agents. In 
this way, when changeover occurs, the virtual AID is redirected to the new primary 
agent. This avoids the need to inform other agents of the new primary agent’s AID.  
6.5.5.5. Implementation Issues 
Two issues were identified for the standby-redundant base class implementation: 
the first is a potential issue relating to how containers are monitored, and the 
second is related to how the ARS performs replicated method calls. 
The possible issue with JADE’s platform event implementation, which is used for 
container monitoring, is that there is no way to subscribe to a specific subset of 
the different event types; an agent either gets all the events or none of them. 
Therefore, the receive statements of subscribed agents need to be developed in 
such a way that they only match the desired events and ignore the remainder.  
This could have a substantial communication overhead, especially in large 
systems, since every standby-redundant agent would be sent a message for every 
platform event. This scalability impact could be reduced by using a separate agent 
that subscribes to the platform events and monitors the received events for 
container events which are then forwarded to all the standby-redundant agents. 
This container monitor agent would then become a single point of failure in the 
system and would therefore need to implement a form of redundancy. 
An issue when using inheritance with the ARS’s replicated method calls was 
identified: The reflection approach used for replicated method calls in the ARS only 
looks for the required method in the lowest-level subclass of the agent. This means 
that it is not possible to make replicated calls to methods in the standby-
redundant agent base class when it is inherited from to create a standby-
redundant application agent. A workaround for this is to make the replicated calls 
to an abstract method that must be implemented in the application agent class 
and then call the state synchronisation method in the base class from that method. 
Unfortunately, this workaround is not elegant since the developer must remember 
to implement the call to the base class’s state synchronisation method in each 
class that inherits from it. 
6.5.6. Failure Detection 
An important aspect of any standby redundancy implementation is how it detects 
failure of the primary instance. In the case of this JADE implementation, there are 
two forms of failure that must be detected, i.e. agent failure and container failure. 
JADE services are implemented using a distributed coordinated filters architecture 
(Bellifemine et al., 2007). When an agent fails, the container on which the agent 
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was executing generates a notification which is sent to the AMS. The ARS 
implements a filter which intercepts this notification and checks whether the 
failed agent is a replica before passing the message on to the AMS. If the failed 
agent is one of the replicas, then the ARS can act accordingly. In order to generate 
a notification when a container fails, the master main container must monitor all 
of the containers in the AP (since a container may be unable to generate a 
notification about its own failure).  
6.5.6.1. The Default RMI-Based Container Monitoring Mechanism 
JADE’s default container monitoring mechanism uses Java’s Remote Method 
Invocation (RMI) interface, which operates over a permanent TCP connection. 
These RMI connections already exist between all the AP’s containers since they 
are used to serve inter-container commands. The default mechanism on the 
master main container uses RMI to make a blocking call on each of the containers 
in the AP. When the TCP connection between the master main container and one 
of the containers is dropped, the RMI mechanism generates an exception. The 
master main container assumes that this exception has occurred because the 
other container has failed, and that container is removed from the AP.  
This approach works well on reliable networks when the AP only contains a few 
containers (Bellifemine et al., 2010). However, as the system grows there will be 
increasing network congestion, which increases the chance that the TCP 
connection of an active container will be dropped, and that container will be 
falsely removed. 
6.5.6.2. The UDP Node Monitoring Service 
JADE provides the UDP Node Monitoring Service (UDPNMS) as an alternative 
container monitoring mechanism to facilitate APs that have many containers or 
that use unreliable networks (Bellifemine et al., 2010). The UDPNMS uses UDP 
multicast heartbeats to identify unresponsive containers. The UDPNMS must be 
enabled at start up for all containers in the AP. An advantage of the UDPNMS is 
that it allows containers to be temporarily unavailable without being falsely 
removed from the AP (Bellifemine et al., 2010). A further advantage is that its 
configuration parameters allows for greater control of the container failure 
detection delay.  
There are four configuration parameters that control how the UDPNMS behaves: 
the port_number, the ping_delay, the ping_delay_limit and the 
unreachable_limit. The port_number specifies the port on which the 
master main container listens and to which the UDP heartbeats are addressed. 
The ping_delay (in milliseconds) determines the rate at which containers will 
emit heartbeats. If the master main container does not receive a heartbeat from 
a container within the ping_delay_limit (in milliseconds), then that 
container is considered unreachable. If the container remains unreachable for 
longer than the unreachable_limit (in milliseconds), then it is considered to 
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have failed and is removed. These parameters are specified on the main container 
and propagated to the other containers in the AP during execution. 
6.5.6.3. Comparison 
It was observed that the default RMI-based implementation has a short detection 
period for faults that result in immediate termination of the TCP connection (i.e. 
software faults that terminate the container but leave the host device’s OS 
operational). However, for faults that do not result in immediate termination of 
the TCP socket (i.e. whenever the container’s host device experienced power loss 
or was isolated by network failure), the detection of a failed container is delayed 
until the TCP socket times out. This timeout is dependent on the device and OS 
but may be in the order of several minutes. 
Disappointingly, the UDPNMS also experiences a similarly delayed failure 
detection whenever container failure is due to power loss or network isolation of 
the container’s host device. Fortunately, the delayed detection period is 
substantially shorter than that of the default mechanism (tens of seconds as 
opposed to minutes).  
An examination of the UDPNMS source code, in conjunction with system logs at 
JADE’s finest logging level, revealed the source of this added delay as an RMI ping 
timeout. Before classifying a container as unreachable, the master main container 
first attempts a non-blocking ping of the container over the RMI connection 
between the two containers. It is suspected that this is done to ensure that the 
unresponsive container is in fact unreachable, since UDP is a connectionless 
protocol characterised by best-effort packet delivery – therefore neither the 
sender nor the intended receiver of a UDP packet have any awareness or control 
of packet loss. If the ping is successful, then the container it is not classified as 
unreachable since the UDP heartbeats were assumedly lost. However, if the 
container has failed, the ping blocks until it times out and the UDPNMS handles 
the container failure as expected. 
Although a logical motivation for the non-blocking RMI ping can be theorised, it is 
not strictly necessary. To avoid scenarios where the ping_delay_limit is 
falsely reached for an active container, the ping_delay and 
ping_delay_limit could rather be adjusted to increase the number of 
heartbeat pings that would need to be lost before a node is considered 
unavailable. Alternatively, the ability to configure the RMI ping timeout would be 
desirable. It could be possible to reduce the RMI ping timeout using certain flags 
when compiling JADE, but this may affect the stability of other aspects of the JADE 
platform that utilise RMI. Since JADE is open source, the RMI ping could be 
removed from the UDPNMS source code, but this paper seeks to use standard 
JADE features. Despite its shortcomings, the UDPNMS is the superior node 
monitoring mechanism and is therefore the mechanism used in this standby 
redundancy implementation.  
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6.5.7. Handling Standby Redundancy Events 
The three forms of standby redundancy events that are typically catered for by 
software based standby redundancy implementations are controller failure due to 
power loss or a hardware fault, controller isolation by a network fault, and 
operator triggered changeover. The JADE standby redundancy implementation’s 
ability to handle each of these scenarios is discussed below. 
6.5.7.1. Controller Failure due to Power Loss or Hardware Fault 
Changeover due to power loss or fail-stop hardware faults is the simplest form of 
standby redundancy event to address. If the failed control device was host to a 
backup agent, then the primary agent continues execution with one fewer backup 
agent. If the failed device was host to the primary agent, then the standby 
redundancy base class implementation detects the failure and selects a new 
primary agent. When the failed control device is brought back online, the JADE 
container is restarted. The primary agent will detect the addition of this container 
to the AP and create a backup replica on it. 
6.5.7.2. Controller Isolation by a Network Fault 
Controller isolation due to a network fault is usually complicated to manage for 
software based standby redundancy implementations. This is because, to the rest 
of the system, the isolated controller appears to have failed, while to the isolated 
controller, the rest of the system appears to have failed. This is most evident in 
systems with only two containers. These systems will contain a primary redundant 
agent and a single backup agent. When one of the controllers is isolated, both 
containers detect this as the other container having failed. As a result, the backup 
agent is promoted to primary agent. There are now two primaries in the system.  
This is less of an issue if the only means by which these agents influence the rest 
of the system is over the network since the primary on the isolated container 
would not be able to conflict with the primary on the non-isolated container. 
However, if the primary agents interact with the system using the control device’s 
I/O then this is a significant issue and mechanisms need to be implemented to 
ensure that only the non-isolated primary agent performs I/O operations, as 
described by Hawkridge et al. (2018 (a)). 
A second key aspect of handling controller isolation is reintegration of the 
controller after the network fault has been rectified. The JADE functionalities used 
here to implement standby redundancy do not provide an easy mechanism for 
achieving this. The main issue is that, due to the use of the MCRS, the isolated 
container is now a main container. In the work presented here, it was found that 
the best approach to reintegrate a container, is to shut it down and then restart 
it.    
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6.5.7.3. Operator Triggered Changeover 
This standby-redundant agent implementation does not facilitate operator 
triggered changeover. This is because it is not possible to request the selection of 
a new master replica from the ARS. The only way to trigger the selection of a new 
master replica is for the current master replica to terminate. Operator triggered 
changeover would typically be used when a controller needs to be brought offline 
for maintenance.  It is expected that JADE’s agent mobility functionality could 
instead be used to move the primary agent to a new container if the container 
upon which it is executing needs to be brought offline. 
6.6. Case Study 
6.6.1. Case Study Configuration 
This paper evaluates the proposed approach for standby redundancy using JADE 
through the case study implementation of a generalised distributed holonic 
controller using two control devices (the minimum setup required to implement 
standby redundancy). The case study system is shown in Figure 48. The holarchy 
contains two resource holons, an order holon and a product holon. Each holon is 
implemented using a single (active) JADE agent which is hosted by containers on 
each of the control devices. The product considered in this case study requires a 
particular service to be executed consecutively a set number of times. The 
required service can be provided by both resource holons. Each order holon 
produces an instance of the product by using the contract net protocol to 
negotiate and book execution of this service by the resource holons.  
 
Figure 48: Case Study Architecture 
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The order holon implements standby redundancy and is the focus of the 
evaluation in this section. The resource holons do not implement redundancy and 
are each assigned their own container. The product holon is replicated (i.e. 
executes on both containers) since it is not instance specific (Hawkridge et al., 
2018 (c)). This could be achieved using the ARS, however product replication is not 
further considered in this paper. 
The two control devices used in this case study are a Microsoft Windows PC and 
an embedded Linux microcontroller (a Raspberry Pi 3 model B). This highlights the 
portability of Java/JADE code since the holon code is identical for both control 
devices. The ability to use different computational hardware and different 
operating systems is beneficial from a redundancy standpoint as it reduces the 
likelihood of common cause faults. 
6.6.2. Test Procedure 
There are two measures for standby-redundant systems: changeover time and 
system bump. Since holonic control typically deals with discrete event systems, 
changeover time is one of the main contributors to system bump as it increases 
the probability that events will be missed. Therefore, the JADE implementation 
will be evaluated in terms of its changeover time.  
The changeover time is the sum of the failure detection time, the primary selection 
time and the application initialisation time. The application initialisation time will 
vary from use case to use case and will be of little meaning since this case study 
uses a generic holarchy. The application initialisation time is therefore disregarded 
from the analysis and changeover is measured from primary failure until the 
backup is notified of its new status as primary. 
6.6.2.1. Measuring Changeover Time 
Changeover times are calculated using custom system logs that generate 
timestamps with millisecond precision. Using timestamps is complicated due to 
differences between the two devices’ system times and clock drift. A mechanism 
was implemented that periodically logs the time difference between the two 
containers as calculated using an adaptation of Cristian’s clock synchronisation 
algorithm (Cristian, 1989).  
The algorithm is shown in Figure 49. First party A sends a timestamp request to 
party B and stores its local timestamp (𝑡𝐴1) at the time of sending. When party B 
receives the timestamp request, it sends a reply containing its local timestamp 
(𝑡𝐵). When it receives the response from B, party A takes a second timestamp 
(𝑡𝐴2). The time difference is then calculated as ∆ =
𝑡𝐴1+𝑡𝐴2
2
− 𝑡𝐵 with a round-trip 
time of 𝑅𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝐴2 − 𝑡𝐴1. The algorithm assumes that the outbound and inbound 
transmission time are equal. These synchronisation measures were performed at 
regular intervals and the time difference with the shortest round-trip time was 
used in order to reduce the accuracy impact of possible differences between the 
outbound and inbound transmission time. 
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Figure 49: Calculating the Time Difference between Two Parties using Cristian’s Algorithm 
6.6.2.2. Fault Injection 
The following four categories of faults were tested for the order holon: agent 
failure due to a software error; JADE container shutdown or failure due to a 
software fault; container isolation due to a network fault; and control device 
failure due to a hardware fault or power loss.  
To test changeover due to agent failure, a fault insertion mechanism was 
developed that throws a Java runtime exception when the container ID and certain 
aspects of the order holons state match some predefined values. Container 
shutdown or failure was simulated by terminating the JVM instance that was 
executing the container. On Windows this was achieved by closing the command 
prompt that was executing the container. On Linux this was achieved using the 
“pkill” command to terminate the JVM process2. Container isolation was simulated 
by removing the network cable from the device in question. Control device failure 
was simulated by removing power from the device. 
All the fault conditions were injected midway through the order holons execution. 
The tests were performed for the cases when the primary order holon is on the 
master main container and when it is on the backup main container.  
6.6.3. Test Results 
The JADE implementation’s failure handling was first tested for agent failure due 
to software faults, and then for the three forms of container failure. 
                                                     
 
2 The type of termination signal is important for simulating container failure when the container is 
the master main. For example, if the container is shutdown using a SIGTERM exit signal in Linux 
then the entire AP will shut down, whereas if a SIGKILL exit signal is used then only the container 
terminates. 
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The detection and handling of agent failures due to software faults is performed 
by the agent platform and is not affected by the selected container monitoring 
mechanism. An average changeover time of 26.4 ms with a standard deviation of 
3.21 ms was measured. This changeover time does not appear to be influenced by 
whether the primary was executing on the master main container or the backup 
main container. 
The measured changeover times for the three forms of container failure are 
shown in Table 2. The tests were performed for both the case where the primary 
order holon is initially executing on the master main container and for the case 
when it is initially executing on the backup main container. For both cases, the 
container where the primary order holon initially executes is hosted by the 
Raspberry Pi 3B. (Preliminary tests suggested that the execution location of the 
failing container does not affect results, so the Raspberry Pi 3B was used as the 
failing device since fault injection and measurements were simpler for this case).  
Each fault type was tested with two different UDPNMS configurations. The first 
configuration (Config. A) uses a ping_delay of 20 ms, a ping_delay_limit 
of 80 ms and an unreachable_limit of 160 ms for an expected detection 
time of 240 ms. This configuration represents the shortest delay that could be 
achieved stably. Configurations with shorter timeouts were tested, but these were 
deemed to be only marginally stable since an analysis of the logs revealed that 
these configurations frequently lost heartbeat pings and that false detection was 
only prevented by the RMI ping. The second configuration (Config. B) uses a 
ping_delay of 250 ms, a ping_delay_limit of 2000 ms and an 
unreachable_limit of 1000 ms for an expected detection time of 3000 ms. 
This configuration represents a more typical use case that makes a compromise 
between network load and changeover time. 
Table 2: Measured Changeover Times for Container Failure 
 
Primary on Master Main Primary on Backup Main 
Mean [s] 
Standard 
Deviation 
[ms] 
Mean [s] 
Standard 
Deviation 
[ms] 
 Container Shutdown or Failure due to a Software Fault 
Config. A 2.531 70.10 1.056 288.78 
Config. B 5.576 461.58 3.977 212.62 
 Container Isolation due to a Network Fault 
Config. A 40.535 157.62 20.670 269.35 
Config. B 43.132 113.24 22.909 61.27 
 Control Device Failure due to Power Loss or a Hardware Fault 
Config. A 40.787 298.57 20.893 545.86 
Config. B 43.726 104.85 23.551 500.23 
There appears to be a correlation between expected detection time based on the 
UDPNMS configuration and the achieved changeover time. The average difference 
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between the changeover times for Config. B and Config. A is 2.73 seconds and the 
difference between their expected detection times is 2.76 seconds. However, 
further tests with multiple configurations would be required to identify the 
relationship between the UDPNMS configuration parameters and the achieved 
changeover time with a level of certainty. 
The test results show that the changeover takes longer when the primary order 
holon is on the master main container than when it is on the backup main 
container. This is because the MCRS first needs to handle the master main 
container failure and select the new master main container before the ARS-based 
standby redundancy implementation can select a new primary holon. 
The results also highlight the effect of the RMI ping timeout on the changeover 
time for container isolation and control device failure. For the case where the 
primary holon begins on the backup main container, the RMI ping timeout appears 
to add approximately 20 seconds of additional delay. For the case where the 
primary holon begins on the master main container, the additional delay is 
approximately 40 seconds. It is suspected that this may in fact be due to two RMI 
ping timeouts: the initial ping for container failure detection and an additional ping 
once the backup main container is selected as master main. However, this requires 
further investigation. The changeover times achieved for container shutdown or 
failure due to software errors are potentially an indication of the changeover times 
that could be achieved for container isolation and control device failure if the RMI 
ping timeout delay is rectified. 
6.7. Conclusions 
This paper presents and evaluates an approach for implementing, by using JADE’s 
built-in functionality, standby redundancy for a distributed holonic cell controller. 
The paper considers holon standby redundancy as agent standby redundancy, 
since MAS implementations of holonic systems typically use a single agent for each 
holon. The approach uses JADE’s Main Container Replication Service (MCRS) to 
ensure that main container failure does not result in Agent Platform (AP) failure. 
The creation of backup holon instances and primary holon instance selection is 
facilitated by the Agent Replication Service (ARS). JADE’s UDP Node Monitoring 
Service (UDPNMS) is used to detect container faults since its fault detection period 
is superior to that of the default Remote Method Invocation (RMI) based container 
monitoring mechanism. 
The presented standby redundancy implementation can handle four categories of 
failure: agent failure due to software faults; container shutdown or failure due to 
software faults; container isolation by network faults; and control device failure 
due to power loss or fail-stop hardware faults. The implementation does not 
facilitate automatic reintegration of containers that have been isolated by 
network faults – instead it requires that they be terminated and restarted. The 
implementation also does not allow for operator triggered changeover, but JADE’s 
agent mobility functionality can be used to achieve a similar effect. 
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The case study of a minimal distributed holonic cell was used to validate the 
proposed approach. The holarchy contained two resource holons, an order holon, 
and a product holon and was implemented across two control devices. The 
changeover time was measured for each of the four fault categories using two 
different UDPNMS configurations and for both the case when the primary holon 
is on the master main container and for when the primary holon is on the backup 
main container. 
Changeover times in the event of controller isolation or control device failure in 
the order of 40 seconds for the master main container and 20 seconds for a backup 
main container were observed. Changeover durations of this magnitude may be 
acceptable at higher levels of manufacturing control. However, at a cell level 
changeover times that exceed a few seconds are typically unacceptable. 
In conclusion, it is possible to implement standby-redundant holonic cell control, 
using JADE, that can handle the types of failures that are typically expected from 
a software based standby redundancy solution. However, the achievable 
changeover times may be unacceptable for many manufacturing cell applications 
without making modifications to the JADE source code. 
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7. Evaluation 
This section describes the evaluation of the Erlang/OTP implementation of 
standby redundancy. The evaluation seeks to determine the suitability of 
Erlang/OTP for implementing standby redundancy in a distributed holonic cell. 
The evaluation is performed through a case study comparison with a similar JADE 
implementation as described in section 1.4. The comparison is presented in the 
form of a paper titled “Comparison of Erlang/OTP and JADE Implementations for 
Standby Redundancy in a Holonic Cell Controller” (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (f)). 
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Comparison of Erlang/OTP and JADE 
Implementations for Standby Redundancy in a 
Holonic Controller 
G Hawkridge, AH Basson, K Kruger 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University 
Abstract 
This paper presents a comparison between two standby redundancy 
implementations within the context of a holonic controller for a manufacturing 
cell: using the Erlang/OTP programming framework and the JADE (Java Agent 
DEvelopment framework) multi-agent system (MAS) framework. Erlang (and its 
associated library OTP) contains several features that greatly simplify the 
implementation of standby redundancy. JADE is a popular MAS framework that 
has become the prevailing solution within academic research in holonic control. 
Both solutions implement standby redundancy using standard features of their 
respective frameworks. A case study comparison is performed using both 
quantitative and qualitative measures.  
The comparison shows that, for the case study, the Erlang/OTP implementation 
performs better than the JADE implementation for all the standby-redundant 
metrics: it achieves shorter changeover times, lower computational requirements 
overall, less computational and state synchronisation overhead, and greater fault 
handling flexibility. Erlang/OTP lacks the level of supporting communication and 
protocol infrastructure that is available in JADE due to JADE's strong heritage 
within multi-agent systems.  
Keywords: Standby Redundancy; Holonic Control; Erlang/OTP; JADE 
7.1. Introduction 
Modern manufacturing paradigms are becoming increasingly distributed and 
complex. This is particularly evident in the recent focus on Industry 4.0, cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) (Brettel et al., 
2014; Bi, Xu & Wang 2014; Gerbert et al., 2015). The reliability or availability of 
such complex systems is a significant concern. Availability here refers to the 
percentage of time for which a system is ready and able to perform its expected 
functions.  
The holonic paradigm has been highlighted as a promising approach for managing 
complexity, changes and disturbances in systems (Monostori et al., 2016). Holonic 
manufacturing control maintains the global control and optimisation potential of 
hierarchical structures, while leveraging the improved flexibility and fault-
tolerance of heterarchical structures. 
Holonic manufacturing systems achieve fault-tolerance by facilitating functional 
redundancy. Functional redundancy here refers to the use of multiple holons that 
can perform a certain task. Even though holonic systems will, in general, continue 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
144 
 
operating in the presence of holon failure (for holons that have functional 
redundancy), this holon failure will reduce the functionality or capacity of the 
system, leading to bottlenecks and possible system failure. Additionally, functional 
redundancy is not always possible for all types of holon. Standby redundancy is an 
approach that can be used to improve the availability of individual holons. Standby 
redundancy has traditionally been used to improve the availability of hierarchical 
or monolithic control systems. 
This paper compares two alternative software platforms, Erlang/OTP and the Java 
Agent DEvelopment framework (JADE), in terms of their suitability for the 
implementation of standby redundancy in a holonic controller for a manufacturing 
cell.  
JADE is a framework that facilitates the implementation of multi-agent systems. 
The multi-agent system (MAS) is a computational paradigm in which systems are 
composed of many intelligent agents which interact with one another. Kravari and 
Bassiliades (2015) claim that JADE is the most popular framework in the agent-
based computing community. This popularity can be largely attributed to JADE’s 
foundations in the Java ecosystem and the supporting tools and community that 
foundation brings. Additionally, JADE is compliant with the Foundation of 
Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) standards which facilitate interoperability 
between different MAS frameworks by specifying common architectural, 
communication and management components (Leitao et al., 2016; Bellifemine et 
al., 2007). MASs are frequently used when implementing holonic manufacturing 
systems due to the similarities between agents and holons (Babiceanu & Chen, 
2006). Due to its popularity within the MAS environment, JADE has in many 
respects become the de facto standard for holonic implementations in academic 
research.   
Erlang is a functional programming language designed for the development of 
fault-tolerant soft real-time control systems (Armstrong, 1996). OTP (Open 
Telecom Platform), a key feature of Erlang, is a set of libraries that simplify the 
development of large complex systems (Armstrong 2010: 73).  Erlang/OTP is not 
well known within the manufacturing systems’ academic community, but it has an 
impressive industrial track record. Initially developed by Ericsson, Erlang/OTP has 
been used in several successful, large-scale products such as the AXD301 switch 
(Armstrong, 2003). Erlang and OTP were public released as open source software 
in 1998. Since then, its use has provided several companies with competitive 
advantages, leading to a rapidly growing user community. A prominent example 
of the competitive advantage that Erlang/OTP can provide is WhatsApp, which 
used Erlang/OTP to develop a high-reliability, massively-scalable messaging 
service that serves more than 450 million users (O’Connell, 2014).  
Erlang has many attractive features, such as concurrency and scalability, that are 
useful when implementing holonic manufacturing control systems (Kruger & 
Basson, 2017). Researchers at KU Leuven have used Erlang/OTP to achieve a 
technology readiness level 7 for the control implementation of a 3D printing 
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factory (Valckenaers and Van Brussel, 2015). Furthermore, GRiSP has used 
Erlang/OTP to create robust embedded controllers (Anonymous, s.a.). Erlang/OTP 
has been proposed as an alternative to JADE and MAS for holonic implementations 
as it inherently provides greater modularity and fault tolerance (Kruger, 2018). 
This paper begins with an outline of the comparison’s methodology. This is 
followed by an overview of the holonic cell controller considered in this paper and 
the two standby redundancy solutions. The evaluation criteria are then presented 
and motivated. The two solutions are then compared based on those criteria. 
Finally, some conclusions and recommendation are provided. 
7.2. Methodology 
This paper presents a comparison between two different software frameworks. As 
discussed in Kruger (2018), generalised comparisons of software platforms are 
complicated by paradigmatic, syntactic and philosophic differences. Instead, this 
paper follows the examples of Chirn and McFarlane (2005), and Kruger (2018) by 
performing a comparison that focuses on each platform’s supporting functionality 
for a specific use case. In this paper, that use case is the implementation of standby 
redundancy in a holonic cell controller. This comparison is performed using 
separate standby redundancy implementations of the same holonic architecture 
for a case study system. Both implementations are restricted to using the standard 
features and functionalities of their respective software frameworks.  
This comparison uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative metrics. 
Quantitative metrics are used to compare the solutions in terms of their 
performance and overhead. Qualitative metrics are used to compare the 
behaviour and characteristics of the standby redundancy implementations and 
their underlying software frameworks. Qualitative evaluations are based on 
experiences and impressions of the authors and are therefore susceptible to the 
preconceptions and agenda of the evaluator. While the subjective nature of 
qualitative metrics is unavoidable, this paper endeavours to provide an impartial 
evaluation. 
Since this paper considers a system with multiple control devices and multiple 
software elements that can be distributed across those devices, there are a 
multitude of potential permutations. Although this paper endeavours to test a 
representative selection of those permutations, it is possible that unexpected 
edge cases may exist. It is further emphasised that the results obtained in this 
paper are specific to the case study scenario considered, and that application of 
these standby redundancy approaches to other scenarios may lead to different 
results. 
Although this paper considers standby redundancy in a holonic architecture, this 
comparison will only focus on aspects of holonic architecture implementation that 
are pertinent to standby redundancy. For a more complete evaluation and 
comparison of Erlang/OTP and JADE for the implementation of holonic 
architectures, the reader is referred to Kruger (2018). 
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7.3. Holonic Architecture 
This section describes the distributed holonic architecture considered in this paper 
(Figure 50). Holonic architectures use a fractal approach. A grouping of related 
holons is called a holarchy, where any holon in the holarchy is either a singular 
entity or a lower-order holarchy. This holarchy architecture is based on the PROSA 
reference architecture (Van Brussel et al., 1998). Apart from the standard PROSA 
holons, this architecture features three architectural resource holons, namely the 
gateway holon, the order manager holon and the service directory. These 
architectural holons do not represent manufacturing resources but rather 
software resources that are necessary to provide the desired functionality.  
 
Figure 50: Architecture of the Redundant Distributed Holonic Controller 
7.3.1. Gateway Holon 
The gateway holon is the communication interface between the higher-level 
controller (HLC) and the holarchy. The gateway holon serves as a middleman 
which forwards messages between the HLC and holons within the holarchy. The 
gateway holon can act as a reverse proxy and rewrite the source address of 
outgoing messages in order to hide the internal structure of the holarchy. If the 
HLC is also a holonic controller then the single point of contact provided by the 
gateway holon contributes to the holarchy appearing as a single resource holon to 
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the HLC. As the single point of contact, the gateway holon is responsible for 
advertising the holarchy’s capabilities with the HLC (should the HLC provide such 
a mechanism). 
If the holarchy and the HLC use different messaging schemes, the gateway holon 
can be used to translate between these messaging schemes. This may include 
translating between different encodings (i.e. from XML encoded text to Erlang 
records), performing encryption/decryption or converting between different 
transmission media (i.e. from TCP/IP to RS-232).  
7.3.2. Order Manager Holon 
The order manager holon dispatches order holons to handle new requests from 
the HLC. The order manager holon can be used to limit the number of active orders 
to prevent the holarchy from being flooded by requests. When the number of 
active orders reaches a specified limit, the order manager holon queues additional 
requests and dispatches them when current active orders are completed. 
7.3.3. Service Directory 
The service directory is an architectural resource holon which assists both 
resource and order holons. By allowing resource holons to advertise their 
capabilities, the service directory helps each order holon find resource holons with 
the capabilities required for the next stage of that order’s production procedure. 
A service directory can contribute to the modularity and reconfigurability of a 
holarchy since a resource can be added to or removed from active use by 
registering or deregistering with the service directory without directly affecting 
the remainder of the holarchy. 
7.3.4. Product Holons 
Each product holon contains the production procedure, product model and 
parameters required to produce an instance of that product. Typically, when 
products have many possible alternative procedures, the complete production 
procedure is stored in a top-level product holon, while the local product holons 
maintain a subset of the complete procedure based on the capabilities present 
within their holarchy. If the holarchy's capabilities change or the top-level product 
holon is updated, then the local product holons are updated. 
7.3.5. Resource Holons 
The resource holons in this holarchy are standard PROSA resource holons. They 
may be singular holons or they may represent lower order holarchies. Resource 
holons can represent both hardware and software resources. Examples of 
resources include interchangeable machine tools, storage slots, specialised 
software, conveyor intersections, execution time on specialised hardware and 
robotic arms. 
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7.3.6. Order Holons 
Each order holon is responsible for managing the production of a single instance 
of a product type. The order holons interact with the relevant product holon to 
obtain the production procedure for their product instance. The order holon then 
negotiates the production of its instance with the required resource holons as 
determined by the production procedure. 
7.4. Standby Redundancy Implementations 
7.4.1. Background 
Standby controller redundancy refers to the scenario where there is a single 
primary control element and one or more backup control elements. If the primary 
instance fails, then one of the backup instances assumes the role of primary – this 
is referred to as changeover. Standby-redundant control is categorised as either 
cold, warm or hot, based on its performance and features (Hawkridge et al., 2018 
(a)). The two implementations considered in this paper can be categorised as 
warm standby redundancy, since the state of the primary controller is 
synchronised with the backups to ensure that the initial state after changeover is 
relatively close to the system’s actual state. Also, the changeover time is shorter 
than would be expected for cold standby redundancy. 
7.4.2. Erlang Implementation 
The details of the Erlang/OTP implementation of standby redundancy for this 
holonic architecture are given in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (c)). The gateway holon, 
order manager holon, service directory and order holons implement standby 
redundancy. The product holons use replication, rather than standby redundancy, 
since they are not instance specific (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (c)). The resource 
holons could also implement standby redundancy (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (b); 
Hawkridge et al., 2018 (c)), but that was excluded here since the coupling between 
the resource holons and the manufacturing equipment they represent is 
application specific.  
The control logic for the standby-redundant holons is implemented as state 
machines using OTP’s gen_statem behaviour. State replication is achieved using 
OTP’s distributed database management system, mnesia. Primary changeover is 
implemented using OTP’s failover and takeover mechanism for distributed 
applications.  
7.4.3. JADE Implementation 
The implementation of a standby-redundant holon in JADE is described in 
Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)). This implementation uses the following JADE features: 
The Main Container Replication Service (MCRS) to ensure the availability of the 
Agent Management System (AMS); the UDP Node Monitoring Service (UDPNMS) 
for container failure detection; and the Agent Replication Service (ARS) to create 
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backup agents, perform state synchronisation and handle primary agent selection. 
The JADE holonic framework developed by Kruger (2018) was adapted to 
implement the holonic architecture described above using the standby-redundant 
agent base class developed in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)). Standby redundancy was 
added to the gateway holon, order manager holon and all the order holons. The 
service directory functionality is fulfilled by the Directory Facilitator (DF), which 
features its own fault tolerance mechanisms. As for the Erlang implementation, 
standby redundancy was not tested here for the product holons and resource 
holons, although Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)) gives approaches to implement that.  
7.4.4. Equivalency 
Establishing that the two implementations are equivalent is an important 
foundation for their comparison. These solutions are being compared according 
to their suitability for standby redundancy and, therefore, equivalency is based on 
their ability to handle the same fault cases.  
Both implementations are expected to handle the following fault categories: 
failure of holons due to software errors; failure of a node3 due to a software fault; 
node isolation due to a network fault; and controller failures due to power loss or 
fail-stop hardware faults. These fault categories are typical of what would be 
expected from a software-based standby redundancy implementation. 
The implementations are not expected to handle hardware faults that lead to 
erroneous behaviour (such as stuck outputs, etc.), since these faults require 
standby redundancy implementations that include a redundant hardware 
component. The implementations are also not expected to handle software errors 
that lead to incorrect behaviour, since these forms of fault are either handled at 
an application level or using a hot standby redundancy that provides consistency 
checking between the primary and backups over a high bandwidth connection. 
For the Erlang/OTP solution, detection and handling of holon failure due to 
software errors is facilitated by OTP’s supervision tree mechanism, while node 
failure, node isolation and controller failure are all detected and handled by OTP’s 
application failover and takeover mechanism. For the JADE solution, all the fault 
categories are detected and handled by the ARS. Therefore, the two solutions are 
both able to handle the same fault scenarios, but they may not be able to handle 
each scenario equally well (as discussed in Section 7.8.1). However, for both 
implementations the holonic cell will continue to operate after theses faults are 
experienced. 
Both implementations implement a form of conversation recovery. However, 
since the contract net protocol classes in JADE restrict access to internal state, the 
                                                     
 
3 A node here refers to a distributed instance of the specific control implementation, i.e. an Erlang 
node or a JADE container. 
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JADE implementation is not able to recover to the same extent as the Erlang/OTP 
implementation. Instead the JADE recovery mechanism must restart any ongoing 
contract net negotiations. JADE contract net classes that allow for the same level 
of internal state access as the Erlang/OTP implementation could be developed for 
equivalency, but one of JADE’s strengths it the presence of existing frameworks 
that reduce development effort (discussed in greater detail in Section 7.8.3.2). 
7.5. Evaluation Criteria 
This section presents the evaluation criteria used to compare the Erlang/OTP and 
JADE implementations of standby redundancy. These criteria consist of both 
quantitative and qualitative metrics.  
7.5.1. Quantitative Metrics 
The quantitative criteria considered in this paper are: the standby-redundant 
performance of the implementations; the computational requirements of each 
implementation; and the system overhead due to the use of standby redundancy. 
7.5.1.1. Standby Redundancy Metrics 
The performance of a standby-redundant controller is quantified by two key 
measures: the changeover time and the system bump. The changeover time refers 
to the time it takes for a backup instance to assume control in the event of primary 
failure. System bump refers to the impact on the system (i.e. loss of product 
quality, etc.) due to the changeover period during which there is no active control. 
Since both implementations implement state synchronisation, system bump is 
also influenced by the difference between the last synchronised state, which is the 
backup’s initial state, and the systems’ actual state when the backup assumes 
control. 
In a continuous system where the state trajectory of the system is to be controlled 
(i.e. the temperature profile of a solder reflow oven), the system bump is easily 
quantified by how far the system has drifted from its desired state trajectory 
during the changeover period. However, system bump is harder to quantify for 
discrete event systems, such as the case study considered in this paper. 
Manufacturing execution systems (MESs) are an example of discrete event 
systems to which the holonic paradigm is applied.  
For discrete event systems, the system bump can be considered as missed events 
(i.e. missed requests or notifications) and lost opportunities (i.e. missing a bid 
deadline due to changeover). The significance of a missed event or lost 
opportunity is highly application dependent. Loss of a periodic progress update 
may simply lead to a slightly incorrect world view until the next update is received, 
whereas loss of a request relating to an urgent order could have a substantial 
impact. 
The changeover time has a significant influence on the system bump since the 
longer the control element is down, the more likely it is that an event or 
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opportunity will be missed. Certain missed events can be recovered using rollback 
conversation recovery mechanisms as discussed in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (b)). 
However, it may not be possible to recover events originating outside the system. 
Due to the probabilistic and application specific nature of system bump in discrete 
event systems, the system bump is not quantified nor used to compare the two 
implementations in this paper. Instead, changeover time is used as the primary 
measure of standby-redundant performance. 
7.5.1.2. Computational Resource Requirements 
As industry progresses towards the systems envisioned by Industry 4.0 and the 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), the use of low-cost embedded systems will 
become more prolific. The computational capability of these embedded devices is 
a significant factor in their cost. As a result, the computational requirements of a 
control implementation will impact on the cost of that system. 
For this paper, the computational resource requirements of each implementation 
are quantified using three metrics: CPU time, peak RAM usage and thread count. 
CPU time is a measure of the cumulative CPU usage by the application’s threads 
across all the device’s logical cores. It gives an indication of processing 
requirements of each implementation and provides an estimate of the tier of 
device required to execute them. Peak RAM usage is an indicator of each 
implementation’s memory requirements. Peak RAM usage is a consideration 
particularly for embedded devices, since RAM is a scarce resource. If usage 
exceeds the available RAM, then paging may be used, but this is usually 
undesirable due to the low speed of secondary storage for these devices. Ideally, 
the minimum and average RAM usage would also be profiled, but due to the 
complication of testing on multiple heterogeneous distributed devices, this could 
not be achieved. 
These metrics are assessed for normal operation (i.e. no failures) since this is the 
predominant state in which the standby-redundant system will operate. 
7.5.1.3. Standby Redundancy Overhead 
The overhead of a standby-redundant system is a significant consideration. 
Overhead here refers to the impact that the implementation of standby 
redundancy has on the system during normal operation. This is quantified in two 
ways: the additional computational resources required, and the total time for 
which process execution is blocked while waiting for state synchronisation to 
complete. 
As discussed in the previous section, the computational resource requirements 
have a direct relationship with the implementation costs of a system. By 
comparing the computational requirements of each standby-redundant 
implementation to their equivalent non-redundant implementation, it is possible 
to quantify the “computational cost” of implementing standby redundancy. 
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Additionally, since both implementations provide warm standby redundancy, they 
both perform synchronisation of state data. This state synchronisation is blocking 
in nature, which ensures that control execution, and by extension the system’s 
state, does not progress too far beyond the standby redundancy recovery point. 
This time spent blocking reduces the potential speed of the control system and 
may influence its reactivity. The total time spent blocking during state 
synchronisation should therefore be considered as part of the standby system’s 
overhead. 
7.5.2. Qualitative Metrics 
This section presents the qualitative criteria that are used to compare the nature 
and behaviour of the two standby-redundant implementations.  
7.5.2.1. Fault Handling Capabilities 
As discussed in section 7.4.4, the two standby redundancy systems can handle the 
same categories of faults, but certain fault scenarios may be handled better by one 
implementation than the other. This criterion evaluates how well each software 
platform facilitates the handling and recovery of faults. 
7.5.2.2. Distributability 
Distribution is key to the implementation of standby redundancy because multiple 
controllers are required if a system is to be expected to withstand controller 
failures. The distribution of control is also foundational to modern manufacturing 
paradigms. Distributed control offers the following benefits: it is useful for 
managing the physical distribution of manufacturing hardware; it improves 
modularity which assists in reconfiguration; it improves robustness and fault 
tolerance through fault isolation and the mitigation of certain single points of 
failure; and the collective computational capabilities of a distributed system 
enables functionality that could not be achieved in a centralised controller (Leitão, 
2009; Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2018). 
The distributability of the two software platforms is evaluated in terms of the 
following criteria:  
• Portability – The ability for the software platform to run on heterogeneous 
devices is beneficial from a standby redundancy perspective as it reduces 
the likelihood of common-cause hardware failures. 
• Architectural provisions – This criterion considers how distribution is 
achieved on each platform.  
• Communication infrastructure – This criterion considers the mechanisms 
and infrastructure provided by each implementation for communication 
between distributed entities.  
• Scalability – Scalability here refers to the ease with which a distributed 
approach or implementation can be expanded for increasing numbers of 
devices. This is an important consideration if the standby redundancy 
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implementations considered here are to be used in large scale systems, 
such as those envisioned by the IIoT paradigm. 
7.5.2.3. Ease of Development 
The development of control software for complex systems represents a significant 
investment of both time and money. Therefore, software platforms that simplify 
development are highly attractive. This is particularly important when considering 
that the implementation of standby redundancy is something that may not be 
familiar to many developers. 
• Development and debugging tools – The existence of effective 
development and debugging tools contribute to development 
productivity.  
• Existing features and frameworks – Existing features and frameworks 
reduce the amount of development work that is required and can provide 
a firm foundation for the developed system. 
• Documentation – The effectiveness of a software platform’s 
documentation is of critical importance since it is the primary source of 
knowledge and understanding for developers. Documentation that is 
unclear or outdated can contribute to substantial development delays. 
7.5.2.4. Configurability 
Configurability refers to the degree to which each implementation allows its 
standby-redundant behaviour or performance to be configured or customised to 
suit the specific application. Configurability allows developers to make 
compromises between the performance and overhead of the standby-redundant 
system. 
7.6. Overview of Experiments 
Two different sets of experiments were used to evaluate the standby redundancy 
implementations for a case study system. The first set of experiments considers 
production during normal operation. The second set of experiments considers 
production during which a fault leads to changeover of one or more of the 
standby-redundant holons.  
7.6.1. Case Study 
The distributed holonic architecture for a singulation and feeder cell in an 
assembly line shown in Figure 51 is used as a case study to evaluate the two 
standby redundancy implementations. The cell contains two singulation units, two 
simulated magazine tables, a six-axis robot and a fixture (which would typically be 
on a conveyor). The singulation units are controlled using two embedded Linux 
microcontrollers, a Raspberry Pi 3 model B for singulation unit A and a Beaglebone 
Black Rev C for singulation unit B. Each of these controllers executes a single node. 
The simulated controllers for the magazine tables operate within two separate 
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nodes on a Microsoft Windows PC. The resource holon for the robot is 
implemented on a second Microsoft Windows PC. 
Each singulation unit takes a batch of unordered parts and presents them one-by-
one to the robot in collectable orientations. Magazine stations are attractive 
alternatives to singulation units where labour is inexpensive. In the case study, it 
is assumed that a worker fills the magazine with parts and then places it in a fixture 
that allows the robot to collect parts from known positions. Once the magazine is 
empty, it would be removed and replaced with a full magazine by a worker.  
In the case study, the singulation and feeder cell provides components for 
different product instances by placing them in fixtures in the "Part Fixture" area 
shown in Figure 51. Each product type requires specific quantities of parts “A” and 
“B”. Each part type is provided by both a singulation unit and a magazine. When 
an order is placed for a product, the required quantities of “A” and “B” are 
individually transported by the robot from the singulation units and magazines to 
the fixture for further processing after all the parts have been placed. The 
negotiation between the order and resource holons is facilitated by the contract 
net protocol. These experiments were conducted for a product that requires the 
singulation and placement of five instances of part “A” and five instances of part 
“B”. 
 
Figure 51: Physical Layout of Case Study Cell 
This case study was implemented without a dedicated cell controller (i.e. an 
additional stand-alone control device reserved for the execution of coordinatory 
holons). Instead, the holons that are not coupled to specific controllers are 
implemented in a distributed manner across the five nodes (each corresponding 
to a single resource holon) in the system. These case study nodes are abbreviated 
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as SU-A (Singulation Unit A), SU-B (Singulation Unit B), MT-A (Magazine Table A), 
MT-B (Magazine Table B) and RA (Robotic Arm) for the remainder of this paper. 
Both resource holons for the two singulation units interact with the manufacturing 
equipment they represent through the I/O of their control devices. Since this 
interaction is typically facilitated by some form of driver that is typically written in 
a separate, lower-level language (such as C), this portion of the resource holons is 
not considered in this paper’s comparison to prevent differently performing 
drivers from influencing results. Instead the low-level control was removed and 
replaced with a TCP/IP bridge to a separate independent control logic 
implementation that is used for both implementations, for consistency. 
7.6.2. Normal Operation Experiment 
The normal operation experiment is performed twice for each software platform, 
i.e. once with standby redundancy enabled and once with the standby redundancy 
features disabled/removed. The experiment was conducted with the gateway 
holon and order manage holon executing on the RA node and the order holon 
executing on the SU-A node. For the Erlang implementation, the service directory 
also executes on the RA node. For the JADE implementation, the RA node is the 
(master) main container and therefore executed the DF. Both implementations 
were configured for an expected failure detection time of approximately 5 
seconds. The execution locations of the specific holons are not important for this 
experiment as long as they are the same for corresponding redundant and non-
redundant runs. These experiments are used to quantify the typical computational 
requirements and overhead of each standby redundancy solution. 
7.6.3. Changeover Experiments 
The changeover experiments consider three test cases. Each test case is evaluated 
for each of the three node fault categories:  node failure due to a software fault, 
node isolation by a network fault and controller failure due to power loss or 
hardware fault. The fourth fault category, namely holon failure due to a software 
fault, is considered separately since it is not typically influenced by other holons’ 
execution locations. 
Test cases one and two use the same holon configuration (i.e. which holons 
execute on which nodes). For this holon configuration, the order holon executes 
on one node, while the gateway holon, order manager holon and service directory 
execute a second node. For the JADE implementation, the service directory is 
implemented by the DF and, therefore, the second node is the master main 
container. In test case one, faults are injected for the node that hosts the order 
holon. This is the simplest test case since only the standby-redundant order holon 
fails. In test case two, faults are injected for the node that hosts the gateway 
holon, order manager holon and service directory. 
Test case three uses a different holon configuration, i.e. the gateway holon, order 
manager holon, service directory and order holon all execute on the same node. 
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Faults are then injected for this node that hosts all the standby-redundant holons. 
This is the worst-case scenario since all the standby-redundant holons fail at the 
same time. 
Each test case considers a scenario with a single active order holon. The test cases 
have been selected such that the system behaviour for scenarios with multiple 
order holons can be generalised as a combination of the test cases. Test case one 
represents order holon failure when the order manager holon is not affected. Test 
case two represents the handling of order manager failure for order holons that 
remain operational, while test case three represents order manager failure for 
order holons that also fail. 
For the JADE implementation, the fault injection methodology is described in 
Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)). For the Erlang/OTP implementation, the fault injection 
methodology is described in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (c)) and section 4.3. 
7.7. Quantitative Results 
7.7.1. Changeover Times 
The changeover time measurements were performed with the following 
configurations: 
• Erlang/OTP: 
o net_ticktime = 2 s 
• JADE implementation: 
o ping_delay = 250 ms 
o ping_delay_limit = 1500 ms 
o unreachable_limit = 500 ms 
Both configuration times provide an expected failure detection time of 
approximately 2 seconds. The changeover times were measured for each of the 
changeover experiment’s three test cases described in Section 7.6.3. The 
changeover times were calculated from synchronised log file entries using the 
approach described in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)). 
7.7.1.1. Test Case 1 
In this test case, only the primary instance of the order holon is affected by node 
failure and experiences changeover. Table 3 shows the measured failure detection 
time, time to start-up and total changeover time achieved by the Erlang/OTP and 
JADE implementations for each of the three node fault categories. The presented 
times use the failure instant as a datum: the failure detection time refers to the 
duration between failure occurring and the system detecting that the primary 
order holon has failed; the time to start-up refers the duration between holon 
failure and a new primary instance being selected/created; and the total 
changeover time is duration between holon failure and the new primary instance 
being initialised and ready to continue execution. The detection time could not be 
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determined for node failure due to software faults for JADE since the relevant log 
entries are not generated for this fault case.  
Table 3: Measured Failure Detection, Start-up and Changeover Times for the Order Holon 
during Test Case 1 
 
Detection Time [s] Time to Start-up [s] 
Total Changeover 
Time [s] 
 Node Failure due to Software Faults 
Erlang/OTP 1.38 1.45 1.65 
JADE - 13.93 18.59 
 Node Isolation due to Network Faults 
Erlang/OTP 2.26 2.28 2.51 
JADE 32.63 32.96 37.23 
 Control Device Failure due to Power Loss or Hardware Faults 
Erlang/OTP 2.25 2.26 2.77 
JADE 33.32 33.40 37.64 
The results show that for both implementations, the changeover time for node 
failure due to software faults is shorter than for node isolation or control device 
failure. This is expected since termination of the TCP/IP connection by the host 
operating system improves detection speed. 
Overall, the Erlang/OTP system achieves substantially shorter changeover times 
(less than 10% of the JADE implementation’s) for this test case. The poorer 
performance of the JADE system can be attributed to the limitations of JADE’s 
container failure detection mechanisms (described in greater detail in Hawkridge 
et al. (2018 (e))). There is an approximately 50% increase in the failure detection 
times for the JADE implementation in this system with five nodes, compared to 
the system with two nodes considered in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)). For the 
Erlang/OTP implementation, there is no significant difference between the failure 
detection times for this five-node system and for the two-node system presented 
in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (a)). However, further testing on larger scale systems is 
required before conclusions about the changeover time scaling of these 
approaches can be made with confidence. 
7.7.1.2. Test Case 2 
In this test case, node failure affects the order manager holon, gateway holon and 
service directory while the order holon remains operational. The time to start-up 
and total changeover time for each of these holons are shown in Table 4.  
Once again, the Erlang/OTP system exhibits significantly shorter changeover times 
compared to that of the JADE implementation, which is further degraded by the 
fact that the failed node is the master main container. It was observed in the 
system logs that before the master main container completes its initialisation, it 
first proceeds to check the status of all the agent replicas (i.e. backup holons). This 
affects the start-up time of other holons since the new primary instance is selected 
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as part of this process. The selection of the master main container and completion 
of the master main container’s initialisation process constitute the start-up and 
changeover times, respectively, for the service directory in the JADE 
implementation (since the master main container hosts the DF). 
A notable aspect of the Erlang/OTP implementation’s performance is the 
increased changeover time for the service directory when changeover is caused 
by node isolation or control device failure. During initialisation, the Erlang/OTP 
service directory re-monitors all processes that have registered services so that 
entries can be automatically removed on provider failure. It appears that, under 
these fault circumstances, attempting to monitor the failed node results in an 
increased delay (possibly because the TCP/IP connection has not been 
terminated). It is also noted that, due to their dependency on one another, the 
gateway holon is only started once the order manager holon has completed its 
initialisation. For an Erlang/OTP implementation that contains standby-redundant 
holons with many inter-dependencies, this “chaining” of start-up delays could 
impact the system changeover time substantially. 
Table 4: Measured Start-up and Changeover Times for the Order Manager, Gateway Holon and 
Service Directory during Test Case 2 
 Order Manager Gateway Holon Service Directory 
 
Time to 
Start-up [s] 
Total 
Changeover 
Time [s] 
Time to 
Start-up [s] 
Total 
Changeover 
Time [s] 
Time to 
Start-up [s] 
Total 
Changeover 
Time [s] 
 Node Failure due to Software Faults 
Erlang/OTP 1.84 1.87 1.91 1.92 1.68 1.92 
JADE 13.07 29.32 13.10 29.28 12.26 14.92 
 Node Isolation due to Network Faults 
Erlang/OTP 2.27 2.29 2.32 2.32 2.15 9.29 
JADE 52.66 98.53 52.69 98.49 52.01 83.34 
 Control Device Failure due to Power Loss or Hardware Faults 
Erlang/OTP 2.62 2.66 2.67 2.71 2.52 9.64 
JADE 52.97 87.92 52.99 87.87 52.09 67.09 
7.7.1.3. Test Case 3 
In this test case, all the standby-redundant holons are executing on the same 
node. This represents the worst-case scenario, where all standby-redundant 
holons fail simultaneously. The results are shown in Table 5.  
As with the previous test cases, the Erlang/OTP implementation exhibits 
significantly shorter changeover times. However, the Erlang/OTP 
implementation’s changeover times for this test case are substantially longer than 
for the previous cases. This is attributed to the fact that the order manager holon 
first checks whether all the order holons that it supervises are alive before 
restarting any failed instances. This re-monitoring causes a delay (as described for 
the service directory in the previous section). Since the order manager is delayed, 
so is the starting of the order holon and the gateway holon. This is one of the 
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downsides of using a monitor-based supervision tree to provide standby 
redundancy for order holons (described in greater detail in Hawkridge et al. (2018 
(c))). It is expected that the initialisation of the order manager, and thereby the 
other order and gateway holons, could be reduced by optimising the order 
manager's initialisation procedure. 
The changeover times for the JADE implementation are also longer for this case 
than for the previous cases. The start-up times are similar for cases two and three 
and, therefore, the increased changeover times for case three can be attributed 
to the additional computation required to restart the order holon. 
Table 5: Measured Start-up and Changeover Times for the Order Manager, Gateway Holon, 
Order Holon and Service Directory during Test Case 3 
 Order Manager Gateway Holon Order Holon Service Directory 
 
Time to 
Start-up 
[s] 
Total 
Change 
over 
Time [s] 
Time to 
Start-up 
[s] 
Total 
Change 
over 
Time [s] 
Time to 
Start-up 
[s] 
Total 
Change 
over 
Time [s] 
Start-up 
Time [s] 
Total 
Change 
over 
Time [s] 
 Node Failure due to Software Faults 
Erlang/OTP 1.06 1.21 1.24 1.24 1.14 1.27 0.93 1.09 
JADE 12.95 41.63 13.01 40.92 23.26 26.56 12.46 13.79 
 Node Isolation due to Network Faults 
Erlang/OTP 2.591 9.73 9.78 9.79 9.60 12.11 2.44 9.63 
JADE 53.000 109.54 53.04 109.50 53.11 79.70 52.76 91.43 
 Control Device Failure due to Power Loss or Hardware Faults 
Erlang/OTP 2.66 10.00 10.18 10.20 9.76 12.54 2.41 9.80 
JADE 52.99 111.71 53.04 111.67 64.29 85.88 52.45 91.11 
7.7.1.4. Holon Failure due to Software Faults 
Holon failure due to software faults is handled differently for the two 
implementations. For the JADE implementation, holon failure is handled by the 
ARS – the same mechanism as for node failures, except that failure detection is 
achieved using JADE’s platform events. As a result, the tests showed a start-up 
time of 0.058 s and a changeover time of 1.928 s for failure of the order holon. 
For the Erlang/OTP implementation, each holon may typically consists of multiple 
processes and, therefore, software faults can lead to failure of one of these 
processes. As described in section 4.3, the criticality of the failed process 
determines whether it leads to that process simply being restarted by its 
supervisor in the applications supervision tree, or to the application failing if the 
error is irrecoverable. If the application fails, it is not restarted to preserve the 
integrity of the system (explained in greater detail in section 4.3). Tests for failure 
of the gateway holon’s primary server process showed a start-up time of 0.0025 s 
and a changeover time of 0.074 s when restarted by the gateway holon’s 
supervisor process. 
This case study also includes the addition of order holons that are supervised by 
the order manager holon using Erlang’s monitor mechanism (described in 
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Hawkridge et al. (2018 (c))). Minor order holon processes that fail will be restarted 
by their host supervisors. However, if a major process fails, it will result in total 
order holon failure, which will be handled by the order manager as in node test 
case 1. 
7.7.2. Computational Resource Requirements 
The computational requirements of the two standby redundancy 
implementations are presented here. The computational requirements were 
evaluated through the normal operation experiment since this is the predominant 
state in which a standby-redundant system operates. The computational resource 
requirements were measured using Windows Sysinternal’s Process Explorer for 
the Microsoft Windows devices and a custom script based on the top command 
for the embedded Linux devices.  
The measured RAM usage, CPU time and thread count for both implementations 
are shown in Table 6. The results show the average measurements over three test 
runs. The Erlang/OTP implementation uses fewer OS threads than the JADE 
implementation. This is because the Erlang/OTP implementation allocates a 
thread pool and then schedules processes to execute within that pool (Lundin, 
2008; Logan et al., 2011). JADE allocates a Java thread for each agent or threaded 
behaviour (Caire, 2009), which corresponds to an OS thread in modern JVM 
implementations (a reputable reference could not be found to support or refute 
this claim, however it appears to be widely understood in the Java community). As 
a result, an Erlang/OTP implementation would typically be expected to have fewer 
threads that are individually more heavily utilised, while a JADE implementation 
would have more threads that are individually utilised less. As the number of 
holons in the system increases, it is expected that this margin will grow, but 
verifying this expectation will require further work and testing. 
On average, the Erlang/OTP implementation’s peak RAM usage is less than half 
that of the JADE implementation. This difference agrees with the results of a 
comparison of Erlang and JADE for holonic control implementation by Kruger 
(2018).  
The CPU time for the Erlang/OTP solution is, on average, lower than for the JADE 
solution. A notable exception here is for the RA node where the CPU time is lower 
for the JADE implementation. This result differs from the results of Kruger (2018), 
but it could be attributed to the JADE implementation’s standby redundancy 
overhead (detailed in the next section). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
161 
 
Table 6: Measured Computational Resource Requirements for the Standby-Redundant 
Implementations 
 Erlang/OTP JADE 
Node 
Peak RAM 
Usage 
[KB] 
CPU Time 
[s] 
Peak 
Thread 
Count 
Peak RAM 
Usage 
[KB] 
CPU Time 
[s] 
Peak 
Thread 
Count 
SU-A 19 615 6.210 32 40 688 9.480 39.67 
SU-B 17 135 3.407 26 34 420 9.610 38.33 
MT-A 38 569 0.998 30.67 87 909 2.033 57.67 
MT-B 38 985 0.920 30.67 88 491 2.200 58.33 
RA 38 296 4.714 26 129 672 3.838 61.67 
7.7.3. Standby Redundancy Overhead 
7.7.3.1. Computational Resource Overhead of Standby Redundancy 
This section compares the computational requirements of the standby-redundant 
systems, presented in the previous section, to a corresponding non-redundant 
implementation. This was done using the normal operation experimental setup. 
Table 7 presents the computational requirement overhead for the Erlang/OTP-
based standby-redundant implementation when compared to a non-redundant 
implementation. There is no significant difference in average thread count 
between the standby-redundant and non-redundant implementations. This is 
expected since the BEAM virtual machine (Erlang’s runtime environment) 
allocates an initial pool of threads at start-up and performs its own process 
scheduling within that thread pool. There is minimal overhead for the RA 
controller and this is because the RA controller houses the service directory, 
gateway holon and order manager holon so that there is little difference between 
what it is executing for the redundant and non-redundant setups. For the other 
controllers, there is a RAM usage overhead of between 10% and 20%. This 
overhead can most likely be attributed to the mnesia table replicas that are 
housed on these nodes in the redundant implementation. These controllers also 
exhibit a CPU usage overhead ranging between approximately 45% and 120%. This 
overhead is also attributed to the maintaining of mnesia replicas. This is 
substantiated by the fact that the node with the highest CPU usage overhead is 
the node which houses the order holon and is therefore the node from which state 
synchronisation is initiated.  
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Table 7: Measured Computational Resource Requirements of the Erlang/OTP Standby-
Redundant and Non-Redundant Implementations 
 Erlang/OTP 
Node SU-A SU-B MT-A MT-B RA 
 Standby-Redundant 
Thread Count 32 26 30.67 30.67 26 
Peak RAM Usage [KB] 19 615 17 135 38 569 38 985 38 296 
CPU Time [s] 6.210 3.407 0.998 0.920 4.714 
 Non-Redundant 
Thread Count 32 26 30.67 31 26 
Peak RAM Usage [KB] 16 396 15 140 33 876 34 123 37 640 
CPU Time [s] 2.933 1.907 0.572 0.629 4.364 
 % Overhead for Standby Redundancy 
Thread Count [%] 0 0 0 -1.1 0 
Peak RAM Usage [%] 19.6 13.2 13.9 14.3 1.7 
CPU Time [%] 111.7 78.7 74.5 46.2 8.0 
      
Table 8 presents the computational requirement overhead for the JADE standby-
redundant implementation when compared to a non-redundant implementation. 
In terms of thread count and RAM usage, there is little difference between the 
standby-redundant and non-redundant implementation for the RA node since the 
node is the master main container and houses the gateway and order manager 
holons. For the other nodes there is approximately 15% overhead for MT-A and 
MT-B, and an overhead of approximately 50% for SU-B and SU-A. This difference 
may be due to differences in the way threads are managed in Windows vs Linux. 
The standby-redundant implementation has a RAM usage overhead of between 
15% and 60%. The CPU time overhead is especially high for the SU-B, MT-A and 
MT-B, because these nodes only execute their resource holon agents for the non-
redundant setup, while for the standby-redundant setup they also execute backup 
agents for the order, gateway and order manager holons. 
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Table 8: Measured Computational Resource Requirements of the JADE Standby-Redundant and 
Non-Redundant Implementations 
 JADE 
Node SU-A SU-B MT-A MT-B RA 
 Standby-Redundant 
 Thread Count 39.67 38.33 57.67 58.33 61.67 
Peak RAM Usage [KB] 40 688 34 420 87 909 88 491 129 672 
CPU Time [s] 9.480 9.610 2.033 2.200 3.838 
 Non-Redundant 
Thread Count 26 26 50 50 61 
Peak RAM Usage [KB] 35 421 26 712 55 859 59 512 122 819 
CPU Time [s] 4.193 2.367 0.260 0.754 1.802 
 % Overhead for Standby Redundancy 
Thread Count [%] 52.6 47.4 15.3 16.7 1.1 
Peak RAM Usage [%] 14.7 28.9 57.4 48.7 5.6 
CPU Time [%] 126.1 306.1 680.9 191.8 113.0 
      
In summary, the JADE implementation has a substantially higher CPU usage 
overhead and, on average, a slightly higher RAM usage overhead than the 
Erlang/OTP implementation. This is primarily attributed to the fact that the JADE 
implementation creates backup agents in advance which synchronise their state 
with the primary agent so that they are ready to take over when a fault is detected. 
In contrast, the Erlang/OTP solution uses an independent state synchronisation 
mechanism for all the standby-redundant holons and the new primary holon is 
started from scratch when failure of the previous primary is detected, thereby 
avoiding the overhead of “idle” backups. Theoretically, the approach used for the 
JADE implementation has the potential for a quicker changeover time since there 
is no start-up and state retrieval delay, but practically this is not the case (as shown 
in section 7.7.1). The Erlang/OTP implementation has a lower thread count 
overhead than the JADE implementation due to the differences in how they 
manage concurrency. The JADE implementation creates additional Java threads to 
execute the backup agents, whereas the Erlang/OTP solution makes more 
extensive use of its existing thread pool. 
7.7.3.2. Time Spent Blocking during State Synchronisation 
State synchronisation is a fundamental part of warm standby redundancy that 
enables backups to begin with a post-changeover initial state that is close to the 
pre-failure state. The state synchronisation for both implementations is blocking 
and therefore has the potential to impact the performance of a standby-
redundant holon. 
The state synchronisation blocking time for the order holon is considered here 
since it is the main redundant holon in the case study system. The state 
synchronisation blocking time was measured by taking timestamps before and 
after the synchronisation call and recording the difference in the system logs.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
The average total blocking time during state synchronisation for an order holon in 
the Erlang/OTP implementation is 10.544 seconds, while the average total 
blocking time in the JADE implementation is 15.769 seconds. The Erlang/OTP 
solution spends 33% less time blocking than the JADE solution, but this blocking 
time does not directly result in longer completion times because much of the order 
holon's execution is spent waiting for resource holons to complete their requested 
tasks. Therefore, only a subset of the state synchronisations block the order holon 
during its critical execution path. 
Blocking is more problematic for the JADE implementation than for the Erlang/OTP 
implementation. This is because Erlang’s process scheduling is pre-emptive, while 
JADE’s default behaviour scheduling is not. This means that, if a JADE behaviour 
blocks, the entire agent is blocked, whereas if an Erlang process blocks, other 
processes in the holon can continue to execute (assuming they are not waiting for 
a reply from the blocked process). This issue can be mitigated by using JADE’s 
functionality for multi-threaded parallel behaviours, but this has an impact on the 
required computational resources. 
A box and whisker plot of the individual state synchronisation blocking times is 
shown in Figure 52. The horizontal line within the box indicates the median value, 
the lower and upper box boundaries indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles 
respectively. The whiskers indicate the minimum and maximum values that are 
within 1.5 times the inter-quartile range of the box boundaries, outliers beyond 
these ranges are indicated by dots. The plot shows that more than 75% of the 
Erlang/OTP implementation’s state synchronisations were shorter than the fastest 
JADE state synchronisation.  
Furthermore, the average order holon synchronises its state 368 times for 
Erlang/OTP compared to 110 times for JADE. This is because the Erlang/OTP order 
holon comprises multiple Erlang processes which synchronise their individual 
state independently, leading to more frequent state synchronisation with smaller 
data sets. 
The performance of the Erlang/OTP implementation is particularly impressive 
when considering that state synchronisation is performed using mnesia’s 
transaction mechanism, which performs a two-stage commit to ensure 
consistency across all replicas. As a result, there is additional overhead for each of 
the more frequent state synchronisations. Furthermore, standard transactions are 
the slowest form of table interaction in mnesia Alternate interaction mechanisms, 
such as sticky locks or dirty operations, could be used to further reduce the 
blocking time of an Erlang/OTP implementation if required. 
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Figure 52: Box and Whisker Plot of Individual State Synchronisation Times for the JADE and 
Erlang/OTP Implementations 
7.8. Qualitative Results 
7.8.1. Fault Handling Capabilities 
This section highlights key aspects of how the redundant implementations handle 
faults and changeovers. 
7.8.1.1. Handling Agent/Process Failure 
One of Erlang/OTP’s strengths is the facilities it provides for managing process 
failure (Armstrong, 2010). Erlang provides a mechanism for process monitoring, 
where a monitoring process is notified if the monitored process fails. A similar 
functionality can be implemented in JADE using platform event subscription. 
However, the primary difference between these implementations is that failure 
notification for Erlang’s monitor mechanism provides the reason for failure. As a 
result, Erlang/OTP applications can handle failures differently depending on the 
reason (i.e. doing nothing if the process terminated normally), whereas a JADE 
implementation only knows that the agent is no longer alive. 
7.8.1.2. Recovery from Network Faults 
There are no significant differences between Erlang/OTP and JADE in this regard. 
Both standby redundancy implementations detect the isolation of nodes. In both 
cases, if a primary holon is isolated, a new primary holon is selected within the 
non-isolated containers/nodes and the previous primary holon continues to 
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execute on the isolated container/node. Backup holons on an isolated 
container/node interpret the isolation as their corresponding primary having 
failed and subsequently assume that role. If controller I/O is used, then some form 
of isolation detection may be required to avoid conflicting controller outputs from 
the duplicate primary holons (Hawkridge et al., 2018 (a)). 
When the network fault is rectified, neither solution has a mechanism for re-
integrating the previously isolated controller. This can be worked around by 
restarting the previously isolated container, but this is not ideal. This lack of 
reintegration is a shortcoming in both Erlang/OTP and JADE.  
7.8.2. Distributability 
7.8.2.1. Architectural Provisions 
Distribution can be achieved in JADE using two different concepts: Agent Platforms 
(APs) and containers. The AP is a FIPA concept that refers to the infrastructure 
required to facilitate agent execution. FIPA is an international standards body 
focused on agent interoperability within heterogeneous environments. This 
includes both the computational hardware and the software framework – 
essentially a complete MAS (FIPA, 2004). Distribution based around APs is 
designed for interoperability so that APs implemented using different software 
frameworks can be used. This essentially leads to several complete MASs which 
interact with one another. In contrast, containers are a JADE specific concept 
designed to achieve distribution within an AP. Each JADE AP contains one or more 
containers. A container is any JVM instance that executes JADE. In JADE, message 
transmission between containers has less latency than between APs since there is 
an added overhead for marshalling JADE messages into a FIPA compliant format 
for inter-platform communication (Cortese et al., 2002). Therefore, container-
based distribution is better for lower-level control architectures, such as in a 
manufacturing cell, while AP-based distribution is better for higher-level control, 
such as between different manufacturing plants, where interoperability is a more 
significant concern. 
Since a JADE AP may contain multiple containers, this leads to the concept of the 
main container, which is where the AMS (and DF) reside. When JADE is distributed, 
multiple containers are started on different devices. The main container is started 
first and all subsequent containers register with it when they start. To achieve this, 
the hostname and port used by the main container is provided as a boot argument 
to each of the non-main containers. If the MCRS is used, multiple main containers 
exist with a single master main and JADE provides multiple mechanisms for 
resolving the network address of the current master main container (discussed in 
greater detail in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e))). 
Distribution in Erlang/OTP is achieved using nodes. A node refers to an instance of 
the BEAM virtual machine. Each distributed Erlang node must be given a unique 
name by which it can be referenced. A node can either use Erlang’s short naming 
scheme or long naming scheme, but all nodes must use the same naming scheme. 
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During the case study implementation, it was found that the long naming scheme 
worked best for networks with domain names. The format of a long node name is 
(Name)@(FQDN), where (Name) is the unique node name (for that device) and 
(FQDN) is the Fully Qualified Domain Name of the host device. When a process 
sends a message to a process in a different node, the Erlang Port Mapper Daemon 
(EPMD) resolves the node name to the transport address for that node, i.e. the IP 
address and port for TCP/IP based distribution (Ericsson AB, 2018 (a): 274). The 
message is then transmitted to the corresponding address. 
7.8.2.2. Communication Infrastructure 
Both Erlang/OTP and JADE feature send and receive primitives. (In Erlang/OTP 
code, message sending is typically represented by the “!” operator rather than the 
primitive send function). Both Erlang/OTP and JADE allow messages to be 
extracted from the relevant message queues through pattern matching.  
JADE messages are addressed using an Agent Identifier (AID). If the AID contains 
transport addresses, then the JADE Message Transport System (MTS) attempts to 
send the message using these addresses, but if there are no associated transport 
addresses or the contained addresses are unsuccessful then the JADE MTS 
attempts to resolve the agent name with AMS (FIPA, 2002 (b)). 
In Erlang/OTP, each process has a process identifier (pid) which serves as a unique 
identifier for message transmission. Erlang/OTP also features mechanisms for 
both local and global name registration: local names have scope within each node, 
whereas global names have scope within the global group. Registered names and 
process identifiers can be used interchangeably, since registered names are 
automatically resolved when a message is sent. 
A key difference between the communication of holons for the two 
implementations is how holon communication interacts with the concurrency 
approach. For the JADE implementation, concurrency within holons is achieved 
through behaviours, all of which share the message queue of their host process. 
In contrast, for the Erlang/OTP implementation, concurrency within a holon is 
achieved using multiple processes, each of which have their own “address” and 
message queue. Each approach has its compromise: for the Erlang/OTP solution, 
managing all the pids of the holon’s processes to ensure that external messages 
arrive at the correct process can be a cause of complication; for the JADE 
implementation, each message may be checked by several behaviours before 
arriving at the correct one, and additionally, care must be taken to ensure that 
behaviours’ receive patterns only match messages that are intended for them. 
A key difference between JADE and Erlang/OTP is that name resolution is 
centralised in JADE, whereas Erlang/OTP offers various levels of naming in a 
decentralised manner. As a result, holons in the Erlang/OTP implementation are 
typically not influenced by failures that do not affect them directly. In contrast, in 
JADE, failure of the master main container halts all name resolution until the AMS 
is restarted on the new master main container. 
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All JADE messages use the ACL Message Structure defined by FIPA 00061 (FIPA, 
2002 (a)). Erlang/OTP does not enforce any format or structure on message 
contents; it is the developer’s responsibility to design/select and implement any 
required structures. 
7.8.2.3. Portability 
Portability is highly beneficial from a standby redundancy standpoint as it allows 
for the use of dissimilar control hardware and operating systems. This reduces the 
likelihood of multiple controllers failing due to common-cause faults. Additionally, 
since the code for a redundant application must be available on every device 
where it will execute, the ability to re-use the same application code on each of 
the distributed devices is desirable. 
Since JADE is Java-based, it benefits from the exceptional portability of the JVM. 
JVM versions are available for all major operating systems, including a variety of 
embedded systems. Additionally, JADE features the JADE-LEAP variant designed 
for resource constrained mobile devices (Bellifemine et al., 2007; Bellifemine et 
al., 2008). Erlang/OTP applications are also executed by a virtual machine, called 
BEAM. BEAM is not as ubiquitous as the JVM, but is it available for Windows, 
macOS and many major Linux/Unix-based operating systems. Both Erlang and Java 
code can generally be considered as platform independent, given that they do not 
utilise OS specific functionalities or drivers (i.e. for I/O control), and can therefore 
be reused for all the distributed control devices in a system. 
7.8.2.4. Local Debugging 
There is a substantial time overhead involved in debugging a distributed system 
on multiple devices, especially since any fix must be propagated to all the devices 
before it can be tested. The ability to test/simulate a distributed system locally on 
a single machine is therefore highly beneficial since it has the potential to reduce 
development time substantially 
Armstrong (2010: 70) claims that it is possible to develop an Erlang program on a 
single device and deploy it to a cluster with minimal code modification. During the 
development of the Erlang/OTP case study implementation, this was found to be 
true; the distribution of the system could be simulated by starting multiple BEAM 
instances on a single device. The local simulation of the system provided a good 
representation of the implementation’s behaviour in an actual distributed system, 
with the exception that there was less latency and it was not possible to simulate 
hardware and network failures properly. Distributed tests are, therefore, still 
required to validate the standby-redundant performance under all fault 
conditions. However, by this stage, local testing will have helped to rectify many 
of the system’s bugs. 
It is similarly possible to locally simulate the distributed behaviour of a JADE 
implementation by creating multiple containers on the same device. It was found 
that each JADE container needs to be executed in its own JVM instance. This is 
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supported by Czajkowski & Daynàs (2012) who suggest that Java applications 
should run in separate JVM instances to achieve isolation from one another. 
Several transient errors relating to the Main Container Replication Service and the 
Agent Replication Service were observed when executing multiple containers 
within the same JVM instance. Nevertheless, local testing was found to be useful 
for validating the distribution aspects of the implementation before commencing 
with distributed tests to validate the standby redundancy aspects. 
7.8.2.5. Scalability 
It is not possible to accurately evaluate the scalability of the two solutions without 
performing tests for a large number of nodes. For this reason, the scalability of the 
two implementations is compared based on the authors' opinions. 
The JADE standby redundancy implementation’s use of platform events for 
container monitoring is a scalability concern. Subscribed agents are notified of 
every event in the AP. Therefore, as the number of subscribed standby-redundant 
agents increases, so does the number of agents to which each platform event is 
sent. This is further aggravated by the fact that an “agent born” event is sent for 
each replica creation when a new container is added. This could, therefore, lead 
to substantial congestion when a container is added or removed. As discussed in 
Hawkridge et al. (2018 (e)), this could be mitigated through a centralised 
monitoring mechanism, but this has its own complications. 
Bellifemine et al. (2008) state that JADE is used in Telecom Italia’s Network Neutral 
Element Manager which manages ten thousand devices. Bellifemine et al. imply 
that the implementation is distributed over multiple containers, but do not specify 
how many. The scalability of the JADE DF is a concern (Buckle et al., 2002; 
Bellifemine et al., 2007). JADE offers a variety of mechanisms that can be used to 
address these issues, including federated DFs and storing DF contents in relational 
databases. 
Erlang/OTP has been used to develop several commercial software products that 
are renowned for their scalability. Notable examples include: ejabberd (an XMPP 
server), RabbitMQ (a message broker service), Apache CouchDB (a document-
oriented NoSQL database), and RIAK (a distributed NoSQL key-value store). 
ejabberd claims to be able to handle two million concurrent users on a single 
Erlang node (Rémond, 2016). Further scaling is achieved using multi-node clusters. 
When considering clustered Erlang nodes, it is important to consider how nodes 
interact. Inter-node connections are generally established when the first message 
is exchanged. Additionally, when two nodes connect, they exchange their list of 
currently known nodes, each node then attempts to connect to all the nodes in 
that list for which it does not currently have an existing connection. Therefore, all 
the nodes in an Erlang/OTP system are typically interconnected. This can be 
problematic in large systems, particularly for features that have a global scope 
such as the global name registry and node failure detection (Ghaffari, 2014). Often 
this interconnectedness is unnecessary since many of the nodes which are 
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connected to one another may never exchange messages. Erlang/OTP’s 
functionality for hidden nodes and global groups can be used to group nodes and 
limit this interconnectedness, but it may complicate development. An alternative 
solution is the use of SD (Scalable Distributed) Erlang, an Erlang variation 
developed as part of the RELEASE project, which offers a distribution scheme that 
claims to scale better (Trinder et al., 2017) using an approach that is similar to the 
fractal hierarchy used in holonic systems. Chechina et al. (2017) compare standard 
Erlang and SD Erlang using a series of case study benchmarks for a system with up 
to 256 nodes. Their results suggest that standard Erlang performs better for 
systems with fewer than 40 nodes and thereafter SD Erlang scales better. 
7.8.3. Ease of Development 
7.8.3.1. Development and Debugging Tools 
7.8.3.1.1 Development Tools 
The existence of effective development tools can improve development 
productivity. There is a large variety of development tools and frameworks 
available for use with JADE thanks to its use of the Java ecosystem. Erlang/OTP has 
a substantial user base and therefore a complete set of tooling has been 
developed. Both software platforms provide IDE support, build systems, unit 
testing, system testing, code coverage analysis and interactive code execution 
through a shell interface. 
7.8.3.1.2 Debugging Holons’ Internal Behaviour 
The ability to debug a holon’s internal behaviour is important especially when the 
holon does not perform as expected after changeover has occurred. 
There are two main tools that can be used to examine a JADE agent’s execution: 
JADE’s Introspector Agent and the Java debugger. The Introspector Agent provides 
a graphical interface that can be used to interrogate an agent’s behaviour and 
message queues. Using the Introspector, an agent’s execution can be slowed, 
halted or stepped through. The Introspector can be useful for troubleshooting 
behaviours that are not executed or messages which are not received. However, 
it cannot be used to view the values of agents’ or behaviours’ class variables – this 
requires a tool like the Java debugger. The Java debugger is relatively complicated 
and not particularly user friendly, but using it on a local node is achievable. 
Remotely debugging a Java application on a different device is possible but adds 
further complication.  
Erlang/OTP’s primary debugging tool is the Observer application. The Observer 
provides a graphical interface that can be used to monitor both local and remote 
nodes. Notable features of the Observer include system performance metrics and 
load charts, a graphical representation of the executing applications’ supervision 
trees, and the ability to view the contents of ETS and mnesia tables housed on that 
node. 
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When using the Observer to debug a holon, there are two features that were 
found to be useful. Firstly, the ability to view the contents of mnesia tables is 
helpful for ensuring that the correct state data is synchronised for each holon. 
Secondly, the Observer can be used to view the state variable contents of 
processes that are built on top of OTP behaviours or are developed according to 
OTP conventions. This is especially beneficial when debugging state machines. 
If these features are insufficient, the Observer provides an interface for 
Erlang/OTP’s trace functionality which is extremely powerful, although not 
particularly user friendly, and can be used to investigate the execution of a process 
with a high level of granularity. This includes the ability to trace individual function 
calls with their arguments, as well as the sending and receiving of messages.  
7.8.3.1.3 Inter-Holon Communication Debugging 
Inter-holon communication is foundational to holonic architectures. The ability to 
effectively debug this communication is crucial, especially when implementing 
conversation recovery mechanisms. 
The primary tool for monitoring and evaluating inter-agent communication in 
JADE is the Sniffer tool. The Sniffer is a graphical tool that shows the message 
interactions between selected agents. The Sniffer was found to be an effective and 
user-friendly tool in this regard. The only identified shortcoming is the inability to 
filter out certain messages, since the platform event messages sent to the 
standby-redundant agents often obscured those of the contract net-based 
negotiations. 
Erlang/OTP does not have a graphical means for debugging inter-holon 
communication. The trace functionality can be used to log the inbound and 
outbound messages for selected processes but understanding the conversation 
dynamics from these logs is not trivial. 
7.8.3.2. Existing Features and Frameworks 
This section considers the features and frameworks provided by each software 
platform that facilitate the implementation of holonic control and redundancy. 
The benefit of these existing features and frameworks are twofold: firstly, they 
minimise the amount of development work required, and secondly, they provide 
a tried and tested foundation. 
JADE has a many existing features and frameworks that facilitate the development 
of holonic architectures. JADE has a fully featured Directory Facilitator which has 
been verified and optimised for use in large systems. The JADE platform has a 
wealth of communication and protocol infrastructure due to its FIPA compliance 
(Bellifemine et al., 2001). For example, JADE’s base classes for the contract net 
protocol were valuable in the case study implementation. The implementation of 
holonic features, that are not inherently provided for, is facilitated by several 
behaviour base classes, including a state machine implementation.  
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When it comes to standby redundancy, JADE provides several features that can be 
combined to implement standby-redundant agents (as described in Hawkridge et 
al. (2018 (e))). However, this requires development time and effort to implement 
and debug. 
For Erlang/OTP, there are no existing features for holonic architectures. OTP 
provides several behaviours which implement generic architectural models or 
patterns, which include gen_server (which implements a client-server model), 
gen_statem (which implements an event driven state machine), gen_event 
(which implements a publish-subscribe mechanism) and the supervisor model 
(which is used to implement supervision trees). These behaviours were found to 
provide a useful foundation for the development of the architectural elements 
required to implement the case study’s holonic architecture. However, the 
implementation of the case study’s holonic architecture required more 
development effort since it was necessary to develop the service directory, as well 
as base behaviours for the contract net protocol. In contrast, when considering 
the implementation of standby redundancy, there are several features than can 
be combined with relative ease. The standby redundancy implementation still 
requires development effort to ensure that each failure case is handled as 
intended, particularly when state synchronisation is used to achieve warm standby 
redundancy. 
7.8.3.3. Documentation 
The effectiveness of a software platform’s documentation is of critical importance 
since it is the primary source of knowledge and understanding for developers. 
Documentation that is unclear or outdated can contribute to substantial 
development delays. 
The official JADE documentation includes an API and tutorials, as well as 
programming and administration guides. The book by Bellifemine et al. (2007) was 
found to be the most complete information source for the JADE system, especially 
for more advanced features such as platform events and the Main Container 
Replication Service. During the development of the JADE standby redundancy 
implementation it was found that there is a lack of documentation about the 
functioning and usage of JADE’s ARS. 
Erlang and OTP have an abundance of documentation. The official Erlang/OTP 
documentation contains the typical API documentation and several development 
guides – included in which are tutorials for various Erlang and OTP features. A 
standout among these guides is the OTP design principles guide, which provides a 
highly detailed description of the functioning and use of OTP’s primary 
functionalities. 
A key aspect of Erlang/OTP’s documentation that is lacking for JADE is the 
existence of third-party reference sources. Due to Erlang/OTP’s large and active 
community of users there are several books, guides, tutorials and blogs that have 
been developed by Erlang/OTP users, many of whom are not directly associated 
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with the development of Erlang and OTP. The fundamental advantages of this 
variety of sources are two-fold: firstly, different perspectives help to prevent 
misinterpretation and, secondly, they reflect the practical experiences of users 
from real-world production usage of Erlang and OTP. 
7.8.4. Configurability 
Configurability is the degree to which each implementation allows its standby-
redundant behaviour or performance to be configured or customised to suit the 
specific application. There are two key configuration aspects for the standby-
redundant systems: execution location and changeover time.  
In terms of execution location configurability, both systems allow for the 
specification of which nodes each standby-redundant holon is permitted to 
execute upon. However, the Erlang/OTP implementation takes this configuration 
a step further by allowing node priorities to be specified (Ericsson AB, 2018 (b): 
338). This is highly beneficial as it allows preference to be given to more powerful 
or reliable hardware. Additionally, it can be used to avoid the scenario where all 
the redundant holons end up executing on, and overburdening, a single device 
when others are still available. A similar functionality is not possible for the JADE 
implementation since JADE’s ARS does not allow for control/influence of the 
selected master replica.  
In terms of changeover time configurability, both systems allow the changeover 
time to be tuned to suit an application’s needs. Changeover time is determined by 
the fault detection time, the primary selection time and the application start-up 
time. The failure detection time of the JADE implementation is configured using 
the UDPNMS’s three configuration parameters: ping_delay which specifies the 
rate at which containers send heartbeat messages; ping_delay_limit which 
specifies the timeout after which a container is considered unreachable; and 
unreachable_limit after which an unreachable container is considered to 
have failed. The failure detection time of the Erlang/OTP implementation is 
configured using a single parameter namely the net_ticktime, which 
specifies the timeout after which an unresponsive node is considered to have 
failed.  
The JADE implementation allows the fault detection time configuration 
parameters to be specified with millisecond resolution. Unfortunately, although 
the configuration parameters appear to influence the node failure detection time 
(Hawkridge et al., 2018 (e)), there is no defined relationship between the 
configuration parameters and the actual fault detection time. This is evident in the 
changeover time measurements in section 7.7.1. As a result, achieving the desired 
changeover time is an iterative procedure for JADE-based standby redundancy and 
could take a substantial amount of time to perform. 
Erlang/OTP’s net_ticktime parameter is only specified with second 
resolution. The limited resolution for Erlang/OTP was not an issue in the case study 
implementation since sub-second changeover times were not achievable over the 
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100 Mb/s network infrastructure that was used. However, in higher speed 
networks Erlang/OTP’s shortcoming in this regard could be a limiting factor. 
Erlang/OTP’s node failure detection time is bounded by net_ticktime ± 25% 
(Ericsson AB, 2017: 7). This predictability greatly simplifies achieving the desired 
changeover time.  
7.9. Comparison 
This section discusses the findings of the quantitative and qualitative evaluations 
of the Erlang/OTP and JADE implementations presented in sections 7.7 and 7.8.  
In terms of standby-redundant performance, the Erlang/OTP implementation 
provides a significantly better changeover time for all the considered test cases. 
Overall, the Erlang/OTP implementation uses less computational resources than 
the JADE implementation. This is due, in part, to the fact that the JADE 
implementation of standby redundancy has a higher computational overhead, 
particularly in terms of CPU usage. That is not to say that the computational 
overhead for the Erlang/OTP implementation is negligible; the evaluation shows 
that, for both implementations, the addition of standby redundancy requires 
significantly more computational resources compared to a non-redundant 
implementation. The Erlang/OTP implementation also has the advantage in terms 
of state synchronisation overhead, spending 33% less time blocking in total and 
having significantly shorter individual state synchronisation blocking times.  
As far as fault handling is concerned, the inclusion of a failure reason in 
Erlang/OTP’s monitoring mechanism offers enhanced flexibility. However, both 
implementations lack a graceful mechanism for nodes to be re-integrated after 
having been isolated by network faults. Both software platforms provide a firm 
foundation for the implementation of distributed control and facilitate use in 
heterogeneous environments through their portability. Both systems simplify the 
development of distributed applications by allowing them to be tested locally on 
a single device. Both software platforms claim to offer scalability. It is suspected 
that the Erlang/OTP implementation will scale well due to the renowned scalability 
of several Erlang/OTP-based commercial applications and the amount of research 
that has gone into improving Erlang’s scalability. However, the scalability of both 
standby redundancy implementations could not be verified without further (large 
scale) testing. 
The development of holonic systems in JADE is simplified by the wealth of 
communication and protocol infrastructure associated with its FIPA compliance. 
Many of the required message structures and protocol implementations must be 
developed from scratch for Erlang/OTP-based systems. Debugging the internal 
behaviour of holons was found to be easier in Erlang/OTP due to the ease with 
which a process’s internal state can be examined using the Observer application. 
On the other hand, debugging inter-holon communication was found to be easier 
and more user friendly in JADE thanks to the graphical representation provided by 
JADE’s Sniffer. Erlang/OTP’s documentation was found to be superior to JADE’s. 
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This is particularly evident when considering the shortage of documentation on 
the ARS, a key component of the JADE standby redundancy implementation. 
In terms of configurability, the Erlang/OTP implementation allows for more 
control over the execution location of standby-redundant holons, while the JADE 
implementation provides a greater level of control over the behaviour of the fault 
detection mechanism since it provides more configuration parameters. The 
limited resolution of Erlang/OTP’s net_ticktime parameter is problematic and 
could hinder its ability to fully utilise high bandwidth network infrastructure. 
However, JADE’s lack of a predictable and defined relationship between the 
configuration parameters and the achieved failure detection time is a major 
deficiency. 
7.10. Conclusion 
The paper presents a comparison between two software platforms, Erlang/OTP 
and JADE, for the implementation of standby redundancy in a holonic 
manufacturing cell controller. The holonic architecture and standby redundancy 
implementations are described, along with the case study system considered in 
this paper. A set of quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria are developed 
and described. These criteria were applied to each of the two implementations 
using two experimental scenarios: one for normal production, and one where 
failure is induced and standby-redundant holons perform changeover. 
The comparison shows that the Erlang/OTP implementation performs better than 
the JADE implementation for all the standby-redundant metrics: it achieves 
shorter changeover times, lower computation requirements overall, less 
computational and state synchronisation overhead and greater fault handling 
flexibility. However, Erlang/OTP lacks the same level of supporting communication 
and protocol infrastructure that is available in JADE due to JADE's strong heritage 
within multi-agent systems. The documentation available for Erlang/OTP is 
superior to that of JADE, especially with respect to the features used to achieve 
standby redundancy. The configurability of both implementations is less than 
ideal, but the lack a predictable and defined relationship between JADE’s 
configuration parameters and the achieved failure detection time is a major 
deficiency. 
In conclusion, fault tolerance is a foundational design objective for the Erlang/OTP 
platform and as such the features used to achieve standby redundancy are core to 
the both Erlang and OTP. On the other hand, JADE endeavours to provide seamless 
communication in large-scale, distributed peer-to-peer agent networks and 
therefore the features used to achieve standby redundancy in JADE are essentially 
add-ons. Erlang/OTP’s focus on fault-tolerance is evident in the superior standby-
redundant performance achieved by the Erlang/OTP implementation and the 
degree to which it facilitates the implementation of such functionality. It is 
therefore concluded that Erlang/OTP provides a better platform for the 
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implementation of standby redundancy for the case study system considered in 
this paper. 
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8. Conclusions 
Future manufacturing systems as envisioned by Industry 4.0 and the Industrial 
Internet of Things are becoming increasingly complex. The reliability or availability 
of these complex systems is a concern. Holonic systems show great promise for 
managing this complexity, but they may contain holons that represent single 
points of failure. The availability of these holons can be improved through standby 
redundancy. 
This dissertation evaluates the hypothesis that Erlang/OTP is an effective platform 
for implementing standby-redundant control in a distributed holonic 
manufacturing cell. This hypothesis is investigated by first assessing the 
effectiveness of Erlang/OTP for implementing standby redundancy at a device 
level in a monolithic station controller. The implementation approach is then 
expanded to the implementation of standby redundancy in a distributed holonic 
cell controller. The Erlang/OTP standby redundancy approaches are evaluated 
through case study implementations in the context of a singulation and feeder cell 
in an assembly line. 
The Erlang/OTP implementation of standby redundancy for a monolithic station 
controller is presented. This implementation is representative of standby 
redundancy for a resource holon in a holonic cell. The implementation is 
benchmarked against the standby-redundant metrics claimed by Siemens 
Software Redundancy solution for S7 class PLCs. The Erlang/OTP implementation 
can handle the same failure modes as the Siemens solution and achieves a similar 
changeover time. This evaluation shows that using Erlang and OTP is a valid 
approach for implementing standby controller redundancy at a software level for 
embedded systems which do not provide such mechanisms at a hardware level. 
This dissertation evaluates the redundancy requirements of a PROSA-based 
holonic cell controller architecture and presents an Erlang/OTP implementation of 
standby redundancy for the presented architecture. The Erlang/OTP 
implementation is evaluated through a case study comparison with a JADE 
implementation of the same architecture. JADE is in many respects the de facto 
standard for holonic control implementations in academic research. An approach 
for achieving standby redundancy using JADE’s standard features is presented. 
The evaluation is performed using a set of quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
criteria and shows that the Erlang/OTP implementation performs better than the 
JADE implementation for all the standby-redundant metrics: it achieves shorter 
changeover times, lower computational requirements overall, less computational 
and state synchronisation overhead, and greater fault handling flexibility. 
Erlang/OTP lacks the same level of supporting communication and protocol 
infrastructure that exists in JADE due to JADE’s strong heritage within multi-agent 
systems. This comparison shows that Erlang/OTP provides a better platform for 
the implementation of standby redundancy for the considered case study system.  
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Kruger’s (2018) comparison between Erlang and JADE for RMS implementation 
found that Erlang has an inherent suitability for holonic control and offers 
enhanced modularity and fault tolerance. Kruger’s fault tolerance evaluation uses 
qualitative arguments based on the software platforms’ claimed features. This 
dissertation augments these arguments by showing Erlang/OTP’s superior 
performance when using these features to achieve fault tolerance through the 
implementation of standby redundancy for a case study holonic system. 
It is concluded that Erlang/OTP provides an effective platform for the 
implementation of standby-redundancy in a distributed holonic manufacturing 
cell. However, some challenges were identified with the Erlang/OTP approaches 
and implementations that require further investigation and development: 
• Erlang/OTP’s failover and takeover mechanisms for distributed 
applications do not handle node reintegration after isolation by network 
faults (the mechanisms used for the JADE implementation are not able to 
handle this case either). As a result, developers are required to make 
provisions for this shortcoming. The modification of this mechanism, or the 
creation of a new mechanism, to better handle recovery from this failure 
scenario would greatly simplify standby redundancy implementations.  
• Erlang lacks an effective, easy-to-use tool for validating and debugging 
inter-holon communication. The existence of a graphical tool like JADE’s 
Sniffer would be useful in this regard. 
• One of JADE’s strengths is its wealth of communication and protocol 
infrastructure. The development of such infrastructure in Erlang/OTP, and 
possibly the development of an Erlang/OTP-based FIPA compliant MAS 
platform, would be of great benefit to Erlang/OTP standby redundancy 
implementations. 
If these issues are rectified, it would further improve Erlang/OTP’s advantages for 
implementing standby redundancy in distributed holonic cell controllers. 
Furthermore, there is potential for future research into the use of Erlang/OTP for 
standby redundancy in holonic control architectures. The following topics have 
been identified for future work: 
• Further refinement of the approaches and architectures presented in this 
dissertation through application to other manufacturing scenarios could 
provide a more complete view of Erlang/OTP’s advantages. 
• Further testing of the Erlang/OTP standby redundancy for large scale 
systems would enhance the scalability arguments of this dissertation. 
Additionally, an investigation into the implementation of a large-scale 
holarchy using SD Erlang may prove interesting due to similarities between 
SD Erlang’s distribution approach and the holonic paradigm.  
• Extension of the PROSA-based architecture considered in this dissertation 
for use with the ARTI reference architecture may open the approaches 
developed here to application in holonic systems outside of 
manufacturing. 
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• This dissertation specifically focusses on standby redundancy. However, it 
was found that replication is better suited to holons that are not instance 
specific, such as product holons. Erlang/OTP does not currently contain a 
feature for the creation and management of replicated applications. The 
existence of such a feature would assist in providing a complete 
redundancy solution using Erlang/OTP. 
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Appendix A:  
Redundancy in Erlang/OTP Lab Report 
G Hawkridge, AH Basson, K Kruger 
Department of Mechanical and Mechatronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University 
A.1. Introduction 
The objective of this report is to provide detailed information about specific 
aspects of the Erlang/OTP based standby redundancy approach developed by the 
authors. This report will also describe some best practices and potential pitfalls. 
This report assumes that the reader is familiar with the authors’ work and with 
Erlang/OTP and its associated terminology.   
A.2. Erlang Boot Scripts 
Documentation: 
http://erlang.org/doc/system_principles/system_principles.html 
http://erlang.org/doc/man/systools.html 
http://erlang.org/doc/man/rel.html 
http://erlang.org/doc/man/erl.html 
A boot script is used to provide instructions for the initialisation procedure of a 
BEAM instance so that all the necessary code is loaded, and all the required 
applications are started in the correct order. Boot scripts can be written by hand, 
but it is easier to generate them using the systools module. To use systools 
a release resource file (.rel file) must be created. This file specifies every 
application that is to be included and started as part of the boot procedure. For a 
release resource file “filename.rel”; a boot script is created using 
systools:make_script(“filename”). An advantage of using 
systools (apart from the time it saves) is that it automatically determines the 
correct order in which the applications must be started to satisfy the dependency 
relationships listed in the applications field of the .app files.  
There are two forms of a boot script; the human readable form which has the 
.script extension and the binary form with the .boot extension which BEAM 
requires. The make_script function generates both forms of the boot script. (If 
a hand-crafted boot script is used, it can be converted to a binary boot script using 
systools:script2boot(File)) 
To start a BEAM instance using a boot script the -boot command line flag is used. 
For a start script called “start.boot” the usage would be: 
erl -boot start 
A.3. The Heart Mechanism 
Documentation:  
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http://erlang.org/doc/man/heart.html 
The heart mechanism creates a separate OS process that monitors an instance of 
BEAM and executes a specified OS command if the BEAM instance terminates or 
stops emitting heartbeat signals. The executed command is set in the 
HEART_COMMAND OS environment variable prior to initialisation of the heart 
process. This functionality can be used to restart a node (BEAM instance) when it 
terminates. (If a deliberate shutdown is required then the heart process must first 
be terminated). The heart mechanism is activated by adding the -heart 
command line flag when starting a BEAM instance with erl (Code Example 1: Line 
11). The heart process terminates after it executes HEART_COMMAND so the -
heart flag must be included in HEART_COMMAND so that the heart process is 
restarted as well, otherwise the node will only be restarted the first time. 
A heart restart can be detected by setting an application configuration parameter 
in the command line flags of the HEART_COMMAND which restarts the node using 
to the syntax -Application Parameter Value. The application can then 
check the value of the specified parameter to detect if the BEAM instance has been 
(re)started by the heart mechanism and possibly log a warning to some higher-
level controller. Code Example 1 (Line 9) show an example which sets the 
heart_restart parameter to true for the tb_sm application. 
01. #Identify current controller 
02. TB_DIR= … 
03. #Initialise Parameter Values 
04. ERL_PATH=”$TB_DIR/ebin $TB_DIR/*/ebin/ 
$TB_DIR/*/*/ebin” 
05. CONFIG_FILE=”$TB_DIR/sys.config” 
06. NODE_NAME=”tb@$(hostname -f)” 
07. BOOT_FILE=”$TB_DIR/tumbling_barrel-1.0” 
08. #Heart command to run when BEAM goes down 
09. export HEART_COMMAND="erl -pa $ERL_PATH -config 
$CONFIG_FILE -name $NODE_NAME -detached -tb_sm 
heart_restart true -heart -boot $BOOT_FILE” 
10. #Start BEAM with heart mechanism activated 
11. erl -pa $ERL_PATH -config $CONFIG_FILE -name 
$NODE_NAME -detached -heart -boot $BOOT_FILE 
Code Example 1: Bash (Linux) Shell Script that Initialises the Heart Mechanism 
A.4. Distributed Applications 
Documentation:  
http://erlang.org/doc/man/app.html 
http://erlang.org/doc/apps/kernel/application.html 
http://erlang.org/doc/design_principles/applications.html 
http://erlang.org/doc/design_principles/distributed_applications.html 
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A.4.1. Standard Applications 
An application is a group of related modules. Each application has an application 
resource file (or .app file). (Typically stored as <Application 
Name>.app.src in the src directory and copied to a .app file in the ebin 
directory during compilation).  Shown below in Code Example 2 is an example 
.app file with the parameters relevant to this report. 
01. {application, Application, 
02.   [{vsn, Vsn}, 
03.    {description, Description}, 
04.    {modules, [Modules]}, 
05.    {applications, [Apps]}, 
06.    {registered, [Names]}, 
07.  % {included_applications, [InclApps]}, 
08.    {mod, {Module,StartArgs}}, 
09.    {start_phases, [{Phase,PhaseArgs}]}, 
10.    {env, [{Par,Val}]}]}. 
Code Example 2: Example Application Resource File 
Starting at the top, the Application parameter is the name of the application. 
Vsn is a string representation of the version number. Description is a short 
description of the application. Modules is a list of modules in the application. 
When the application is started, the application controller ensures that all these 
modules are loaded. Apps is a list of applications that this application depends on 
and must be started before it (used by systools to generate boot scripts, see 
Section A.2). Names is a list of registered names used by the applications (used by 
systools to detect name clashes between apps). 
There are two types of applications: library applications and supervision tree 
applications. A library application does not have a mod parameter in its .app file. 
Library applications are used to ensure that the contained modules are loaded 
(usually library apps are dependencies listed in the application parameter field of 
one or more supervision tree applications). A supervision tree application starts a 
supervision tree of Erlang processes. The mod parameter specifies the callback 
module (Module) that contains the initialisation code for the supervision tree and 
any start arguments (StartArgs). The start_phases parameter is discussed 
in detail below. The env field can contain a list of key-value parameters. Code 
Example 3 shows the .app file of the order holon host application. 
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01.   {application, order_holon, 
02.    [{vsn, "1.0"}, 
03.     {description,"Generic Order Holon"}, 
04.     {modules, 
[order_holon,oh_node_sup,oh_instance_sup, 
oh_responder,oh_am,execution_order_holon, 
oh_gateway]}, 
05.     {applications,[stdlib, 
kernel,my_log_abs,product_holon, 
mnesia,serv_dir]}, 
06.     {registered, []}, 
07.     {mod, 
{application_starter,[oh_node_app,[]]}}, 
08.     {start_phases, []}, 
09.     {env,[]}]}. 
Code Example 3: App File for Order Holon Host Application 
A.4.2. Enabling the Failover and Takeover Mechanism 
To enable the OTP’s failover and takeover mechanism, an application must be 
configured as a distributed application. This is achieved by adding arguments for 
the kernel application in a config file. 
01.  [{kernel, 
02.    [{distributed, [ 
03.      {ApplicationName,[NodeList]}, 
04.       … 
05.      ]}, 
06.     {sync_nodes_mandatory,[MandatoryNodeList]}, 
07.     {sync_nodes_optional,[OptionalNodeList]}, 
08.     {sync_nodes_timeout, SyncTime}, 
09.     {net_ticktime,NetTickTime}]}]. 
Code Example 4: Config File Format for Distributed Application 
Code Example 4 shows a template of the kernel application arguments for 
distributed applications. ApplicationName is the name of the application 
which is to be distributed and NodeList is the list of nodes on which it is 
permitted to run. The MandatoryNodeList is a list of nodes that must be 
reachable at boot time for the node to start successfully. The 
OptionalNodeList is a list of nodes that the node will wait to be reachable 
before starting. SyncTime is how long the node waits for the mandatory and 
optional nodes. NetTickTime is not directly part of the distributed application 
spec, but it does affect how quickly node failures are detected. 
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(Note A: For a failed node to be reintegrated into an already running node cluster, 
the application needs to be started as part of the boot procedure of the node. It 
was found that using a boot script, described below, was an effective means of 
doing this) 
(Note B: While it is not necessary to include mandatory or optional nodes, it was 
found that including all the systems nodes in one of these two categories greatly 
improved the reliability of an added node finding and syncing with existing nodes.) 
A.4.3. Enabling Failover and Takeover Application Start Types  
When an application is started, the start(StartType,StartArgs) 
function in its callback module is called. StartArgs is some Erlang term 
specified in the app file. StartType is always normal unless the application is 
distributed and configured to use start phases. If configured as such StartType 
is normal when it is initially started. If the application has been started by the 
failover mechanism (the distributed application instance on the previous node 
failed) then StartType is {failover,Node} where Node is the node on 
which the application was previously running. If the application is started by the 
takeover mechanism (manually triggered or current node is a higher priority that 
previous node) then StartType is {takeover,Node} where Node is the 
node from which application execution is being taken over. 
To activate start phases the mod app file parameter must be configured to use the 
application_starter as follows:  
{mod, {application_starter,[Module,StartArgs]}}  
(Module and StartArgs have the same meaning as in a normal mod entry) 
The start_phases parameter in the app file must also be defined, however the 
list of start phases can be left empty as follows: 
{start_phases, []} 
A.4.4. Start Phases 
Start phases are executed after the start function of the application callback 
module has returned. Start phases can be added by listing them in the app file as 
follows: 
{start_phases, [{Phase,PhaseArgs}]} 
Phase is the phase name/identifier and PhaseArgs can be used to provide 
phase specific arguments. Each phase is executed one by one (from left to right in 
the list) by calling the start_phase(Phase, StartType, PhaseArgs) 
function in the applications callback module. Start phases can be used to perform 
some specific action after the start function has initialised the applications 
supervision tree. They are also intended to be used to synchronise included 
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applications. (Included applications are applications that are started under this 
applications supervision tree instead of being started separately by the application 
controller. Since an application can only be included by one other application and 
there can therefore only be one instance of the included application on a node, 
the included application functionality has not been used in this research). 
(Note: During takeover, the instance of the application on the “old” node only 
terminates after all the start phases have completed on the new node.) 
A.4.5. Failover/Takeover Issues 
The failover/takeover mechanism is not able to reintegrate nodes that are 
separated due to network faults. This issue has been discussed in the research and 
a workaround has been proposed. 
Another potential issue that must be considered is that the failover/takeover 
mechanism is susceptible to software errors in code that is executed by the 
application controller when starting a distributed application. This includes the call 
to the start function in the application callback, the initialisation of the 
supervision tree (a delayed initialisation can mitigate this) and start phase calls. If 
an error occurs during this critical phase, then the application does not start 
successfully on the node and the failover mechanism stops operating. It is 
important to note that this critical phase of application starting occurs when the 
application is initially started and every time it is started on a node due to failover 
or takeover. It is recommended that distributed application start up code be 
thoroughly tested and that as much initialisation as possible be deferred until after 
the supervision tree has been created.  
A.5. gen_statem Implementation Details  
State machines were found to be an appropriate method for implementing 
redundant control as they allowed the state of control execution to be easily 
summarised and facilitated re-entry at the required point of execution. This 
section provides some details about the functioning of OTP’s gen_statem 
behaviour that are necessary when using it to develop standby-
redundant/complex systems. 
A.5.1. Event Ordering 
The gen_statem behaviour can be considered to have two event queues; an 
internal event queue and an external event queue. The external event queue is 
the message queue of the process which executes the state machine. The message 
queue uses a FIFO policy, so all received messages are handled in the order that 
they are received. The state machine takes its next event from the external event 
queue only once the internal event queue is empty. The internal event queue 
stores events that are generated by the state machine behaviour when processing 
the results of a handled event.  
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The gen_statem behaviour classifies four types of event; external events, 
timeout events, postponed events and inserted events. The way events are 
inserted into the event queues is summarised in Figure 53. External events are 
events that originate outside the state machine (received as messages). The 
gen_statem behaviour currently provides three different internally managed 
timeouts; state timeouts, event timeouts and generic timeouts. If a timeout of 
length 0 is specified in an event handler result, it is immediately added to the end 
of the internal event queue. Non-zero timeouts are registered with the timer 
process and received as messages in the external event queue when they expire. 
 
Figure 53: Event Insertion into gen_statem Event Queues 
Postponed events are events for which the transition action in the event handler 
result was set to postpone. Postponed events are initially added to a separate 
queue and then reinserted into the internal event queue when the state changes. 
Inserted events are generated by adding an expression of the form 
{next_event, EventType, EventContent} to the list of state 
transition actions. Inserted events are added to the head of the internal event 
queue. 
A.5.2. Event Queue Extraction/ Replication 
When adding standby redundancy to a state machine, it is desirable to replicate 
both the state/data of the state machine and the contents of the event queue(s) 
(so that unprocessed events are not lost). For a gen_statem based state 
machine, the external event queue is easily extracted using the function call 
erlang:process_info(self(),messages) to obtain the contents of 
the process’s message queue. Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain the 
contents of the internal event queue. It was therefore necessary to avoid using 
events which would be placed on the internal event queue (where possible). This 
was done by using external timers instead of internally managed timers, by 
disallowing inserted events and by mirroring postponed events in the state data. 
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A.5.3. Compound State Machine 
When developing a complex gen_statem state machine, the resulting code in 
the callback module can become rather large. It would be desirable to separate 
this code into logical sections. This is particularly relevant for scenarios where 
execution can be divided into consecutive portions, as was the case for the 
interaction between order and resource holons in this research (First a contract 
net-based bidding phase followed by execution related messaging once a contract 
is established). It is possible to turn one state machine into another one using 
gen_statem:enter_loop(…) however care must be taken as events in the 
first state machine’s internal event queue are not carried over. It is expected that 
more effective compound state machine functionality could be achieved using 
callback module layering as described in Hawkridge et al. (2018 (d)) to insert a 
faciliatory module between the gen_statem behaviour and the state machine 
implementing callback modules, however this was not further investigated. 
A.6. Records vs Maps 
Documentation: 
http://erlang.org/doc/reference_manual/records.html 
http://erlang.org/documentation/doc-6.0/doc/reference_manual/maps.html 
A.6.1. Background 
Erlang and OTP have many mechanisms for storing structured data. Records and 
Maps are two of the most commonly used mechanisms. The advantage that these 
two mechanisms offer over other mechanisms, such as dicts, sets and 
gb_trees, is that their contents can be pattern matched in function heads. 
Pattern matching is a core feature in Erlang. In pattern matching the input 
expression is compared to a pattern, and if the two are equivalent then the match 
succeeds. This is often done in function heads to test arguments and select the 
appropriate function body, as opposed to in an if statement for imperative 
languages. Being able to perform pattern matching in the function head can lead 
to clearer and more concise code. (Section 5.3.2.4 provides a more detailed 
description along with some usage examples) 
A.6.1.1. Records 
A record is a data structures which stores a fixed number of elements in named 
fields. Code Example 5 shows the definition and usage of a record with three fields 
in lines 2 and 4. Records are built on top of Erlangs tuple data type as shown in line 
8. During compilation record expressions are converted to tuple expressions. For 
example: line 6 which extracts the value stored in field1 and stores it in Var 
would be converted to Var = element(2, RecordVar) which extracts the 
2nd element in the record tuple. 
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01. %Definition: 
02.  -record(record_name,[field1,field2,field3]). 
03.  %Usage: 
04.  RecordVar= 
#record_name{field1=Value1,field2=Value2,field3=V
alue3}. 
05.  %Pattern Matching: 
06.  #record_name(field1=Var)=RecordVar. 
07.  %Tuple form: 
08.  {record_name,Value1,Value2,Value3} 
Code Example 5: Erlang Records 
A.6.1.2. Maps 
A map is a key-value data structure comparable to a hash map (Large maps are 
implemented as hash maps). Maps are dynamic, i.e. the number of stored entries 
can vary during execution. Code Example 6 shows an overview of the definition 
and usage of maps.  
01. %Definition and Usage: 
02.  MapVar = 
#{key1=>Value1,key2=>Value2,key3=>Value3}. 
03.  %Pattern Matching: 
04.  #{key1:=Var} = MapVar. 
05.  %or Direct Access: 
06.  Var = maps:get(key1,MapVar). 
Code Example 6: Erlang Maps 
(Note A: When maps are pattern matched, the key must be bound (i.e. not a 
variable). The following is not currently valid in a function head: 
f(A,#{A:=Var})->… however this is valid: f(A,M)-> #{A:=Var}=M, …) 
(Note B: Erlang’s Maps implementation is still under development [see the 
proposal at http://erlang.org/eeps/eep-0043.html]. It is likely that the 
functionality they provide will improve with future releases) 
A.6.2. Evaluation 
During this research, three main considerations were identified when deciding 
whether to implement data structures as records or maps. These considerations 
are: ease of inter module use, ease of definition modification and ease of 
debugging. 
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A.6.2.1. Ease of Inter Module Usage 
For records, the header file containing the record definition must be included in 
all modules that require access to contents of record instances. This is not required 
for maps; all modules need only reference the key corresponding to the data they 
want to extract. 
A.6.2.2. Ease of Definition Modification 
When a records field names are refactored, then compile time errors will occur for 
code that references the previous (un-refactored) field names. Furthermore, if 
additional fields are added to the record, then all code that references that record 
definition must be recompiled. This is because the underlying tuple 
implementation of records means that code which is not recompiled may be 
referring to the previous tuple index of a field instead of its new index and could 
result in unexpected behaviour or runtime errors.  
For maps, key-value pairs can easily be added or refactored. However, code that 
contains references to previous (un-refactored) keys will not be evident at compile 
time and may result in unexpected behaviour or runtime errors.  
A.6.2.3. Ease of Debugging  
When records are printed to logs or in debugging tools, the record fields are not 
shown, only the underlying tuple is shown which contains the field contents 
separated by commas. This can make debugging large and nested records 
exceptionally difficult. In contrast, printed maps are more conducive to debugging 
large data structures as they show the key-value mappings. 
A.6.3. Conclusions 
For this research, records were primarily used to store data. Since the code 
developed as part of this research is experimental, the data structures were 
frequently adapted and improved. Therefore, the use of records to avoid 
accidental runtime errors outweighed the extra effort required for inter module 
use and the difficulty that their use adds to debugging. It should be noted that 
established code, such as OTP’s supervisor module, have started migrating to 
maps for data structures that cross the module boundaries (At the time of writing, 
the supervisor module still uses records for internal data structures). 
A.7. Handling Controller I/O 
A.7.1. GPIO and Interrupts 
The Erlang/ALE library (https://github.com/esl/erlang_ale) was used to access the 
GPIO of the two microcontrollers used in this research. This library provides GPIO 
access and control through Linux’s sysfs file system. GPIO simulation was 
achieved by developing an interface module that mirrors the API of Erlang/ALE. If 
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the simulation compile flag is set, then it redirects calls to a simulation module, 
otherwise they are forwarded to the Erlang/ALE library. 
A.7.2. Timing and Pulse Generation 
To control one of the singulation units, which was used in this research’s case 
study setup(s), it was necessary to generate a pulse train to control a stepper 
motor driver board. This was initially attempted from within Erlang using the 
receive - after approach to generate the required delays between pulses. 
However, it was determined that this could not provide a reliable pulse train above 
50 Hz. It was therefore necessary to program the pulse generation in C and link it 
to the system using Erlang’s port mechanism. 
A.7.3. IP Socket I/O 
Erlang provides the gen_tcp and gen_udp modules to handle TCP and UDP 
communication respectively. Both TCP and UDP sockets (referred to as sockets 
hereafter) can either be set to active mode or passive mode. In passive mode, the 
socket is read by calling the recv function. In active mode, received socket 
messages are automatically converted to Erlang messages and sent to the Erlang 
process which controls that socket (Usually the process that created the socket, 
but can be changed). Active mode is generally preferred as it is considered easier 
to work with since socket messages become normal Erlang messages. However, 
passive mode is preferred in high load scenarios as it can prevent the controlling 
process’s message queue from being overloaded. 
When using socket communication in a standby-redundant state machine as part 
of this research, two approaches were investigated; the standalone approach and 
the integrated approach. For the integrated approach, the socket communication 
(in active mode) is integrated into the state machine (which is the controlling 
process for the socket). For the standalone approach, the socket communication 
is managed by a separate gen_server process which parses received socket 
messages and generates the relevant state machine events. 
The advantage of the integrated approach is that all socket messages are placed 
in the event queue of the state machine and therefore replicated whenever a 
checkpoint is made. This means that it is less likely that a socket-message-based 
event will be lost during failover. An advantage of the standalone approach is that 
it has the option of both active and passive mode. Furthermore, separating the 
state machine from the socket message encoding and decoding operations 
isolates the state machine from errors that may occur there. For this research, the 
standalone approach was found to be easier to implement and debug than the 
integrated approach. 
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